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This dissertation examines the influence of leaders’ incentives on civil conflict 
termination and outcome.  Building upon principal-agent framework and insights 
from credible commitment theories of civil war, I argue that culpable leaders – those 
viewed as responsible for the war by their constituencies and opponents – are more 
likely to be punished following poor war performance than non-culpable leaders, who 
can more easily avoid responsibility for the war.  As a result, culpable leaders will 
have incentives to ‘gamble for resurrection’, extending a losing war in the hope of 
turning the tide, achieving victory, and avoiding punishment.  The culpable leader’s 
incentive to gamble for resurrection thus influences the dynamics of war termination, 
making wars less likely to end when culpable leaders are in power.  Culpability is 
also hypothesized to increase the likelihood of extreme war outcomes – total defeat or 
major victory – and to decrease the likelihood that the leader makes concessions to 
end the war.  These propositions are tested using both quantitative and qualitative 
  
evidence.  First, using an original dataset of rebel and state leaders of a global random 
sample of civil wars between 1980 and 2010, I test the influence of leader culpability 
on civil war termination and outcome.  The results provide strong support for my 
theoretical expectations; culpability decreases the likelihood of conflict termination 
and concessions, while increasing the likelihood of extreme war outcomes.  
Additionally, I test the mechanism underlying the theoretical argument using 
quantitative and qualitative evidence.  Original data on each leader’s culpability, war 
performance, and post-tenure fate demonstrate that culpable leaders are, in fact, more 
likely to be punished following poor war performance than their non-culpable 
counterparts.  Within-case comparative analysis of settlement attempts during the 
civil war in Angola provides additional support for the theoretical argument, 
demonstrating that leader vulnerability to punishment played a critical role in 
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Chapter 1 : Introduction 
 
I. Central Question 
All civil wars eventually end.  When and how they end, however, varies 
greatly across conflicts.  Some end quickly, within days or months of their initiation. 
The 1946 Kurdish rebellion in Iran, for example, ended within 7 months, while 
Hezbollah’s war with Israel in 2006 lasted only 30 days.  Some conflicts, on the other 
hand, drag on for years or even decades.  The civil wars in Colombia and the 
Philippines, for example, both began in the 1960s and are still ongoing today. 
Civil conflict outcomes also vary significantly from case to case, ranging from 
comprehensive negotiated settlement to total military victory to truce or ceasefire.  
State and rebel forces in Burundi, for example, signed a series of peace agreements 
between 2000 and 2008, ending their decades-long civil war through mutual 
concessions and extensive military and political power-sharing.  Conflicts in Sri 
Lanka and Rwanda, on the other hand, ended through decisive military outcomes 
rather than negotiated settlement.  In Sri Lanka’s fight against the LTTE, government 
forces achieved a military victory in May 2009 after more than 25 years of conflict, 
while the FPR’s fight against the Rwandan government ended in victory for the 
rebels, who overran the country as government forces fled.  Finally, many conflicts 
end indecisively, through ceasefires, unofficial truces, or a gradual decline in armed 




MQM, for example, tapered off when the rebel organization decided to pursue a 
political strategy.    
More generally speaking, both civil conflict termination and outcome exhibit 
significant variation.  In the dataset used for analysis in this project, civil wars range 
in duration from a minimum of one year to a maximum of 48 years, with an average 
of 8.65 years.  Conflict outcomes are similarly varied: 43 percent end through formal 
peace agreement or a formalized ceasefire, approximately 20 percent through victory 
for one side or the other, and 37 percent through other means, such as low activity.  
This observed variation in war termination and outcome raises two important 
questions.  First, what explains when conflicts end?  Why do some end quickly, while 
others drag on for years or even decades?  Second, why do some combatant groups 
agree to compromise outcomes while others fight to a military end?  Stated more 
generally, what explains variation in the termination and outcome of civil war?  
Answering these questions constitutes the central aim of this dissertation. 
 
II. The Importance of Studying Civil Conflict Termination and Outcome 
Developing clear, accurate explanations for how and when civil wars end is 
important.  The prevalence of interstate war has declined over the past half century, 
leaving civil conflict as the most common form of organized violence in the 
international system.  Not only is civil war common, but it is deadly.  As global battle 
death trends presented in Figure 1.1 demonstrate, civil wars have consistently caused 










Furthermore, the costs of civil conflict extend well beyond the battlefield.  
The social, economic, and political consequences of civil war are wide-ranging and 
often severe.  Noncombatant populations, in particular, often bear the brunt of these 
consequences, suffering from direct targeting, forced migration, and the destruction 
of social, economic, and health infrastructure and services.  Collier et al (2003), in 
fact, argue that by the 1990s, 90 percent of war victims were civilian.  Additionally, 
the UN estimates that over 43 million people worldwide are currently suffering from 
forced displacement due to conflict or major human rights violations, including 15 
million refugees, who have fled across borders to escape conflict, and 27 million 




(“Global Issues at the United Nations” 2013).  Civil conflict also negatively impacts a 
variety of health outcomes, including HIV/AIDS transmission, infant mortality, life 
expectancy, fertility rates, and vaccination rates, depressing both immediate and 
longer-term health outcomes for civilian populations (Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett 
2003; Hoddie and Smith 2009; Iqbal 2010). 
In addition to these human costs of civil war, the economic consequences of 
internal conflict are often severe.  Sometimes referred to as ‘development in reverse’, 
civil war not only destroys infrastructure necessary for economic production, but it 
also qualitatively changes the composition of a country’s economy, reducing 
investment and increasing subsistence-based economic activity (Collier et al. 2003).  
The overall impact of civil war, therefore, is to deflate economic growth, reduce per 
capita income, shrink food production, and decrease export growth, while increasing 
external debt as a percentage of GDP (Collier 1999; Collier et al. 2003; Stewart, 
Huang, and Wang 2001).  Perhaps equally troubling, the economic consequences of 
civil war often extend beyond the borders of the warring country.  Internal conflict 
displays economic spillover effects, reducing economic growth in neighboring states, 
particularly in the short term (Murdoch and Sandler 2002), and reducing bilateral 
trade (Bayer and Rupert 2004).  
The regional consequences of civil war are not limited to economic issues.  
Rather, civil conflict itself is contagious, often spilling over the borders of one state 
into neighboring countries, thereby destabilizing entire regions (Gleditsch 2007; 
Sambanis 2002).  This diffusion of conflict across borders has been attributed to a 




movements, destabilization caused by the diffusion of economic and health impacts 
across borders, and upheaval due to massive refugee flows as people attempt to 
escape conflicts in their own countries (Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008; Gleditsch 2007; 
Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006).  The spread of conflict is also often purposeful, as 
neighboring states with a vested interest in the issues at stake become involved, 
thereby increasing interstate militarized activity in association with civil war 
(Gleditsch, Salehyan, and Schultz 2008). 
 Finally, of particular concern is growing evidence that civil conflict creates a 
‘conflict trap’ in which countries emerging from war often cannot consolidate peace 
(Collier et al. 2003).  Over one third (36%) of countries immersed in civil wars 
between 1945 and 1996 returned to war shortly after termination (Walter 2004).  
Emerging research suggests that despite international emphasis on peaceful resolution 
through negotiations, conflicts ending in military victory are less likely to recur than 
those ending in negotiated settlement (Mason et al. 2011; Quinn, Mason, and Gurses 
2007; Toft 2009).  Thus, understanding the determinants of conflict outcome and why 
settlement attempts are prone to collapse is a critical first step towards better 
understanding conflict recurrence and to devising policies that can offset its risks.
1
 
                                                 
1
 The international community has become increasingly involved in trying to resolve 
ongoing civil wars as their costs have become more apparent.  The UN alone has, 
since 1948, launched 67 peacekeeping missions, and is currently directing 15 
missions globally.  With a budget of over 7.3 billion dollars for the current fiscal year 
and over 92,000 personnel in the field, these efforts to resolve ongoing wars and 
prevent a return to war in post-conflict states are costly.  And this is to say nothing of 
the costs incurred by individual states involved in non-UN interventions.  The 2011 
US intervention in Libya, for example, cost the defense department alone 1.1 billion 





Given the prevalence of civil war and these myriad costs of conflict for 
civilian populations, national and global economies, regional stability, and post-
conflict peace-building, understanding how and why wars end, as a precursor to 
devising ways to facilitate rapid and stable termination of civil conflicts, should be a 
priority for scholars and policy-makers alike. Better understandings of the factors 
influencing civil war termination and outcome are needed to inform policy that more 
effectively resolves and mitigates the serious consequences of internal conflict.  
 
III. Existing Explanations 
Political scientists have developed a variety of theoretical arguments to 
explain variation in civil conflict termination and outcome.  One major vein of 
research in this field focuses on conditions that make conflicts ‘ripe for resolution’ 
(Zartman 1989) by decreasing the expected utility of war and thus encouraging 
combatants to seek negotiated settlement.  Scholars in this tradition argue that 
combatants decide whether to continue fighting in pursuit of victory or settle on 
compromise terms based upon a careful utility calculation that takes into account the 
chances of victory, the costs of war, and the relative payoffs of winning versus 
accepting a settlement.  Wars, they argue, end in settlement when the utility of 
compromise is greater than the utility of fighting (Mason and Fett 1996; Mason, 
Weingarten, and Fett 1999; Walter 2002; Wittman 1979).  In particular, combatants’ 
utility calculations are influenced by the costs of conflict and relative power.  Higher 
costs of war promote settlement by decreasing combatants’ expected payoffs for 




relatively evenly-matched military capacity promotes settlement by reducing the 
likelihood of either side achieving a military victory (D. E. Cunningham, Gleditsch, 
and Salehyan 2009; DeRouen and Sobek 2004; Gent 2008; Hegre 2004).   
More recently, many scholars have taken the bargaining model of war as their 
theoretical starting point, specifically focusing on information.
2
  This approach 
explains conflict as a result of actors having private information about their relative 
strength or resolve, and incentives to misrepresent that information.  If one or both 
sides are overly-optimistic about their prospects for victory, armed conflict may 
result.  Once fighting breaks out, battlefield performance reveals private information 
about combatants’ relative strength, allowing them to update expectations regarding 
the likely outcome of the war.  As this information is revealed, state and rebel 
combatants revise their demands and the concessions they are willing to offer, leading 
to a negotiated settlement that both sides can agree upon to end the conflict.  
 Using this information revelation theory of conflict as a jumping off point, 
scholars seek to explain why combatants in civil war often continue to fight even 
when the outcome of the war seems apparent; that is, when it is clear that neither side 
can win.  One common explanation focuses on the economic incentives for continued 
conflict.  Economic theories of civil war focus primarily on ‘lootable resources’, 
arguing that fighting can be profitable when these resources are present, and thus 
difficult to terminate due to the economic incentives to continue the conflict (Lujala 
2010; Ross 2004b).  Economic theories treat rebellion as a quasi-criminal activity 
(Collier 2000); leaders in these models care more about economic profit through war 
                                                 
2




than about often ill-defined political platforms, and behave more like criminal gangs 
than revolutionary organizations.  The critical incentive in these rebellion-as-business 
models, therefore, is the economic payoff during conflict, rather than the post-conflict 
political payoff (Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom 2004).   
As such, these theories problematize the ‘war is costly’ assumption underlying 
the bargaining model of war and earlier theories focused on the costs of conflict.  The 
implication is that when wars are profitable for those with the authority to end them 
(i.e. leaders), conflict will drag on because key actors have no incentive to stop 
fighting.  This effect can be large; Lujala (2010) finds, for example, that gemstones 
and hydrocarbons located in a conflict zone double, on average, the duration of war 
due to the incentives and opportunities they create for rebel groups.
3
 
 A second bargaining model-based explanation for why civil wars continue 
even after private information is revealed focuses on the difficulty in achieving and 
implementing negotiated settlements during civil war.  Fearon (1994b, 2004) argues 
that commitment problems represent the primary barrier to bargaining in civil war, 
influencing both the duration of conflict and the likelihood that the war will end via 
negotiated settlement.
4
  Commitment problems arise, in a domestic context, when 
state authority breaks down, leaving two political communities without a governing 
authority that can guarantee adherence to agreements made between them (Fearon 
1994b).  With no higher authority to enforce agreements, the stronger party in a civil 
                                                 
3
 As the economic approach to civil conflict has gained prominence among scholars 
and policymakers, international organizations have spearheaded efforts to reduce the 
profitability of conflict.  The United Nations has, for example, implemented sanctions 
against rebel groups using looted resources to finance their war efforts in Angola, 
Liberia, and Sierra Leone. 
4




war cannot credibly promise not to exploit its position of power once a settlement is 
in place.  Knowing this, the weaker party, fearful of exploitation, will be unwilling to 
agree to a negotiated settlement.  Thus, government and rebel forces fight on, despite 
little hope of military victory and despite the fact that bargains exist that both sides 
would prefer to continued war.  Fluctuations in combatants’ relative power ensure 
that at least one side will have incentives to renege in the future, and commitment 
problems thus prevent conflict termination (Fearon 2004).   
 Extending this logic to the settlement phase of conflict, Walter (1997, 2002) 
argues that distrust between combatants and the high risk and uncertainty associated 
with post-civil-war states critically undermine peace.  Combatants cannot make 
credible commitments to uphold the terms of settlement because the process of 
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) – essential for conflict 
termination – simultaneously provides opportunities for exploitation.  DDR renders 
former fighters unable to defend themselves should their adversary renege on a 
settlement agreement.  It thus represents a critical node in any peace process; turning 
in weapons and cantonment of troops by a former combatant group significantly 
alters the balance of power in favor of its opponent.  This relatively large and rapid 
shift in the balance of power can be easily exploited by the actor whose relative 
power has just increased in order to gain more favorable terms of settlement.  The 
incentives to renege generated by demobilization, and the resulting commitment 
problem, thus undermine the stability of settlement agreements. 
Scholars focused on the commitment problem in civil war argue that certain 




Walter (2002), for example, commitment problem can be overcome through third 
party monitoring and enforcement of agreements.  Third party verification of 
compliance with the terms for demobilization and disarmament provides combatants 
with prompt, reliable information to ensure that reneging does not occur without their 
knowledge.  Further, strong third party missions with the mandate to use force can 
enforce the terms of settlement by reassuring the weaker side that surprise attacks will 
be defended against by the guarantor, and by deterring such surprise attacks by 
making them more costly for the stronger actor (Walter 2002).  
In addition to third party guarantees, the design of settlement agreements can 
offset commitment problems and thus increase the likelihood of successful conflict 
termination.  Agreements are more effective at ending conflict, and more durable, 
when they include power-sharing provisions, as these provisions ameliorate 
commitment problems by ensuring that the weaker party to the agreement retains a 
voice in post-conflict politics.  As power-sharing expands across political, military, 
territorial, and economic dimensions, peace becomes more durable; multiple 
dimensions of power sharing ensure that neither side can exercise full control over 
any area of state power, thus reassuring former combatants that they will not become 
victims of discrimination or renewed violence in the post-conflict state  (Hartzell and 
Hoddie 2003, 2007).  In addition, components of a negotiated settlement that increase 
the costs of renewed fighting, such as the withdrawal of foreign forces, border seals, 
the separation of troops, and peacekeeping, facilitate durable settlement by decreasing 





IV. Gaps in Existing Explanations 
The expected utility, conflict profiteering, and commitment problems theories 
discussed above all provide important insights into the dynamics of civil conflict.  
Each of these theories, however, suffers from certain weaknesses that limit its ability 
to explain variation in conflict duration and outcome.  First, theories focused on the 
utility of conflict and the costs of war are not well-supported by empirical evidence.  
While findings suggest that more costly conflicts do increase the likelihood of 
negotiations, they have no significant impact on the success of those negotiations; 
that is, whether or not talks actually result in conflict settlement (Walter 2002).  This 
suggests that theories focused on the costs of war have overlooked other factors 
which, once negotiations are underway, play a more important role in shaping the 
outcome of those talks.   
Second, while economic models of conflict are theoretically intuitive, they 
have little to say about the dynamics of conflict in countries with few lootable natural 
resources.  For example, they cannot easily explain the duration of civil war in 
Mozambique, Sri Lanka, and the Philippines, none of which exhibited the 
characteristics of a rebellion-as-business model, as none was impacted by lootable 
economic resources that could incentivize actors to prolong conflict for profit.  And 
yet these conflicts lasted 16, 26, and over 40 years, respectively, all well over the 
average civil conflict duration of approximately 8 years.   
Finally, models that focus on commitment problems cannot easily explain a 
variety of cases in which settlements were reached despite a lack of third party 




settlements in which these provisions were present have failed to produce lasting 
peace.  Why, for example, did the MNLF sign a settlement agreement with the 
Philippine government in 1996, despite a lack of third party guarantees backing the 
agreement?  And why, in the Angolan civil war, did peace agreements signed in 1991 
and 1994 fail despite a UN peacekeeping presence and relatively robust power-
sharing provisions, while a successful settlement was achieved in 2002 despite terms 
that were arguably less favorable for peace from the commitment problems 
perspective?  In more general terms, scholars focused on facilitating conflict 
termination by ameliorating commitment problems tend to assume all conflicts are 
equally plagued by incentives to renege, rather than examining potential variation in 
the prevalence of commitment problems and identifying conditions that make 
credibility issues more or less severe. 
In addition to these theory-specific limitations, existing explanations share one 
important characteristic in common which, I argue, limits their ability to provide a 
comprehensive explanation for civil war termination and outcome. Specifically, while 
existing theories provide important insights into the country or dyad-level 
determinants of war termination, they provide little insight into how the personal 
incentives of rebel and state leaders influence war termination and outcomes.  Put 
differently, existing scholarship on intrastate conflict termination has done relatively 
little to open the black box of rebel organizations, or to focus attention on the 
incentives of rebel and state leaders involved in civil wars. 
This oversight is surprising, given the importance placed upon personal utility 




Weinstein 2008; Kocher and Kalyvas 2007; Lichbach 1995).  Recent research on the 
organizational structure of rebel groups (Weinstein 2007) and the composition of self-
determination movements (Bakke, Cunningham, and Seymour 2012) has begun to 
examine variation in the internal structures of rebel organizations, and how those 
variations influence a variety of outcomes.  These studies represent the most recent 
stage in the theoretical and empirical disaggregation process ongoing in the civil war 
literature, which has, over the past decade, moved from analysis of country-level 
characteristics (Fearon 2004; Hegre 2004), to dyad-level and group-level attributes 
(D. E. Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009; K. G. Cunningham 2011).  Each 
step in the process of disaggregating civil war studies has provided important 
theoretical insights, allowing for refinement of theories through the use of more fine-
grained empirical evidence.  However, these studies have thus far ignored the 
incentives of individual leaders, instead focusing on more general characteristics of 
the combatant group or conflict dyad.
5
  
This failure to account for leaders’ incentives is a critical weakness in existing 
literature for several reasons.  Most importantly, by ignoring leader incentives, these 
analyses fail to account for the high-stakes nature of civil war for the state and rebel 
leaders involved. Figure 1.2 demonstrates that leaders often face punishment as a 
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 There are two exceptions to this lack of research.  First, Thyne (2012) finds that 
politically stronger, more stable state leaders are more capable of achieving civil war 
settlements.  Thyne’s analysis is limited, however, in that it examines only state 
leaders.  Second, research in the terrorism literature finds that leadership decapitation 
increases the likelihood conflict termination and government victory (Johnston 2012; 
Price 2012). However, these analyses are limited in two respects: first, they focus 
only on specific attempts by the state to remove terrorist leaders rather than all types 
of leadership turnover. Second, they do not theoretically explore variation in the 





result of the civil wars they fight: nearly half (43%) of the leaders included in my data 
experience some type of punishment – i.e. loss of political power, exile, 
imprisonment, or death – as a result of civil conflict.  Given the prevalence of these 
outcomes, it is reasonable to assume that leaders take the threat of punishment 
seriously as they make strategic decisions regarding tactics, war aims, and 
negotiations during civil war.   
 





Source: Original Data Collection
N=447 Leaders
 




What does this mean for theories of civil war termination and outcome?  If 
rebel and state leaders take the threat of punishment seriously, and it influences their 




should also take a leader’s expectation of punishment into account.  Failure to 
account for this important factor influencing conflict behavior in existing literature is 
a major oversight.  It renders these existing explanations incomplete at best, and, at 
worst, inaccurate.  Thus, while existing theories tell us a great deal about how a 
variety of country, conflict, and dyad-level factors influence conflict termination and 
outcome, a full understanding of when and how civil wars end requires looking 
beyond existing explanations and accounting for the personal incentives of rebel and 
state leaders. 
 
V. A Leader-Based Theory of Civil War Termination 
To this end, this dissertation moves beyond existing country and dyad-level 
explanations and explicitly models the important role played by leaders.  The theory 
developed herein simultaneously accomplishes two things.  First, it addresses the 
serious oversight in existing literature which fails to account for leaders’ incentives, 
and second, in so doing, it provides potential explanations for many of the remaining 
puzzles and inconsistencies in existing theories of civil war termination that were 
highlighted in the previous section.    
Building upon recent international relations scholarship that examines how 
domestic political considerations shape foreign policy decisions in general (Bueno De 
Mesquita et al. 1999a, 1999b; Chiozza and Goemans 2004; Debs and Goemans 2010; 




(Colaresi 2004; Croco 2011; Goemans 2000; Mattes and Morgan 2004)
6
, I argue that 
an individual rebel or state leader’s incentive to retain political power and otherwise 
avoid punishment is an important determinant of wartime behavior.  The 
dissertation’s central theoretical claim posits that culpable leaders – those viewed by 
internal and opposition-based audiences as responsible for the war – face a higher 
expectation of punishment from both internal and opponent-based sources following 
unfavorable war outcomes than non-culpable leaders, as war losses will be viewed as 
their own personal policy failures.  Non-culpable leaders, on the other hand, can more 
easily avoid responsibility for poor war performance because they can avoid 
association with the original decision to go to war and the war aims established at the 
start of the conflict.  Because of their higher expectation of punishment, culpable 
leaders will have a lower utility for settlement on compromise or losing terms than 
their non-culpable counterparts, and will therefore face incentives to continue losing 
wars in a ‘gamble for resurrection’ (Downs and Rocke 1994) through which they 
hope to turn the tide, achieve victory, and avoid punishment.  
Because of these incentives to gamble for resurrection, I hypothesize, culpable 
leaders will be less likely to terminate a conflict than their non-culpable counterparts, 
instead choosing to prolong ongoing wars in order to avoid internal and adversary-
based punishment.  The heightened threat of punishment faced by culpable leaders 
will also influence war outcomes; they will forego compromise settlement 
opportunities, choosing to continue the fight in the hope of achieving a military 
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 A leader’s domestic political concerns and incentives to avoid punishment have been 
shown to impact a state’s war aims, termination behavior, and the outcome of conflict 





victory as a way to forestall punishment.  Thus, culpable leaders will be less likely to 
make concessions on key issues at stake in the war than their non-culpable 
counterparts, who can more easily disassociate themselves with the war aims 
established at the start of the conflict and thus avoid punishment for conceding on one 
or more of those central issues.  Additionally, the culpable leader’s incentive to 
gamble for resurrection will lead to more extreme war outcomes.  The military 
gamble will sometimes pay off, allowing the culpable leader to achieve victory where 
a non-culpable leader would have settled for less.  At other times, however, the 
gamble will fail, and culpable leaders who forego settlement opportunities only to 
suffer further setbacks on the battlefield will suffer more negative war outcomes than 
their non-culpable counterparts.  Thus culpable leaders are more likely to experience 
major victories and total defeats than non-culpable leaders. 
I employ both quantitative and qualitative methods to test my theoretical 
expectations regarding the impact of leader culpability on civil conflict termination 
and outcomes.  First, I test these hypotheses quantitatively using an original dataset of 
rebel and state leaders of a global random sample of civil conflicts ongoing between 
1980 and 2010.  Results demonstrate, as expected, that civil conflicts are significantly 
less likely to terminate when culpable leaders are in power.  Additionally, the results 
show that culpable state and rebel leaders are more likely to experience extreme 
outcomes than non-culpable leaders, and are less likely than non-culpable leaders to 
make concessions on central war aims at termination. These results are robust to a 




strategies, and tests to account for potential endogeneity problems indicate that the 
relationship between culpability and war outcomes is not spurious.  
Second, I use both quantitative and qualitative evidence to test the underlying 
causal mechanism in my theoretical argument, that culpable leaders are more 
commonly punished for poor war performance than their non-culpable counterparts.  
To test this mechanism quantitatively, I use an original dataset on the fate of every 
rebel and state leader in my sample, as well as original data on each leader’s war 
performance.  Statistical results show, as expected, that culpable leaders who perform 
poorly in war are significantly more likely to be punished than non-culpable leaders 
who perform similarly poorly in war.  Again, these results are robust to a variety of 
alternative specifications and modeling strategies.           
Finally, I use qualitative evidence from the civil war in Angola between 1975 
and 2002 to provide additional evidence in support of the mechanism underlying my 
theoretical argument.  Using within-case comparison of the periods before and after 
UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi’s death in 2002, as well as process-tracing of the 
settlement attempts between UNITA and Angolan government forces in 1989, 1991, 
1994, and 2002, I examine the role that culpability and the resulting threat of 
punishment played in extending the Angolan conflict and undermining negotiated 
settlement attempts.  Case evidence from Angola demonstrates that the threat of 
punishment faced by Savimbi played a critical role in undermining all three major 
settlement attempts between government and UNITA forces in the 1980s and 90s.  
Non-culpable UNITA leader Paulo Lukamba Gato, who came to power after 




based punishment than his predecessor had, and as a result, was able to commit to a 
final settlement in 2002, ending the Angolan conflict after 27 years.    
This strong quantitative and qualitative support for my theoretical argument 
demonstrates the importance of taking leader incentives into account when examining 
civil conflict dynamics and outcome.  This dissertation has far-reaching implications 
for scholarly understandings of civil war termination, suggesting that the decision to 
terminate and the outcome achieved in civil war are affected not only by state and 
dyad-level factors, but also by state and rebel leaders’ expectations of personal 
punishment, from two distinct sources, following conflict termination. 
 
VI. Contributions and Policy Implications 
This project makes several important contributions to existing scholarship on 
civil war termination, and has implications for policy-makers seeking to facilitate the 
timely and successful settlement of ongoing conflicts worldwide. 
First and foremost, it is the first study, to my knowledge, to identify both rebel 
and state leaders’ incentives as a novel factor influencing civil war termination and 
outcome.  As such, it demonstrates that existing scholarship focused on dyad and 
country-level factors such as relative strength, costs of war, commitment problems, 
and natural resources are valuable but incomplete.  In moving beyond these dyad and 
country-level explanations, this project recognizes that leaders have personal 
incentives independent of the interests of the groups they represent, and, importantly, 
identifies the conditions under which conflict-level factors will be eclipsed by those 




This project thus has important implications for more well-established 
theories in the civil conflict termination literature.  First, taking leader incentives and 
culpability into account provides a theoretical explanation for why high costs of 
conflict do not consistently produce negotiated settlement.  By recognizing that 
leaders have independent interests which, at times, incentivize the continuation of 
costly conflicts in order to avoid punishment, this project provides a theoretical 
mechanism to explain why negotiations sometimes fail and conflicts continue, even 
when war is particularly costly.  It suggests that culpable and non-culpable leaders 
will respond differently to the costs of war, and identifies a potential conditionality in 
the relationship between the costs of war and war termination that existing theories 
have failed to account for. 
Additionally, the leader incentive-based theory developed herein identifies a 
potential source of variation in the prevalence or severity of commitment problems, 
which existing explanations tend to treat as constant rather than variable.  Because of 
their heightened risk of punishment, I argue, culpable leaders will face particularly 
acute commitment problems.  Non-culpable leaders, on the other hand, will be able to 
make more credible promises and commitments to peaceful settlement of conflict, as 
they face a lower threat of internal and opponent-based punishment when they 
compromise on central issues at stake in the war.  This suggests that leader 
characteristics are a potential source of variation in the severity of commitment 
problems across different conflicts or within the same conflict at different times.  This 
novel insight advances existing theories of civil war termination based on 




seem to be more plagued by commitment problems than others; that is, why some 
negotiated settlements are agreed and implemented relatively quickly, while others 
falter numerous times at the negotiation or implementation stage.
7
  
Third, by introducing leader-based analysis to the civil conflict literature, this 
project extends and modifies existing theories from the international relations 
literature, adapting them to fit the civil war context.  In particular, it applies the 
concept of culpability (Croco 2011) from existing research on interstate conflict to the 
civil war context, and in so doing, modifies and updates existing theory by accounting 
for distinct types of punishment and actors relevant in intrastate conflict.  Punishment 
in the interstate war literature is usually conceived of as loss of political power 
(Bueno De Mesquita et al. 1999a, 1999b).  Because more severe forms of punishment 
are much more prevalent as a result of civil war than interstate war, I extend the 
concept of punishment, combining loss of power with other more severe forms of 
punishment, such as exile and assassination, that are less frequently theorized in the 
interstate conflict literature (though see Goemans 2000).  Further, while the interstate 
literature focuses on punishment by domestic audiences only (i.e. internal 
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 By focusing on leaders’ incentives, this study also contributes to a growing body of 
research in the civil conflict literature that identifies internal group characteristics as 
important determinants of conflict dynamics (K. G. Cunningham 2011; Weinstein 
2007), and advances emerging work on the importance of leadership change for 
conflict termination and the defeat of terrorist organizations (Johnston 2012; Price 
2012; Thyne 2012). It takes an important step forward from these existing studies, 
however, by demonstrating that it is not necessarily leadership change or leader 
tenure per se, but the incentives of culpable versus non-culpable leaders that affect 




punishment), the theory developed here conceptualizes punishment as deriving from 
both internal and opponent-based sources, as both are prevalent during civil war.
8
   
Fourth, this project also makes two important data contributions. First, I 
develop an original dataset on the leaders of a global sample of civil conflicts 
between 1980 and 2010. As part of this data collection effort, I have identified all 
leaders of rebel groups included in the sample. This is the first cross-national dataset, 
to my knowledge, to identify rebel leaders and to include cross-national data on civil 
war leaders’ time in power, culpability, and post-tenure fates.  These new data on 
rebel leaders, and the additional information collected on both state and rebel leaders 
involved in civil wars, can be used in a variety of ways in future analyses.  Second, as 
part of this project, I have developed a novel coding scheme for war outcomes that 
identifies the level of favorability of the war outcome for each warring actor, relative 
to its original war aims.  This new measure overcomes two major limitations in 
existing data on the outcome of civil wars.  First, it eliminates the ambiguity of 
existing coding schemes that group together all outcomes of a particular type (e.g. 
negotiated settlement or low activity), regardless of their level of favorability.  
Second, it better accounts for what each actor achieved through the conflict, and thus 
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 Although testing variations in the impact of culpability in interstate versus civil wars 
is beyond the scope of the current project, theoretically, I expect its impact to vary 
between the two categories of conflict.  In particular, because punishment is often 
more severe and derives from multiple sources during civil war, I expect culpability 
to have a larger impact on conflict duration and outcomes during civil war than 
during interstate conflict.  Further, existing research demonstrates that culpability’s 
impact is contingent upon regime type during interstate war (Croco 2011).  In the 
civil war context, however, I expect culpability to influence conflict behavior 
regardless of regime type, largely due to the fact that opponent-based punishment is 
not contingent upon the type of political institutions regulating political competition 
and leader removal in either rebel groups or state governments. This proposition is 




how satisfied each actor is with the post-conflict distribution of benefits.  This has 
important implications not only for how wars end, but also for the stability of the 
post-conflict peace.  
Finally, this project offers important insights for policymakers regarding 
appropriate timing and strategies for intervention and mediation.  Specifically, the 
theory and results of this dissertation suggest that mediation strategies aimed at 
facilitating timely settlement of civil wars should aim to address the personal security 
concerns influencing leaders’ behavior.  Mediator proposals must address the 
personal vulnerabilities of the leader, providing a more favorable post-conflict 
scenario for the leader than he can expect through continued conflict, in order for 
mediation efforts to result in successful settlement.  This may be quite difficult to 
achieve, however, as conciliatory offers towards culpable leaders will be unpalatable 
to a variety of domestic and international actors, and culpable leaders will be willing 
to take on high-risk strategies in the hope of achieving military victory.  This 
suggests, therefore, that the best opportunities for successful mediation – i.e. the 
ripest moments for resolution – will occur when non-culpable leaders take power, and 
that more robust military interventions may be necessary to bring conflict to an end 
when culpable leaders remain in charge. 
 
VII. Roadmap for the Dissertation 
The analysis of civil war termination and outcome in this dissertation 
proceeds through six chapters.  Chapter 2 presents the dissertation’s theoretical 




resulting effect on conflict termination and outcome.  It develops a novel theory of 
civil war termination and outcome, drawing on insights from the international 
relations literature, principal-agent framework, and theories of credible commitments 
in the civil war literature. The theory developed in chapter 2 explains how culpability 
affects the expectation of punishment, which, in turn, affects a leader’s utility for 
termination and the war outcomes he will be willing to settle for. 
Chapter 3 tests the main propositions developed in chapter 2 through 
quantitative analysis.  After reviewing the key hypotheses, it provides information on 
the new dataset developed for this project, discussing the measurement of leader 
culpability and details on the new coding scheme for war outcomes. The empirical 
results are then presented and discussed, and provide strong statistical support for the 
theoretical argument developed in the previous chapter.  A variety of robustness 
checks are also presented in chapter 3 to ensure that the results are not sensitive to 
alternative coding schemes for the dependent and key independent variables, to 
alternative model specifications, or to the potential endogeneity of leader culpability.  
Chapters 4 and 5 examine the causal mechanisms underlying the leader 
incentive-based theory of civil war termination developed in chapter 2, the former 
through quantitative analysis and the latter via qualitative examination of the civil war 
in Angola from 1975 to 2002.  The results of the quantitative analysis presented in 
chapter 4 provide strong support for the punishment mechanism underlying the 
dissertation’s theoretical argument, and are robust to a variety of alternative modeling 
strategies and measurement specifications.  Chapter 5 provides additional support for 




evidence from Angola’s civil war.  Controlled-comparison of the periods before and 
after culpable UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi died demonstrates the critical role that a 
culpable leader’s fear of punishment plays in prolonging civil conflict.    
 Finally, chapter 6 concludes by briefly revisiting the main theoretical 
argument and results, and by examining the broader implications of the project’s 
central findings for theories of civil war termination and outcome as well as the 










Chapter 2 : A Theory of Leader Incentives and Civil War 




In the previous chapter, I introduced two related questions central to research 
on intrastate conflict.  First, why do some civil wars end quickly, while others drag on 
for years or even decades?  Second, why do some combatant groups agree to 
compromise outcomes while others fight to a military end?  That is, what explains 
variation in the duration and outcome of civil wars?  A review of existing literature in 
the previous chapter demonstrated that current scholarly explanations for civil 
conflict termination and outcome are incomplete.  Because they fail to account for the 
incentives of rebel and state leaders in civil wars, they cannot adequately explain why 
some civil wars drag on despite fairly clear evidence that neither side can win, while 
others end in compromise despite the fact that victory may still be possible.  Further, 
they do not adequately address why some attempts at settlement break down in 
continued fighting, despite robust settlement agreements, while other settlement 
attempts succeed despite a lack of proven commitment mechanisms. 
This chapter develops a novel theory of civil war termination and outcome to 
address these remaining puzzles.  It builds upon existing rationalist explanations, but 
revises and updates their expectations by allowing for an important modification to 




that prevails in existing civil war termination literature, instead allowing the 
individual incentives of rebel and state leaders to differ from those of the groups they 
lead.  This chapter thus develops a novel theory of civil war termination and outcome 
focused on the incentives of state and rebel leaders.  It draws upon principal-agent 
theory and insights from credible commitment models of civil war to explain why 
some state and rebel leaders pursue policies that are in the best interests of their 
constituencies, while other leaders make strategic decisions that may serve their own 
interests but leave the groups they represent worse off.  Variation in war termination 
and outcome are explained as a result of leader-specific incentives to avoid 
punishment from two sources: winning coalitions and adversary elites.  
 The chapter’s central theoretical claim is that leaders who bear responsibility 
for a war – that is, culpable leaders – will expect different payoffs for settlement than 
those who are not responsible for involving their states/groups in the conflict.  
Culpable leaders will anticipate a higher likelihood of punishment from both internal 
and adversary-based audiences if they settle for anything less than a win, and will 
therefore have a lower utility for termination on unfavorable terms than leaders who 
do not bear responsibility for starting the war.  Because of their lower utility, culpable 
leaders will be less likely to terminate a civil conflict on compromise or moderately 
losing terms, instead continuing the conflict in the hope of achieving a better outcome 
that will diminish the risk of internal and adversary-based punishment.  The 
theoretical argument developed herein has far-reaching implications for our 
understanding of civil war termination and outcome, suggesting that the decision to 




factors, but also by state and rebel leaders’ expectations of personal punishment, from 
two distinct sources, following termination.
9
 
This chapter elaborates the dissertation’s theoretical argument in the sections 
below.  I first relax the unitary actor assumption and introduce assumptions on the 
theory’s three central actors: leaders, their winning coalitions, and adversary elites.  
Drawing on principal-agent framework, I then develop a theory of civil war 
termination that focuses on the relationship between leader (agent) and constituency 
(principal), which is characterized by information asymmetries and the potential for 
goal conflict, which can cause leaders to act as unfaithful agents, pursuing policies 
and strategies that serve their own interests rather than those of their constituencies.
10
   
I draw upon insights from the interstate war literature, which identifies 
culpability as an important source of variation in leader wartime behavior (Croco 
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 The theory developed in this chapter focuses specifically on domestic-level sources 
of punishment.  There are, in many cases, additional constraints on leaders that derive 
from the international community.  One explicit source of international punishment 
likely to affect leaders’ incentives is investigation or indictment by the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). The impact of this international source of punishment is 
controlled for in the empirical analysis.  
10
 The principal-agent framework provides a useful tool for understanding how 
leaders’ incentives to avoid punishment affect their wartime behavior.  According to 
principal-agent theories, an agency relationship exists “between two (or more) parties 
when one, designated as the agent, acts on behalf of another, designated the principal” 
(Leventhal 1988, 155).  Consider, for example, a firm in which stockholders delegate 
the daily running of the firm to a manager.  In this situation, the manager (agent) acts 
on behalf of stockholders (principal) by handling the daily operations of the firm.  In 
the application of the principal-agent framework to rebel and state actors in civil war, 
the leaders of these organizations are considered the agents, while the groups they 
represent are the principals.  This use of principal-agent theory builds upon similar 
applications in the interstate conflict literature (Davies 2002; Downs and Rocke 1994; 
Feaver 2005; Goemans 2000; Richards et al. 1993). While studies of civil war 
termination and outcome tend to treat combatant groups as unitary actors, some 
recent studies use the principal-agent framework to examine the behavior of rebel 
groups during civil war (Gates 2002; Weinstein 2007).  These analyses, however, 




2011).  I modify and adapt this concept for the civil war context, arguing that a 
leader’s perceived responsibility for the war provides information to two relevant 
audiences: the leader’s constituency and his adversary.
11
  First, culpability helps 
mitigate information asymmetries between leader and constituency by providing 
constituents an important cue regarding the leader’s likely type.  Using this cue and 
information provided by war performance, internal audiences will update their beliefs 
regarding the leader’s level of competence, and will decide whether or not to punish 
the leader based upon that determination.  Second, a leader’s culpability also provides 
information to adversary elites regarding the likelihood that that leader will be able to 
commit to peace.  Culpable leaders, because they face a high expectation of 
punishment internally, have incentives to extend losing conflicts in a gamble for 
resurrection, and will be viewed by adversary elites as less capable of making 
credible commitments to peace than their non-culpable counterparts.  Adversary elites 
will therefore have incentives to attempt to remove the opponent leader in the hope 
that a more credible negotiating partner takes his place.  This threat of opponent 
punishment, however, has the paradoxical effect of increasing the culpable leader’s 
incentives to continue the war as a means to avoid punishment.   
Thus, both internal and opponent-based threats of punishment increase the 
culpable leader’s incentives to gamble for resurrection, which in turn affect his 
expected termination behavior and war outcomes.  Hypotheses are developed based 
upon these theoretical expectations, and the chapter concludes by examining the 
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 Only the former is theorized in the interstate war literature.  Examining opponent-




implications of this theory for our understanding of civil war termination and 
outcome.   
 
II. Internal Politics and Civil War Termination: Actors and Assumptions 
The theory developed below makes several important assumptions about the 
incentives of and relationships between leaders, their winning coalitions, and 
adversary elites during civil war.  This section introduces those assumptions, 
beginning with the central assumption that leaders are rational, self-interested actors 
whose primary goal is to maintain political power and avoid other forms of 
punishment.  In addition to this rational actor assumption, I assume that leaders enjoy 
an informational advantage relative to their constituents with regard to their 
competence and wartime decision-making, that constituents are more risk-averse than 
their leaders, and that opponents prefer to face a leader who can credibly commit to 
peace. These assumptions and their implications are discussed below.  
 
2.1 Winning Coalitions and Opponent Elites 
Before discussing these assumptions in detail, however, it is useful to clearly 
identify the two actors who are capable of influencing leaders’ behavior during civil 
war.  A leader’s winning coalition (WC) is the first relevant actor, and the first 
potential source of punishment for the leader (Bueno De Mesquita et al. 1999a).
12
  
Specifically, a leader’s winning coalition includes those individuals or groups within 
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the state or rebel organization who can coordinate to hold the leader accountable 
(Weeks 2008).  The makeup of the winning coalition varies for both state and rebel 
leaders depending upon the type of governing structures or rules of participation that 
determine to whom the leader is accountable.  For state leaders, the size and 
composition of the relevant coalition is determined by the type of political system in 
place.
13
  In democratic states, the coalition includes members of the general public, 
while in autocratic states it is limited to regime elites on whom the leader is reliant for 
his survival in office.  There is similar variation in the composition of internal 
audiences for rebel leaders, as rebel groups, like governments, vary in their rules of 
participation and the level of concentration of power (D. E. Cunningham, Gleditsch, 
and Salehyan 2009; Weinstein 2007).
14
  While the size of the winning coalition 
varies, for nearly all rebel and government leaders, there exists at least a small inner 
circle of individuals that has the power to remove or otherwise punish the leader.    
 The second relevant actor and second potential source of punishment for a 
civil war leader is the opposition or adversary elite.  This actor is comprised of those 
                                                 
13
 As noted in the earliest articulations of audience costs theory, relevant audiences 
vary in size and makeup, having included, at various times, “kings, rival ministers, 
opposition politicians, senate committees, politburos, and, since the mid-nineteenth-
century, mass publics informed by mass media” (Fearon 1994a, 581).  While the 
majority of research on audience costs focuses on the difference between democratic 
and nondemocratic regimes in terms of their abilities to generate audience costs 
(Schultz 2001), more recent research provides convincing evidence that the 
mechanisms driving the generation of audience costs are present in non-democratic 
systems as well (Brown and Marcum 2011; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Weeks 
2008).  As Weeks (2008, 36) notes, the “crucial question … is whether the relevant 
domestic audience can and will coordinate to sanction the leader”, regardless of the 
size or composition of that audience. 
14
 A rebel group leader’s winning coalition is more often limited to a small number of 
high-level commanders or elites within the rebel organization who, if they are able to 
overcome the coordination problem and decouple their own fates from that of the 




individuals within the political/military leadership of the wartime adversary who hold 
positions with decision-making authority on issues of security and justice both during 
the war and at its termination.  The exact composition of this group of adversary elites 
will vary depending upon the adversary’s political system or organizational structure, 
but it generally consists of the group of military strategists and political leaders who 
determine whether they will focus on fighting their opponent as a whole, or will 
instead pursue a strategy that directly targets their opponent’s leadership.  A leader-
targeted strategy can be pursued either during the conflict or after; attempts by the 
adversary elite to decapitate their opponent’s organization through killing, capturing, 
or imprisoning its leader can be pursued throughout the course of the war, while 
retributive justice through formal or informal legal institutions can be pursued at the 
conflict’s end if the adversary has retained or gained control of the state apparatus.     
 
2.2 Rational Self-Interested Leaders 
Existing models of civil war termination and outcome treat states and rebel 
groups as unitary actors.  As such, leaders are assumed to embody the interests of the 
groups they represent.  The theory developed in this section relaxes this assumption, 
allowing leaders’ interests to differ from those of their winning coalition members.
15
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 International Relations (IR) scholars over the past two decades have devoted 
increasing attention to the interconnections between domestic politics and the foreign 
policy decisions of states.  By opening the ‘black box’ of the state, this new tradition 
has generated important insights into how domestic political considerations shape 
foreign policy decisions (Bueno De Mesquita et al. 1999a, 1999b; Chiozza and 
Goemans 2004; Croco 2011; Debs and Goemans 2010; McGillivray and Smith 2006; 
Putnam 1988).  Building upon these recent contributions to the interstate conflict 
literature and new research in the civil conflict literature that examines the internal 




More specifically, I assume that state and rebel leaders are rational actors whose 
primary goal is to maintain political power and avoid more severe forms of 
punishment such as exile, imprisonment, or death.   
The first part of this assumption, that leaders seek to maintain political power, 
is a well-established theoretical assumption in the international relations literature 
(Bueno De Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Bueno De Mesquita et al. 1999a; Caselli and 
Cunningham 2009; Colaresi 2004; Croco 2011; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; 
McGillivray and Smith 2006).  State leaders value their positions of political power, 
as leadership grants them tremendous influence over the resources of the state, as well 
as the distribution of those resources through the setting of domestic and foreign 
policy.  The same is true for rebel leaders.  Leadership of a rebel organization grants 
the individual extensive control over any political or economic resources under the 
group’s control, and generally provides the leader tremendous influence over the 
group’s agenda and the strategies and tactics it uses to publicize its grievances and 
pursue its goals.  Leadership of the rebel organization, furthermore, carries with it the 
promise of future national-level political power, should the group succeed in toppling 
the government.  Because of their authority positions, rebel and state leaders can set 
policy for their groups, pursuing strategies designed to maximize the benefits 
accruing to their winning coalition members and themselves.   
The second aspect of this assumption, that leaders want to avoid more severe 
forms of punishment such as exile, imprisonment, and death, is equally pertinent in 
the context of civil war.  As some scholars recognize, the loss of political office is just 
                                                                                                                                           
developed below builds from the assumption that leaders have interests independent 




one possible – and relatively mild – consequence of failed policies (Debs and 
Goemans 2010; Goemans 2000, 2008).  Particularly in the context of civil conflict, 
loss of leadership is often associated with more severe punishments, such as 
imprisonment, exile, or even death.  Thus, state and rebel leaders who choose to 
forego nonviolence in favor of violent strategies to defeat their opponents take on 
significant personal risk.  While the payoffs from victory are high – control of 
government, economic resources, and the ability to shape political, military, 
economic, and social policy – the costs of defeat are daunting.   
Severe forms of punishment can occur either internally or at the hands of the 
civil war opponent.  Karrim Kassem of Iraq and U Nu of Myanmar, for example, 
were both removed from power in internal coups in the early 1960s, largely due to 
failure to defeat rebellions in their respective countries.  Kassem was killed during the 
coup, and U Nu was imprisoned for several years following his removal.  
Punishment by an opponent is also often severe, as adversary elites may see 
an opening to permanently remove the threat posed by a political foe.  Examples 
abound of unsuccessful state and rebel leaders and the grim fates they met at the 
hands of opponent forces as a result of their failures.  The recent conflict in Libya, for 
example, resulted in the capture and brutal killing of Muammar Qaddafi by 
opposition forces.  High-profile rebel leaders such as Abimael Guzmán of Sendero 
Luminoso and Vellupillai Prabhakaran of the LTTE have faced similarly grave fates, 
the former being imprisoned by Peruvian military officials and the latter being killed 




Given the threat of punishment internally and by opponent forces, both state 
and rebel leaders will be primarily concerned with the retention of political power and 
avoidance of more severe forms of punishment in the context of civil war.  As 
rational actors, leaders are expected to take the threat of punishment into 
consideration when deciding whether to continue or terminate a conflict.  
Importantly, while the goal of maintaining power and avoiding punishment 
sometimes promotes policy decisions that simultaneously serve the interests of the 
leader and the group he represents, at other times, a leader’s desire to avoid 
punishment generates incentives for policies at odds with the interests of the group.  
This potential for goal conflict is discussed further in the theory developed below. 
 
2.3 Private Information 
The second theoretical assumption underlying the current argument also 
focuses on leaders.  Specifically, leaders are assumed to enjoy an informational 
advantage over their winning coalitions during civil war.  Two forms of uncertainty 
characterize the relationship between leaders and group members of both rebel 
organizations and states during civil war.  The first relates to the winning coalition’s 
inability to costlessly observe and monitor the decisions of its leader.  The second 
refers to the constituency’s uncertainty regarding the leader’s type – that is, his 
leadership ability or level of competence.   
First, rebel and state leaders enjoy an informational advantage with regard to 
their own decisions, the effects of their policy choices, and overall war performance.  




internal audience members to directly observe or monitor the leader’s behavior and 
decisions.  Political/military strategy is generally decided behind closed doors during 
civil war, where the high-stakes nature of inter-actor relations increases the need for 
secrecy to limit the threat of exposure and infiltration.  In large-WC states or groups 
with relatively democratic selection procedures, the vast majority of WC members 
(i.e. ordinary citizens or group members) are not privy to the high-level discussions 
that set war-time policy.  Even in small-WC organizations, where the leader relies 
upon the support of a relatively small group of officials for his maintenance in power, 
information asymmetries exist.  Under these circumstances, organizational 
decentralization and specialization within government will ensure that no winning 
coalition members are privy to all strategy decisions made by the leader.  That is, 
individual coalition members may be involved in strategic decisions in their areas of 
expertise, but the vast majority will not be fully informed on all relevant issues.  
Thus, information asymmetries will exist even in small-WC states or rebel groups. 
The leader’s informational advantage is exacerbated by the limited flow of 
battlefield and negotiating table information during civil conflicts.  First, information 
from the battlefield is often sparse due to poor infrastructure, remote conflict centers, 
decentralized organizational structures, particularly within many rebel organizations, 
and media control by states.  While individual commanders will likely have intimate 
knowledge of the state of affairs in their regions of operation, organizational 
structures often prevent anyone but top leadership from gaining a full picture of 
events on all fronts.  Even high-ranking commanders that direct operations on a 




region.  Lack of established communication structures or the disruption of existing 
modes of communication in many conflict zones increases this informational 
disadvantage.  Battlefield information will be reported back to the leader, who can 
strategically control its dissemination to the rest of the winning coalition.  Second, 
negotiations with the opponent generally take place behind closed doors, and the 
specifics of any offers made often remain private information until well after deals 
are agreed and signed.  Thus, the leader’s negotiating strategy and prowess remain 
unobservable by all winning coalition members who are not themselves involved in 
negotiations.   
Leaders thus enjoy an informational advantage with regard to both battlefield 
information and political developments during the war.  Because the flow of 
information is limited, group members cannot easily gain an accurate, real-time 
understanding of the state of affairs.  This information asymmetry between leader and 
audience generates the potential for a moral hazard problem to arise (Leventhal 
1988).  Because constituents cannot directly observe many of the leader’s decisions 
or their repercussions, leaders are free to pursue their own interests rather than those 
of the group/state without detection.  That is, the leader can behave as an unfaithful 
agent with little fear of immediate detection. 
Leaders also enjoy an informational advantage with regard to individual 
characteristics that affect their competence or ability-level.  This source of uncertainty 






  It is also explicitly linked to competence in studies on 
the diversionary use of force, where a leader’s level of competence is treated as 
private information that the public makes inferences about based on domestic and 
foreign policy outcomes (Richards et al. 1993).  Here, I assume that a leader’s level of 
competence is private information, and that constituents prefer a competent leader, as 
leader competence is expected to improve policy outcomes and future bargaining 
effectiveness.  Existing literature commonly identifies a leader’s perceived 
competence as a central concern of domestic audiences and winning coalitions 
because of its impact on current and future outcomes (Croco 2011; Fearon 1994a; 
McGillivray and Smith 2006; Tomz 2007; Weeks 2008).
17
   
Given that a leader’s competence is private information and that constituents 
prefer a high-competence type, low-ability leaders have incentives to portray 
themselves as high-ability types, and constituents have no decisive way, ex ante, to 
distinguish the two.  This problem is exacerbated by the first informational advantage 
enjoyed by leaders.  Because group members or citizens cannot easily observe the 
leadership decisions that lead to observable political and military developments 
during war, they cannot easily update their beliefs on the leader’s type.  While poor 
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 More specifically, this source of private information is referred to as an adverse 
selection or a self-selection issue, which arises specifically because of uncertainty 
over the personal characteristics of an individual (Leventhal 1988). 
17
 Leader incompetence is one of the central mechanisms used to explain leader 
behavior in a variety of settings, including interstate war.  Domestic publics are 
expected to punish a leader who backs down or performs poorly in war because it 
signals a general incompetence on the part of the leader.  While most do not explicitly 
identify a leader’s level of competence as private information (though see Richards et 
al 1993), this assumption is implicit in theories that argue war outcomes reveal 
information about leader competence, which, in turn, affects the likelihood of 




decisions and poor management of the war effort will, in theory, produce observable 
unfavorable political and military outcomes, there are a number of factors beyond the 
leader’s competence in executing the war effort that affect outcomes.  These 
exogenous factors, which are beyond the leader’s control, may lead to unfavorable 
developments or poor war outcomes, despite competent leadership decisions.  As a 
result, internal audiences cannot know with certainty whether observed losses are a 
result of poor leadership or bad luck. 
 
2.4 Risk Averse Constituencies 
In line with existing research, I assume that constituencies are, on average, 
more risk averse than their leaders.  This divergence in risk propensities derives 
primarily from the fact that constituents unequally bear the costs of war, most notably 
casualties and economic costs, whereas leaders are likely to be largely insulated from 
these wartime costs (Chapman and Reiter 2004; Croco 2011; Richards et al. 1993).  
This cost burden differential is particularly acute in modern, interstate wars where the 
leader is almost never directly involved in battle, but instead sets strategy and policy 
from the safety of the state capital.  It should also, however, characterize the leader-
constituent relationship in civil wars.  State leaders, as in interstate conflict, generally 
do not bear direct costs of battle in intrastate war.  And while rebel leaders are 
sometimes less removed from the front lines than their state leader counterparts, in 
the vast majority of cases, even rebel leaders are more insulated against the costs of 
battle than the members of the groups they lead.  This is particularly true for groups 




rebellion from the relative safety of Sweden, where they lived in exile with their 
families.   
The unequal costs of war therefore affect both state and rebel group leaders’ 
winning coalitions.  In large WC states or groups, individual citizens, as members of 
the winning coalition, bear the costs of fighting both directly, as fighters, and 
indirectly, through the loss of family members, friends, and neighbors who are 
injured or killed in battle.  They also unequally bear the economic and social costs of 
war, as they are the first to suffer from the disruption of services and infrastructure 
caused by war and higher tax burdens – both official state taxes and unofficial rebel 
extraction – to fund the war effort.  Even in small-WC states and groups, a leader’s 
winning coalition members, who often include mid and high-ranking field 
commanders, will bear greater costs and risks because they are actively engaged on 
the front lines or in forward bases.   
Because constituents bear the brunt of the costs of war, they will be more risk 
averse than their leaders, and will become increasingly risk averse as costs mount.  
Thus, as recent research demonstrates, popular support for a war declines as the 
human costs of that war increase (Gartner 2008).  Importantly, the relative risk 
averseness of constituencies can result in goal conflict between leader and winning 
coalition.  This goal conflict arises when the constituency’s aversion to additional 
costs and the leader’s incentive to avoid punishment prescribe different policy paths.  





2.5 Adversary Elites 
Finally, I assume that adversary elites are also uncertain regarding the 
opponent leader’s type.  Opponent elites suffer the same information asymmetries as 
their adversary’s winning coalition with regard to the leader’s competence, as they 
also cannot directly monitor the decisions or behavior of their adversary’s leader.  
This informational disadvantage is greater than that suffered by most winning 
coalition members, as adversary elites are generally not privy to any of the internal 
workings of the opponent, unless they have successfully infiltrated the highest levels 
of the opponent’s military-political organization.   
In addition to these information asymmetries, I make one additional 
assumption about adversary elites.  Specifically, I assume that adversary elites prefer 
to face an opponent leader who can credibly commit to peace.  While adversary elites 
will not be interested in pursuing a peaceful resolution to the conflict at all times, I 
argue that they will prefer to face an opponent who can, should the opportunity arise, 
be trusted to uphold promises made during negotiations and carry out agreed upon 
terms of settlement.   
The importance of an opponent leader’s ability to make credible commitments 
derives from the costliness of failed settlement attempts and conflict recurrence, and 
the insecurity it creates for adversary elites themselves (Toft 2009; Walter 2002).  
Specifically, opponent elites are likely to suffer political costs if they make settlement 
overtures that are rejected by their adversary’s leader, or if they agree to settlement 
plans that then break down during the implementation phase.  Policy failures such as 




or her own constituents.  Opponent leaders who pursue a negotiated settlement only 
to have their adversary reject the process or any resulting agreement are thus likely to 
have their leadership questioned internally.  Multiple examples exist of leaders losing 
political power as a result of bargaining failures during civil war.  Megawati 
Sukarnoputri of Indonesia, for example, lost elections in 2004 after negotiations with 
GAM failed to produce results.  Similarly, Belisario Betancur’s PCC party lost 
elections in Colombia in 1986 after peace overtures to the countries rebel groups were 
rejected.  In both cases, the adversary’s inability to commit to a peace deal 
undermined the leader’s political position and resulted in loss of power.  
Adversary elites, therefore, should prefer to face an opponent leader who can 
make credible commitments to peace when the opportunity arises.  A leader’s hold on 
power is likely to be threatened by failed settlement attempts or the breakdown of an 
ongoing peace process, which imposes a variety of social, economic, and political 
costs that undermine stability and political longevity.  The importance of this 
assumption is discussed further in the context of opponent-based punishment in 
section IV.    
 
III. An Agency Model of Internal Punishment 
Recall the two-part assumption articulated above that leaders have private 
information about their competence level, and that internal audiences have incentives 
to punish an incompetent leader.  The means by which the internal audience can 
punish a leader in the political realm, however, are limited.  Constituencies have one 




option of removal of the leader (Downs and Rocke 1994).
18
  Sanctioning incompetent 
leaders through removal from office allows the winning coalition to not only improve 
its prospects in the near term by removing the incompetent leader, but also allows it 
to incentivize leader behavior that aligns with its interests and to deter leader 
adventurism by future office holders.  The threat of removal is a deterrent to current 
and future leaders from exploiting the information asymmetry that characterizes the 
principal-agent relationship and pursuing policies at odds with the interests of the 
constituency.   
Internal audiences will have incentives to differentiate between competent and 
incompetent leaders before sanctioning or punishing the leader, however, as improper 
removal of a competent leader is inefficient (Downs and Rocke 1994).  In more 
concrete terms, constituencies should prefer to maintain leadership continuity, 
particularly during periods of conflict, if the leader is able to execute the war effort 
competently.  This continuity ensures greater stability in strategy, lines of 
communication, and chains of command, thereby minimizing the possibility that 
disruptions caused by leadership turnover during war could lead to military gains for 
the opponent.  The benefits of continuity, however, are outweighed by the drawbacks 
of poor strategic decisions when an incompetent leader is in power during civil war, 
and internal audiences will therefore have strong incentives to distinguish between 
the two types of leaders.  
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 The other, more severe, forms of punishment discussed above are also available 
forms of punishment, but each is precipitated by removal.  That is, removal is a 
necessary precursor to or component of exile, imprisonment, and execution.  These 
options can therefore be thought of as different forms of the same removal sanction 




3.1 Culpability and War Performance: Identifying Incompetent Leaders 
The constituency’s incentive to maintain a competent leader in office while 
dismissing an incompetent one, however, raises an important dilemma.  Namely, 
because leaders have private information regarding their type, internal audiences 
cannot know, with certainty, whether a leader is competent or not.    
Economics solves this dilemma by generating complex contractual 
relationships between principal and agent with contingencies for performance and 
effort, which increases the principal’s ability to weed out low-ability types ex ante.
19
  
This type of contractual complexity, however, is not possible in the political realm 
where the constituency’s only available sanctioning option, leader removal, is a 
crude, ungradated instrument that can only be applied ex post (Downs and Rocke 
1994).  Without the ability to weed out incompetent leaders before coming to power, 
winning coalition members must use cues provided by 1) observable conflict 
outcomes and 2) the leader’s connection to the decision to go to war, to help 
determine whether the leader is competent or incompetent, and thus whether he is 
deserving of punishment or not.
20
   
The first source of information on a leader’s abilities, observed war outcomes, 
provides preliminary information to constituents.  As discussed above, however, the 
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 These complex contractual relationships also allow the principal to counteract the 
agent’s incentives to act unfaithfully.  
20
 Richards et al. (1993) and Downs and Rocke (1994) identify policy/battlefield 
outcomes as the only available signal constituencies have to judge the leader’s 
competency or faithfulness.  As Downs and Rocke note, “high information 
uncertainty forces a citizenry to gauge by battlefield success or by the apparent 
consequences of inaction the extent to which an executive is acting in a manner that is 
consistent with its preferences” (1994, 363).  I argue, on the other hand, that the 
leader’s culpability provides a second source of useful information that allows 




relationship between leader decisions and war outcomes is imperfect, as exogenous 
factors beyond the leader’s control also influence the course of events in war.  
Because internal audiences cannot directly observe either the leader’s decisions or the 
variety of other exogenous variables that affect war outcomes, they can only make 
probabilistic inferences about the extent to which the leader’s decisions led to a 
specific war outcome.  In fact, a leader may make highly competent strategic 
decisions that directly reflect the constituency’s preferences, but which are 
unsuccessful through no fault of his own.  Thus, the relationship between leader 
decisions/competence and war outcomes is inefficient and at times inaccurate, 
sometimes leading constituents to draw erroneous conclusions about a leader’s type.   
The second source of information constituents use to help identify 
incompetent leaders deserving of punishment relates to the leader’s connection to the 
original decision to go to war.  Specifically, constituents will attribute responsibility 
for a conflict to leaders who were in charge of the state or rebel group at the start of 
the conflict, and to those with direct political connections to the decision to involve 
the group in violent conflict.  These leaders will be designated as culpable for the war 
by their internal audiences, as they are directly connected to the start of the war and 
are therefore perceived as responsible.  The concept of culpability was first 
introduced in the interstate conflict literature (Croco 2011).  Whereas previous 
scholarship assumed that constituents had no ability to distinguish among leaders and 
would have equal incentives to punish any leader who presided over poor war 




distinctions between leaders who are connected to the decision to go to war and those 
who are not.   
More specifically, a rebel or state leader’s culpability is determined by two 
factors: (1) whether he/she was in charge of the state/group when the war began (i.e. a 
first leader), and (2) whether a replacement leader shares political connections with 
the first leader.
21
   
Leaders who preside over the start of the conflict (i.e. first leaders) are 
considered culpable because they hold power at the start of the war and are thus 
directly responsible for presiding over the transition from peace to war.
 22
  Rebel and 
state leaders who come to power during the war and share political or familial 
connections with the first leader inherit the first leader’s responsibility for the war by 
virtue of these political or familial connections.  Existing research demonstrates, 
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 Specifically, replacement state leaders are likely to be considered culpable if they 
1) are members of the first leader’s political party (democracies), 2) were members of 
the first leader’s cabinet at the start of the war, 3) are family members of the first 
leader, or 4) were otherwise members of the first leader’s inner circle at the war’s 
start.  For rebel leaders, culpability is likely to transfer to replacement leaders who are 
1) co-founders of the organization, 2) family members of the first leader, or 3) leaders 
who held high-level positions within the organization at the start of the conflict.  
Additional information and coding rules for culpability are provided in chapter 3.     
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 First leaders are considered culpable whether or not they actually initiate violence 
because they bear responsibility for either firing the first shot (initiators) or failing to 
prevent the dispute from escalating to violent conflict (non-initiator first leaders).  A 
non-initiator first leader’s failure to prevent an attack through either a pre-emptive 
strike or accommodative policies is likely to be viewed as a policy failure, 
responsibility for which again rests with the leader, thus ensuring that he faces a 
similar burden of responsibility as one who actually fired the first shot.  Furthermore, 
it can be difficult for citizenry and even elites within the state to identify ‘initiators’ in 
civil conflicts, as both sides may have incentives to portray themselves or the 
opponent as the aggressor, regardless of facts on the ground.  Thus, both rebel and 
state leaders in power at the start of conflict are likely to be assigned responsibility 
for its initiation.  Therefore, attributing responsibility to all first leaders is a 




along these lines, that constituents tend to equate individual leaders and those with 
whom they share political connections, particularly in attributing blame or 
responsibility for poor policy outcomes (Cotton 1986; Erikson 1988).  Thus, both 
internal audiences and opponent elites are likely to assign replacement leaders who 
share political connections with the first leader responsibility for the war with little or 
no discounting because membership in a first leader’s inner circle or political 
affiliation with that leader implies intimate knowledge of and influence over the 
decision-making process that led to conflict.  Leaders who inherit an ongoing war 
upon coming to power but who share no political or familial ties with the first leader, 
on the other hand, will likely avoid responsibility for poor war performance.  They 
will be viewed as non-culpable by constituents because they can concretely avoid 
affiliation with the first leader’s war aims and with the original decision to become 
involved in the conflict. 
Winning coalition members, furthermore, will likely be able to make clear 
distinctions between culpable and non-culpable leaders, making accurate attributions 
of responsibility, for several reasons.  First, the transition from peace to war is 
generally identifiable, within a reasonable window or timeframe.  Winning coalition 
members will therefore be able to identify the start of the conflict – the point at which 
rhetoric transitioned to violent clashes – and link that to the leader in power at the 
time, as well as to other high-ranking members of the government or rebel 
organization at the time.  This is particularly likely given that winning coalitions are 
often relatively small in organizations and states that fight civil wars.  While 




winning coalition members should be generally well-informed on basic 
characteristics of the organization – such as who holds political power and who 
makes up the regime’s insiders at any given time – and on whether the group is 
engaged in violent conflict or not.  Further, even in large-WC regimes, citizens should 
be relatively well-informed about a leader’s connection to the decision to go to war 
because political opponents of the leader have incentives to highlight his connection 
to the war if the war is going poorly, while the leader himself may want to highlight 
his role in initiating the conflict if it is going well.       
Internal audiences should therefore be relatively adept at attributing 
responsibility for a conflict to culpable leaders, while sparing non-culpable leaders.  
Identifying culpable leaders then helps constituents distinguish low from high-quality 
agents by linking responsibility for war outcomes to leaders viewed as responsible for 
the conflict.  Cues provided by the leader’s connection to the start of the war (i.e. his 
culpability) help internal audiences distinguish leaders whose bad choices caused war 
losses from those who made the right policy choices but were unable to achieve 
victory due to the poor decisions of previous leaders.
23
   
Specifically, the culpable leader’s clear association with the decision to go to 
war means that, when confronted with major war losses, internal audience members 
will conclude that the culpable leader’s decision to go to war was a poor one, or that 
his execution of the war effort was deficient.  The clear association between the 
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 Existing models in the interstate war literature either assume that constituencies 
have only the war’s outcome as a tool to identify unfaithful agents (Downs and Rocke 
1994; Richards et al. 1993), or that regime type influences the likelihood and extent 
of punishment (Goemans 2000).  Croco (2011) recognizes that leader culpability 
influences the likelihood of punishment, though does not identify this as a tool to 




culpable leader and responsibility for the decision to initiate conflict, coupled with the 
poor conflict outcome, signals to internal audience members that the leader is likely a 
low-ability type.  Non-culpable state and rebel leaders, on the other hand, can 
distance themselves from the original decision to engage in conflict.  War losses are 
therefore less likely to be viewed as their personal policy failures; the non-culpable 
leader can attribute poor outcomes to the poor decisions of his culpable 
predecessor(s), thereby avoiding a similar low-ability designation. 
 
3.2 Internal Punishment and the Gamble for Resurrection 
Internal audiences’ use of responsibility for the war as a cue to help identify 
incompetent leaders has far-reaching implications for leaders’ expectations of 
punishment and their subsequent conflict behavior.  Culpable leaders who preside 
over poor war outcomes are more likely to be viewed as low-ability types than non-
culpable leaders who preside over similarly poor outcomes.  Recall from section 2.3 
that constituents prefer a competent leader, as leader competence is expected to be 
generate better policy outcomes.  This suggests that culpable leaders are more likely 
to be punished for poor war outcomes than their non-culpable counterparts because 
internal audiences attribute them responsibility for poor conflict outcomes (i.e. judge 
them as incompetent) while disassociating non-culpable leaders from those poor 
outcomes.  Culpable leaders who preside over poor war outcomes are therefore likely 
to have a higher expectation of punishment from internal audiences than non-culpable 
leaders who perform similarly poorly in war.  High-ranking members of Palipehutu-




February 2001 when rumors of secret negotiations with the government surfaced.  
Several years later, his non-culpable successor successfully settled with the 
government on similar compromise terms, without being punished as a result.  
The relationship between culpability and punishment is depicted graphically 
in Figure 2.1.  Neither culpable nor non-culpable leaders will fear punishment when 
they achieve highly favorable war outcomes, as they will have satisfied internal 
audiences and achieved either a total or a major victory over the opponent.  Culpable 
leaders, however, are much more likely than non-culpable leaders to face punishment 
following moderately to severely unfavorable war outcomes.  Under these conditions, 
culpable leaders will be designated incompetent by internal audience members, and 
they will be left vulnerable to punishment as the removal sanction is implemented.   
 
Figure 2.1 Probability of Punishment by War Outcome and Leader Culpability 
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This suggests that variation in the expectation of punishment for culpable 
versus non-culpable leaders drives variation in their expected utilities for termination.  
Responsibility for the war locks culpable leaders into a particular course of action by 
making compromise and concessions costly, as even moderate losses may earn them 
the ‘incompetent’ designation.  Changing course to a more conciliatory strategy for a 
culpable leader essentially involves reneging on promises made at the start of the 
conflict, signals low-ability type, and damages the leader’s ability to bargain 
effectively in the future.  It thus lowers the utility of termination for anything less 
than a victory, as victory is the only way for a culpable leader to ensure his post-
conflict political and physical security.  
 
Figure 2.2 Utility of Termination by War Outcome and Leader Culpability 
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Figure 2.2 depicts the relationship between war outcome and the utility of 
termination for culpable versus non-culpable leaders, demonstrating that culpable 
leaders have a much lower utility of settlement for status quo and moderately losing 
outcomes than their non-culpable counterparts. 
 
Incentives to Gamble for Resurrection 
Given this relationship between culpability and the utility for termination, a 
culpable leader will have incentives to continue a losing war rather than settle on 
unfavorable terms, as he will anticipate punishment for his role in the conflict and his 
utility for termination will be lower than his utility for fighting.  Continuing the fight 
provides the culpable leader the opportunity, however remote, to turn the tide of the 
conflict and achieve a favorable outcome to forestall punishment.  In other words, the 
expectation of punishment creates perverse incentives for culpable leaders to become 
unfaithful agents and ‘gamble for resurrection’ (Downs and Rocke 1994; Goemans 
2000) rather than settle on losing terms that leave them vulnerable to punishment.   
This is the heart of the principal-agent problem in civil conflict.  Recall from 
section II that leaders are more risk-acceptant than their internal audiences.  Because 
constituents are more sensitive to the costs of conflict than their leaders, they will 
prefer to terminate an ongoing conflict when the prospects of victory decline.  The 
leader’s primary goal, on the other hand, is to retain political power and avoid 
punishment.  These divergent preferences do not automatically result in unfaithful 
leader behavior; a non-culpable leader, because his expectation of punishment is low, 




internal audiences’ preference to end a costly war when the prospects of victory 
dwindle.   
Incentive problems arise, however, when culpable leaders are in power.  A 
culpable leader’s high expectation of punishment for poor war performance generates 
incentives for him to stay in a losing war, hoping to turn the tide to avoid 
punishment.
24
  This conflicts, however, with his internal audience’s preference to 
terminate a losing war.  Because acting faithfully in these circumstances ensures the 
culpable leader faces internal punishment, his incentive is to instead act as an 
unfaithful agent.   
The logic of this strategy is straightforward.  Culpable leaders update their 
beliefs about the likely outcome of the war as new information comes in from the 
battlefield and the negotiating table.  As the likelihood of a favorable outcome 
decreases, the culpable leader becomes assured of punishment, as his perceived 
responsibility for the war, in combination with the expected poor war outcome, will 
lead internal audiences to conclude that he is incompetent.  Having passed the 
threshold of near certain punishment, the culpable leader has nothing to lose by 
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 Research in the criminology literature suggests that the threat of punishment 
impacts behavior – in this case the decision to terminate or continue a war – when it 
meets the following three requirements: it is severe, certain, and swift (Bailey and 
Smith 1972; Howe and Brandau 1988; Howe and Loftus 1996; Paternoster 1987; Yu 
1994).  Arguably, each of these conditions is met with regard to the threat of leader 
punishment during civil war.  First, the forms of punishment a leader faces during 
civil war are severe – even loss of political office, the least severe form – is a 
relatively serious consequence of failed policies. Second, the prospects of punishment 
are relatively certain once a culpable leader’s prospects for victory decline past a 
certain threshold.  Finally, punishment of civil war leaders often takes place through 
irregular means and does not occur at specified times through regulated elections or 
the like.  This ensures that some level of imminent threat is always felt by leaders 
involved in civil war, thereby fulfilling the third and final requirement for the threat 




continuing the fight in the hope of turning the tide and achieving victory.  While 
achieving victory may not be likely, the probability of a favorable outcome is greater 
than zero if the culpable leader continues the fight, making his probability of 
punishment less than one.  Should he settle on losing terms as the likelihood of 
victory diminishes, on the other hand, the culpable leader’s probability of victory 
decreases to zero, which ensures punishment with probability one.  Thus, the higher 
variance, higher risk strategy of continuing the fight yields the culpable leader a 
higher utility than termination on unfavorable terms.
25
  Because the attribution of 
blame for war losses is less likely to pass to non-culpable leaders, they will not face 
the same incentive to gamble for resurrection when faced with the probability of 
compromise or moderately unfavorable war outcomes.
26
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 The theory also implies that leaders process information revealed through conflict 
differently depending upon their individual expected payoffs for continuing versus 
terminating a conflict.  Battlefield gains and losses reveal information about each 
side’s relative strength and resolve and thus the likely outcome of the conflict.  That 
information has different implications, however, depending upon the leader’s 
vulnerability to punishment. Culpable leaders, faced with evidence that they will 
likely lose the conflict, are likely to increase their war aims and continue the fight.  
Non-culpable leaders, in contrast, will seek and accept compromise settlements.  
UNITA leader Paulo Lukamba Gato provides a prime example; as a non-culpable 
leader, he quickly agreed to a settlement that had been rejected by culpable leader 
Jonas Savimbi when faced with advancing Angolan government troops. 
26
 It may be the case that the behavior I attribute to culpability and incentives to 
gamble for resurrection is instead a result of leaders who are ‘true believers’ in the 
cause and are therefore unwilling to concede.  I argue that culpability provides a 
better explanation for the observed patterns of behavior, however, because it provides 
a better explanation for why even some hard-liners, upon coming to power, choose to 
settle on compromise terms.  Paulo Gato of UNITA, for example, was considered a 
militant member of the organization, consistently favoring the military option against 
UNITA as a member of the group’s Political Bureau.  Upon taking the leadership role 
in the organization, however, Gato – a non-culpable leader – agreed to a compromise 
settlement which he had not advocated previously.  The differential in expectations of 




Thus, internal audience members cannot ensure that culpable rebel and state 
leaders carry out their duties faithfully (i.e. pursue the group’s interests rather than 
their own), due to their inability to monitor the leader’s behavior and apply real-time 
sanctions, because goal conflict between leaders and constituents generates incentives 
for the culpable leader to take advantage of his informational advantage and pursue 
his own self interest at the expense of the group he represents (Downs and Rocke 
1994; Feaver 2005; Leventhal 1988; Tirole 1988). 
 
IV. Culpability, Gambling for Resurrection, and Opponent-Based Punishment 
The theoretical discussion thus far has focused on a leader’s incentives to 
avoid internal punishment – removal at the hands of his winning coalition.  During 
civil war, however, leaders also face an often severe threat of punishment by the 
adversary.  This opponent-inflicted punishment occurs when the wartime adversary, 
rather than the internal audience, punishes the leader.  This type of punishment is thus 
at least implicitly sanctioned or at most explicitly ordered by the adversary’s military 
or political leadership. 
Internal conflicts are characterized by shared national territory, over which a 
single political system and legal structure extends.  Consequently, during and at the 
conclusion of the conflict, unless it ends in secession by the rebel group and partition 
of the state, the combatant groups share a single national territory and fall under the 
jurisdiction of a single sovereign political/legal system.  This makes punishment by 
                                                                                                                                           
explanation for why wartime hawks such as Gato change course, taking a conciliatory 




the opponent a much more common occurrence in civil conflict than in the interstate 
context, where opponent punishment is generally only precipitated by total defeat and 
occupation.
27
  Opponent, or adversary, based punishment is thus a more important 
consideration for leaders engaged in civil conflict than those fighting internationally.  
The logic of adversary-inflicted punishment is discussed in this section.  
As argued above, leaders who are viewed as responsible for the war and who 
perform poorly in the conflict are likely to be judged as incompetent by their winning 
coalitions.  Because of their culpability, these losing leaders have incentives to 
continue the fight in order to avoid internal punishment.  This phenomenon is called 
gambling for resurrection, and is driven by the culpable leader’s personal incentives. 
Importantly, these incentives to gamble for resurrection internally exacerbate 
commitment problems externally (i.e. with the adversary).  Credible commitments to 
peace are notoriously difficult to make in the context of civil war; conflict recurrence 
is a common and serious problem for states as they emerge from war (Fortna 2004; 
Mason et al. 2011; Quinn, Mason, and Gurses 2007; Toft 2009; Walter 2004).  The 
consolidation of peace is fraught with difficulties and challenges, not least of which is 
the threat that the defeated group will reorganize, regroup, and re-launch its violent 
challenge.  The difficulties associated with agreeing to and implementing settlement 
agreements that successfully terminate conflict arise because steps taken toward 
peace – specifically demobilization and reintegration – are inherently threatening to 
the actor taking these steps.  Every move toward peace renders the group less-able to 
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 Because of the rarity of opponent punishment in the interstate context, this type of 




defend itself should the opponent decide to attack.  This is the classic commitment 
problem as articulated in the civil conflict literature (Walter 2002).  
While existing literature conceptualizes commitment problems as a group-
level phenomenon, I argue that leader-specific incentives are an important source of 
variation in the severity of commitment problems that existing literature largely 
ignores.  Specifically, a culpable leader’s incentives to gamble for resurrection, 
deriving from the threat of internal punishment, make him less able to commit to 
ending the war or to implementing any agreed upon settlement deal.  Similar to 
group-level insecurities, leader-specific vulnerabilities to punishment will make it 
difficult for a culpable leader to commit to a process which threatens his political or 
physical survival.  Thus in the current Syrian crisis, for example, international peace 
proposals that envisage a power transition in which Bashar al-Assad steps down from 
power without any guarantees for his or his family’s personal safety have been 
continually rejected by the Syrian head of state.  Threats of international criminal 
prosecution or exile, furthermore, only serve to decrease the likelihood that Assad 
commits to any sort of compromise settlement, as these threats further undermine his 
prospects for continued power and security. 
Recognizing that the culpable leader is unlikely to be able to commit to 
ending the war because of his personal vulnerability to punishment, adversary elites 
will have strong incentives to try to remove him from power in the hope that a non-
culpable leader takes his place.
28
  These incentives follow from the assumption, 
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 Recent research on leadership decapitation in the counterinsurgency and terrorism 
literatures provides strong evidence that removing and otherwise punishing adversary 




outlined earlier, that adversary elites prefer to face an opponent leader who can make 
credible commitments to peace, and from the expectation that war will be more 
costly, longer, and more likely to end in defeat when a culpable adversary leader 
remains in power.    
It follows that the counter-productive consequence of internal incentives for 
culpable leaders to gamble for resurrection is a worsening of the threat of adversary-
based punishment.  Because the threat of internal punishment increases the leader’s 
incentives to continue the fight, it simultaneously increases the probability that the 
opponent will seek to punish the culpable leader in order to facilitate termination and 
deter conflict recurrence.  This, in turn, increases the culpable leader’s vulnerability, 
reinforcing his incentive to continue the fight in the hope of achieving victory or 
extracting personal security guarantees to ensure his personal safety.  Because non-
culpable leaders have fewer internal incentives to renege on settlement deals or re-
launch the conflict, they will also face a lower expectation of punishment from the 
adversary.  Non-culpable leaders will be viewed as more trustworthy negotiating 
partners, and the adversary will be more willing to envisage a post-conflict scenario 
in which the non-culpable leader remains an important domestic political figure.  The 
non-culpable leader’s distance from the original decision to go to war affords him 
greater flexibility to negotiate and settle with the opponent on compromise terms 
                                                                                                                                           
2012; Johnston 2012; Price 2012).  These analyses, however, do not examine 
variation in the likelihood of a state using this strategy.  This theory has important 
implications for these studies’ initial findings, suggesting that combatants will have 





without the imminent threat of exile, imprisonment, or assassination at the hands of 
the adversary. 
The logic of insecurity due to the threat of adversary-based punishment played 
out in Angola in the mid 1990s.  UNITA founder and leader Jonas Savimbi’s personal 
vulnerabilities played a large role in stalling the implementation processes of both the 
1991 Bicesse Accord and the 1994 Lusaka Protocol designed to end the 20 year 
conflict in the country.  Savimbi refused to take up his position in the Angolan 
government and stayed away from Luanda, out of fear that he would be assassinated 
or imprisoned should he enter the capital.  Savimbi’s inability to commit to these 
peace processes out of personal security fears ultimately spelled disaster for both 
agreements, and in each case, the country returned to war shortly after the settlement 
failed.   
 
V. Empirical Implications 
The theory developed above argues that culpable leaders will anticipate a 
higher likelihood of punishment from both internal and opponent-based sources than 
non-culpable leaders when they experience poor war outcomes.  Recognizing this, 
culpable leaders will respond to battlefield and negotiating table information 
differently than their non-culpable counterparts.   
These varying incentive structures for culpable and non-culpable leaders have 
important implications for war termination and outcomes.  As they update their 
expectations regarding the likely outcome of the conflict with new battlefield 




non-culpable leaders will be more willing to terminate on compromise or moderately 
losing terms.  That is, culpable leaders, when faced with the likelihood of a loss and 
subsequent punishment, will adopt the high-variance strategy of continued conflict 
rather than the low-uncertainty strategy of settlement.  Continued fighting buys the 
culpable leader time to attempt to turn the tide of war, achieve a favorable outcome, 
and avoid punishment.  This logic suggests the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Civil wars are less likely to terminate when culpable leaders are in 
power. 
 
Because culpable leaders have incentives to redouble the war effort when 
faced with possible defeat, culpability is also likely to affect civil war outcomes.  
Specifically, culpable leaders whose gambles pays off – those who manage to hold 
their ground and make inroads against the adversary – will achieve major victories 
more often than their non-culpable counterparts, who would have settled on 
compromise or moderately losing terms when the hope of victory initially diminished.   
The decision to gamble for resurrection, however, will not always pay off.  
Having stronger incentives to win does not mean that culpable leaders will always be 
able to do so. While all culpable leaders have incentives to try to achieve total 
victory, other factors such as relative strength, resolve, and the ability to avoid costs 
will affect which gambles actually succeed.  Leaders who pass up settlement offers 
only to lose additional battles, territory, or troops make their groups worse off than 




stronger position.  This suggests that culpable leaders will ultimately preside over 
more major victories and more major defeats than non-culpable leaders.   
Non-culpable leaders, on the other hand, have a significantly lower 
expectation of punishment, as they can distance themselves from much of the 
responsibility and blame for the war, and thus from charges of incompetent execution 
of the war effort.  This provides non-culpable leaders more freedom to negotiate and 
compromise as the likelihood of victory diminishes.  The following hypothesis 
follows from this logic: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Culpable leaders are more likely to experience extreme war outcomes 
than their non-culpable counterparts. 
 
 Extending this logic suggests that a leader’s culpability will affect the 
likelihood of concessions at termination as well.  Specifically, a culpable leader is 
expected to be more constrained with regard to his ability to make concessions to end 
the war than a non-culpable leader.  Because of their association with and 
responsibility for the war, culpable leaders’ fates are tied closely to the goals they 
establish at the conflict’s start.  Any movement toward compromising on central war 
aims will be viewed as evidence by internal audiences of the leader’s incompetent 
execution of the war effort, due to his close association with the goals established at 
the start of the war, and will increase the likelihood of punishment.  
Non-culpable leaders, on the other hand, can distance themselves from the 




compromise on central war aims without being viewed as an incompetent leader by 
internal audiences.  This reduces the threat of internal punishment, while also 
mitigating fears of adversary-based punishment for the leader who can avoid 
responsibility for the war.  This suggests the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Culpable leaders are less likely to make concessions with regard to 
central war aims than non-culpable leaders. 
 
 Finally, the theory presented above makes clear predictions regarding the 
mechanism underlying the relationship between leader culpability and war 
termination and outcome.  Specifically, the threat of punishment is expected to drive 
culpable leaders’ wartime decision-making, and thus the duration and outcome of 
conflict.  Culpable leaders are expected to anticipate a higher likelihood of 
punishment from both internal and opponent-based sources than non-culpable leaders 
when they perform poorly in war, as they are viewed as responsible for the decision 
to go to war, and thus for any setbacks suffered during the conflict.  This proposition, 
underlying the relationship between culpability and war termination/outcomes, yields 
the final hypothesis:   
     
Hypothesis 4: Culpable leaders are more likely to be punished following unfavorable 







The goal of this chapter was to develop a theory of civil war termination and 
outcome that derives from relaxing the unitary actor assumption generally imposed in 
studies of civil conflict.  Drawing upon principal-agent framework and commitment 
problem theories of civil conflict termination, I presented a theory of civil war 
termination and outcome focused on the incentives of rebel and state leaders.  I 
argued that the threat of punishment from two sources – internal audiences and 
adversary elites – affects a leader’s utility for termination and therefore the war 
outcomes he achieves.  Constituents use information provided by war outcomes and 
the leader’s culpability for the war to determine whether a leader is competent.  
Culpable leaders are more likely to be perceived as incompetent should they suffer 
war losses, and will therefore have a heightened expectation of punishment.   
 This suggests that culpable leaders will have incentives to gamble for 
resurrection when the war is going poorly, extending and escalating the conflict in the 
hope of achieving victory and avoiding punishment.  Non-culpable leaders, on the 
other hand, will have little incentive to extend a losing war because they are less 
likely to be branded incompetent due to poor war performance, and therefore have a 
lower expectation of punishment.   
 The threat of punishment by the opponent also affects leaders’ wartime 
behavior.  Adversary elites have incentives to punish their opponent’s leader if that 
leader is unable to make credible commitments to peace.  Culpable leaders who 
preside over poor war outcomes will suffer particularly severe commitment problems 




threat of adversary-based punishment further reinforces the culpable leader’s 
incentives to continue the fight in the hope of achieving victory and avoiding 
punishment from both internal and opponent-based sources.   
 I hypothesized, based on this theoretical argument, that culpable leaders will 
be less likely to terminate an ongoing war and more likely to preside over extreme 
war outcomes than their non-culpable counterparts.  I also hypothesized that they will 
be less likely to make concessions at termination than non-culpable leaders.  Finally, 
based upon the underlying logic of the argument, I hypothesized that culpable leaders 
will be more likely to face punishment for poor war outcomes than non-culpable 
leaders who perform similarly poorly in civil war.  These hypotheses are tested in the 
next two chapters.  Additional hypotheses regarding culpability’s potential 






Chapter 3 : Statistical Analysis of Leader Culpability’s Impact on 




The preceding chapter presented a theory of civil war termination and 
outcome that identified state and rebel leaders’ incentives to avoid punishment as a 
central factor influencing each warring party’s termination calculus.  It built upon 
principal-agent framework and commitment problem theories of civil conflict, 
arguing that internal audiences and opponent elites are more likely to punish culpable 
leaders who perform poorly in war than non-culpable leaders whose war performance 
is similarly poor.  This higher expectation of punishment generates perverse 
incentives for culpable leaders to ‘gamble for resurrection’, extending a losing war 
and striving for total victory in order to ensure his own political survival and to 
eliminate the threat of internal and opposition punishment. 
Responsibility for the conflict thus systematically alters a leader’s anticipated 
payoffs for termination on favorable versus unfavorable terms.  This, in turn, alters 
the likelihood of termination as well as the likely outcome achieved by each actor.  
This chapter presents the research design and data collected to test the hypotheses on 
civil war termination and outcome developed in the previous chapter, and presents the 
results of statistical tests.  
 The empirical analysis presented below demonstrates that factors affecting a 




leader’s culpability for the war – critically influence the likelihood of war 
termination/settlement and the type of outcome the leader is willing to accept.  
Because of their increased risk of both internal and opponent-based punishment, 
culpable leaders fight longer than their non-culpable counterparts.  They also preside 
over more extreme outcomes than their non-culpable counterparts, and are less likely 
to make concessions at termination than non-culpable leaders. 
 This chapter proceeds as follows.  First, I describe the new dataset that was 
designed and collected, based on original research, for this project.  I discuss the 
coding of the dependent and independent variables in the next sections, describing 
limitations in existing war outcome coding schemes and how this new dataset 
overcomes those limitations.  Next, I present the results of the main statistical 
analyses, which provide strong statistical support for the theoretical expectations 
described in Chapter 2.  The fourth section presents the results of a variety of 
robustness checks using alternative variable specifications, alternative modeling 
strategies, and tests to account for the potential endogeneity of leader culpability.  
These robustness checks provide additional evidence in support of the relationship 
between culpability and war termination/outcomes, and demonstrate that the 
statistical results are not sensitive to a variety of specification changes.  The final 
section discusses the implications of these results and remaining empirical questions.  
Statistical tests of the punishment mechanism developed in the previous chapter are 





II. Dataset and Research Design 
2.1 Hypotheses 
The previous chapter laid out three primary hypotheses regarding the impact 
of a leader’s responsibility for the war on its termination and outcome.  To review, 
these hypotheses are the following: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Civil wars are less likely to terminate when culpable leaders are in 
power. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Culpable leaders are more likely to experience extreme war outcomes 
than their non-culpable counterparts. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Culpable leaders are less likely to make concessions with regard to 
central war aims than non-culpable leaders. 
 
 
2.2 The Dataset 
This section discusses the original dataset collected for this dissertation, the 
operationalization of key variables, and research design.  Several innovations in 
research design and measurement of variables were necessary in order to test the 






New Dataset of Civil War Leaders 
Based on original research, I developed a new dataset on civil war leaders 
specifically for this dissertation.  The dataset includes information on all state and 
rebel leaders for a random sample of 102 warring dyads, representing 60 unique civil 
conflicts, between 1980 and 2010.
29
  This random sample was selected from the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s (UCDP) Dyadic Dataset of armed conflicts 
(Themnér and Wallensteen 2012).  It includes both low-intensity (25 to 999 battle 
deaths per year) and high-intensity (at least 1,000 battle deaths per year) conflicts, 
and includes conflicts from all regions of the world.  The regional distribution of 
cases is presented in the first column of Table 3.1 below.  As Table 3.1 demonstrates, 
Africa is strongly represented, comprising approximately half of the dyads included 
in the dataset.  Asian civil wars are the next most common in the dataset, representing 
approximately 20 percent of the conflict dyads in the dataset.  The remaining regions 
comprise approximately 10 percent of the dataset each.  While at first glance this case 
distribution suggests that Africa and Asia may be over-represented in the dataset 
relative to other regions, a comparison with the UCDP dyadic armed conflict dataset 
from the post-1980 period indicates otherwise.  The distribution of civil conflict 
dyads for the same time period in the UCDP data, presented in the second column of 
Table 3.1, closely mirrors the case distribution in the dataset developed for this 
project.    
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 Civil wars ongoing at any time between 1980 and 2010 were eligible for inclusion 
in the sample.  Some conflicts selected were ongoing as of 1980.  For these cases, 
information from the start of the conflict is included.  Several dyads experience more 










UCDP Dyadic Data 
Frequency (%) 
Americas 8 (7.8%) 22 (7.5%) 
Europe 12 (11.8%) 29 (9.9%) 
Africa 52 (50.9%) 142 (48.3%) 
Middle East 9 (8.8%) 31 (10.5%) 
Asia 21 (20.6%) 70 (23.8%) 
Total 102 294 
 
 
Testing hypotheses on the impact of leaders’ characteristics on war outcomes 
requires a data structure that treats the leader as the unit of analysis.  While studies of 
international conflict have used this data structure in the past, to my knowledge, no 
cross-national quantitative analysis of civil conflict has undertaken an analysis in 
which the leader is the unit of analysis.  It was therefore necessary to collect original 
data to identify each state and rebel leader involved in each of the conflicts included 
in the sample.  Existing data sources provide information on state leaders (Goemans, 
Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009), but no comprehensive, cross-national dataset on rebel 
leaders exists.   
To test the hypotheses developed in chapter 2, therefore, I collected original 
data on all leaders of each rebel group included in the sample.  To identify rebel 
leaders, I emphasized power over title: those individuals who exert final decision-
making authority over broad group policy were identified as rebel leaders.  In cases 
where rebel groups included both political and military wings, research was done to 
identify which branch of the organization held more power.  In some cases, the locus 
of power within a rebel organization shifts over time.  Thus with the Provisional Irish 




seems to have shifted by the early 1980s from the Dublin-based Army Council to the 
Northern Ireland branch of the organization headed by Gerry Adams and affiliated 
closely with Sinn Fein, the political wing of the organization.  A variety of sources 
were consulted to identify rebel leaders, their post-conflict fates, their relationships to 
first leaders, and their roles in the organization throughout each conflict.
30
   
Data on state leaders was adapted from an existing data source, the 
ARCHIGOS dataset (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009), which provides 
information on all state leaders from 1875-2004.  ARCHIGOS defines ‘leader’ by 
emphasizing power over title; figureheads are excluded in favor of individuals who 
exert real authority over strategy decisions and bear ultimate responsibility for state 
policy.  As such, this dataset corresponds well with the criteria established to identify 
rebel leaders.  Because these data are updated only through 2004, additional research 
was done to identify leaders in power for those conflicts in the dataset ongoing 
between 2005 and 2010. 
The result of this research is an original dataset in which the civil conflict 
leader is the unit of analysis.  The dataset includes all state and rebel leaders of the 
randomly sampled civil war dyads between 1980 and 2010, a total of 479 leaders.  Of 
these, 286 (59.71%) are state leaders and 193 (40.29%) are rebel leaders.  This 
indicates that turnover in state leadership is somewhat more common during intrastate 
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 A sample of sources consulted includes: 1) news databases such as Factiva, Lexis 
Nexis, and Keesings, 2) secondary sources such as books on specific conflicts or 
groups (Denov 2010; Martinez 2000; O’Brien 1999), 3) encyclopedic sources on 
rebellion and terrorism (Mulaj 2010; Szajkowski 2004), 4) online databases such as 
the UCDP Database and the START Center Database, 5) a variety of primary 
sources, including UN and government documents, as well as manifestoes, press 
releases, and other available documents from the rebel groups themselves.  Specific 




conflict than is rebel leader turnover, but that turnover is fairly common among both 
states and rebel groups involved in civil conflict.  Indeed, state parties to conflict 
average 2.4 leaders per conflict, while rebels average 1.6 leaders per conflict.  There 
is significant variation across conflict actors in wartime leadership volatility.  While 
approximately 58 percent of the rebel and state actors in the dataset experience no 
leadership changes during the course of the conflict, thus having only one leader, the 
42 percent of states/groups that do experience leadership change vary in their number 
of war-time leaders from 2 to twelve.  Table 3.2 provides descriptive information on 
leader volatility for the war combatants included in the dataset.   
 
Table 3.2 Leadership Volatility during Civil War 
Position of 
Wartime Leader 






First 240 (50%) 120 (42%) 120 (62%) 
Second 101 (21%) 57 (20%) 44 (23%) 
Third 53 (11%) 36 (13%) 17 (9%) 
Fourth 29 (6%) 24 (8%) 5 (3%) 
Fifth 17 (4%) 15 (5%) 2 (1%) 
Sixth 11 (2%) 9 (3%) 2 (1%) 
Seventh 8 (1.7%) 6 (2%) 2 (1%) 
Eighth 6 (1.3%) 5 (1.8%) 1 (<1%) 
Ninth 5 (1%) 5 (1.8%)  
Tenth 3 (<1%) 3 (1%)  
Eleventh 3 (<1%) 3 (1%)  
Twelfth 3 (<1%) 3 (1%)  
Total 479 (100%) 286 (59.7%) 193 (40.3%) 
 
 
Research Design for War Duration and Outcome Analyses 
 Two different research designs are used in the analysis of war duration and 




newly collected data on leaders to create a dataset in which the conflict-dyad-year is 
the unit of analysis.  Information on leader culpability is thus incorporated at the dyad 
level (i.e. one or both leaders can be coded as culpable in any given dyad year).  The 
coding of culpability is discussed further in section 2.4 below.  The termination-
leader is the unit of analysis in the tests of hypotheses 2 and 3 on conflict outcomes 
and concessions.  Specifically, each leader that is in power at the end of a given 





2.3 Dependent Variables: War Termination, Outcome, and Concessions 
War Termination 
 The dependent variable used to test the impact of leader culpability on war 
duration is a dummy variable coded one in the year a given conflict ends.  The 
variable takes on a value of zero for all ongoing conflict years.  Of the 120 dyadic 
conflict episodes included in the dataset, 14 are ongoing as of 2010, the final 
observation year included in the dataset.  One hundred and six terminations, 
therefore, are coded in the dataset, representing approximately 10 percent of the 
observation years in the dyad-episode-year dataset used for the war duration analysis 
(see Table 3.3 below).  The conflicts range in duration from one year to 48 years, 
with the average civil war in the dataset lasting 8.65 years. 
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 These non-termination leaders are included, however, in the analysis of leader 




Table 3.3 War Termination DV Descriptive Statistics 
DV Value Frequency (%) 
Ongoing (0) 932 (89.8%) 
Terminated (1) 106 (10.2%) 
Total Observation Years 1038 
 
 
War Outcome in Existing Literature 
A survey of the quantitative literature on civil war outcome and recurrence 
reveals a largely consistent tendency: empirical analyses in this field generally 
focuses on the determinants of negotiated settlement, settlement versus victory, or the 
differences among negotiated settlement, government victory, and rebel victory 
(Brandt et al. 2008; Mason and Fett 1996; Mason, Weingarten, and Fett 1999; Nilsson 
2010; Walter 1997).  Others build upon this basic categorization, adding additional 
categories such as truce and treaty (DeRouen and Sobek 2004), low activity (D. E. 
Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009; Kreutz 2010), and ceasefire/stalemate 
(Mukherjee 2006; Toft 2009).  While the number and type of categories used to 
classify civil war outcomes vary, the basic trend is consistent: civil war outcomes are 
defined (1) at the conflict or dyad level and (2) relative to the opponent, rather than 
relative to the warring actor’s own aims. 
These existing coding schemes are not appropriate for the current project for 
two reasons, one conceptual and one methodological.  First on theoretical grounds, 
the theory developed in Chapter 2 suggests that leaders will be unwilling to settle on 
terms that leave them open to punishment from internal or opponent-based audiences.  
Testing this proposition requires identifying the level of favorability of a war outcome 




defeat, and negotiated settlement provide some preliminary information on 
favorability (i.e. a defeat is clearly unfavorable, while a victory is highly favorable 
and a settlement is often somewhere in between), these broad groupings mask 




In particular, conflicts ending in negotiated settlement, low activity, or 
stalemate/ceasefire show significant variation within each of these categories with 
regard to their level of favorability.  Mauritania, for example, signed a peace 
agreement with POLISARIO in 1979, ending its war in the Western Sahara.  In the 
agreement, Mauritania gave up all claims to Western Sahara, recognized Polisario as 
the representative of the Saharawi people, and agreed to withdraw all troops from the 
disputed territory.  While both Mauritania and Polisario achieved an outcome of 
‘negotiated settlement’ in this conflict dyad, the agreement was highly favorable to 
Polisario, while Mauritania essentially capitulated on all major issues. 
This high level of variation is also apparent among conflicts identified as 
ending through ‘low activity’.  As Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2009, 587) 
acknowledge, “there can be real ambiguities as to whether an outcome is ‘favorable’ 
or not to a faction, particularly for conflicts ending in ‘low activity’, without a formal 
agreement or a clear victory.  Governments may be content with a rebel organization 
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 Fearon and Laitin (2008) identify a related limitation, arguing that wars ending in 
military victory can have aspects of negotiated settlement, while those ending in 
settlement may also be characterized by a lopsided military outcome.  Further, coding 
outcomes across different types of conflict (secessionist versus those for central 
control) introduces additional complications.  A government defeat, for example, 
means different things if the rebels are fighting for secession versus government 




that ceases to engage in violence without a decisive defeat.  Likewise, a rebel 
organization allowed de facto control over territory in the periphery without 
challenges from the government may be quite satisfied with a low activity outcome.”  
In other words, low activity might be coded for a case in which rebels are largely 
defeated and on the run, while the same outcome can be coded for a case in which 
rebel gains on the battlefield have caused the state to give up the fight.  
In addition to these conceptual limitations, existing coding schemes are ill-
suited for use in the current project on methodological grounds.  Because existing 
data define outcomes for each actor based upon how it fares relative to its opponent 
rather than its own war aims, the outcomes coded for individual actors involved in the 
same conflict are not independent.  For example, in existing datasets, a government 
victory necessitates a rebel defeat and vice versa, while a negotiated settlement or low 
activity outcome for one side is automatically coded the same for the other side.  This 
is not problematic empirically for studies that treat the conflict, dyad, or country as 
the unit of analysis, as they include only one observation per conflict/dyad.  The 
analysis of war outcomes in the current project, however, uses the combatant leader 
as the unit of analysis.  It therefore includes two observations (one state and one 
rebel) for each warring dyad at termination.  Using existing data to code war 
outcomes would therefore introduce dependence in the dependent variable between 
observations from the same conflict dyad, and thus would cause correlation among 
the error terms.  Including only one observation per warring dyad would avoid this 
statistical dependence problem, but would not address the conceptual problem 




of these conceptual and methodological issues, therefore, existing data on conflict 
outcomes is not ideally suited for use in the current analysis.  
New War Outcome Variable 
 Rather than adopt existing coding schemes which do not meet the needs of 
this project on theoretical or empirical grounds, I instead develop a new coding 
scheme for war outcomes that identifies the favorability of the outcome for each 
actor, relative to its original war aims.  This new variable measures the degree to 
which a leader achieved his state/group’s original war aims, instead of identifying 
how he/she fared relative to the opponent. 
 Specifically, this new variable is coded on a seven point scale from 3 (total 
victory) to -3 (total loss) with 0 (pre-war status quo) in the middle.
33
  A total victory 
(3) is coded for both state and rebel leaders who achieve all war aims, make no 
concessions, and overthrow their opponents.  For a rebel group, this entails military 
defeat of the central government, while for state leaders this involves militarily 
destroying the rebel group.  A major victory (2) is coded for leaders who achieve all 
war aims and make no concessions, but who do not militarily defeat their opponent.  
A major victory is therefore coded, for example, when a rebel group with secessionist 
aims achieves independence for their desired territory while the government they 
fought against remains in control of the rump state.  A partial victory (1) is coded in 
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 This coding scheme focuses on political concessions, territorial gains and losses, 
and major changes in the composition of the group or state that render it unable to 
continue the war.  It does not take into account casualties or other costs of war in the 
‘loss’ portion of the scale.  All conflict actors are expected to suffer losses and to pay 
other associated costs of war.  These costs are controlled for in the analysis, and are 
not incorporated into the coding of war outcomes because they are anticipated costs 




cases where a leader achieves some, but not all, of his group’s war aims.  A rebel 
leader with secessionist goals who achieves autonomy, or one who wishes to 
overthrow the central government but instead is awarded power-sharing, for example, 
receives a coding of partial victory. 
A status quo outcome (0) is coded in cases where the leader achieves no war 
aims but makes no concessions; essentially where the pre-war status quo remains in 
place at the war’s end.
34
  Among the loss categories, a partial loss (-1) is coded when 
a leader makes minor concessions at termination, while a major loss (-2) is coded for 
leaders who make major concessions.  The former may involve small losses of 
territory, withdrawal of claims to territory, or changes to the character of the state 
political system that do not directly/immediately threaten the composition of the 
winning coalition.  The latter, on the other hand, includes major losses of territory, 
more extreme changes to the character/composition of the government, and military 
outcomes that severely weaken but do not completely destroy the warring party in 
question.  Finally, a total defeat (-3) is coded for leaders who preside over the total 
military defeat of their group/state.  Table 3.4 provides the distribution of this 





                                                 
34
 If the pre-war status quo was the group’s goal, however, achieving the status quo 





Table 3.4 Distribution of War Outcomes 
Outcome Type Value Frequency (Percent) 
Total Defeat -3 26 (12.3%) 
Major Loss -2 40 (18.9%) 
Partial Loss -1 24 (11.3%) 
Status Quo 0 20 (9.4%) 
Partial Victory 1 35 (16.5%) 
Major Victory 2 38 (17.9%) 
Total Victory 3 29 (13.7%) 
Total  212 (100%) 
 
 
This coding scheme has two major benefits over existing measures.  First 
theoretically, it more accurately captures the favorability of the war outcome for each 
leader by identifying the extent to which he achieves his party’s war aims.  This 
directly addresses the conceptual issue in existing data and provides a more 
appropriate test of the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2.  Second, this new measure 
of war outcome introduces variation in war outcomes within each conflict dyad, 
thereby overcoming the statistical limitations of existing measures.  Returning to the 
Mauritania example from above, for instance, what was previously coded a 
negotiated settlement for both Mauritania and Polisario under the old coding schemes 
is now coded as a major victory for Polisario leader Mohammed Abdelaziz and a 
partial loss for Mauritanian leader Ould Ahmed Louly. 
A variation on this war outcome scale is used to test hypothesis 2 (extreme 
outcome) developed in Chapter 2.  Specifically, to measure extreme outcomes, I 
generate a dummy variable that is coded 1 if the relevant actor’s war outcome is 
either a total or major victory (3 or 2) or a total loss (-3).  For all other outcomes – 




dummy variable thus captures all instances in which a leader either achieves all of his 
group/state’s war aims, or achieves none of those war aims and suffers a military 
defeat.
35
  Information on the distribution of this variable is presented in Table 3.5. 
 
Concessions 
 Testing hypothesis 3 requires a measure of whether or not a leader makes 
concessions at termination.  A leader who makes concessions to end the war is likely 
to be viewed differently by winning coalition members than one who stands firm on 
his/her war aims, even in the face of defeat.  Leaders are identified as making 
concessions if they explicitly compromise on central issues at stake in the war.  
Explicit compromise is coded if the leader makes a direct statement conceding on 
central war aims, or if he signs an official settlement agreement through which he 
implicitly gives up central goals.  Antonio Bento Bembe of FLEC-R, for example, 
signed a peace agreement with the Angolan government in 2006 through which he 
officially recognized Angola as a unitary and indivisible state, thereby implicitly 
renouncing separatist claims for control over Cabinda.  Conflicts that end through 
negotiated settlement generally involve concessions-making by at least one party, 
while those that end in military victory/defeat or low activity generally do not.  In 
low-activity outcome cases, leaders often maintain their claims, refusing to 
compromise on central issue at stake, even if such compromise could potentially lead 
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 As a robustness check, I reran the analysis using alternate coding schemes for 
extreme war outcomes.  In the first alternative model, I code only total victories (3) 
and total losses (-3) as extreme outcomes.  In the second alternative model, I code 
both major (2/-2) and total (3/-3) victories and losses as extreme outcomes.  The 




to some concessions that would leave the group better off.  The concessions variable 
is coded 1 if the leader makes concessions on central issues at stake in the war, 0 
otherwise.  Descriptive statistics on this variable are included in Table 3.5.      
 
Table 3.5 Distribution of War Outcomes Dependent Variables 




0 119 (56%) 137 (65%) 
1 93 (44%) 75 (35%) 
Total 212 (100%) 212 (100%) 
 
 
2.4 Key Independent Variable: Leader Culpability 
The primary independent variable of interest in this analysis is the leader’s 
responsibility for the war, or his culpability.  As discussed in chapter 2, culpability is 
hypothesized to influence termination decisions and war outcomes by altering the 
leader’s expectation of punishment.  Culpability is defined as a leader’s perceived 
responsibility for the war, or his responsibility for the decision to involve his group in 
the conflict.  Leaders in charge of the state or rebel group at the start of the conflict, 
and those with direct political connections to the decision to involve the state/group in 
violent conflict, are considered culpable (Croco 2011).   
Culpability is measured as a dummy variable, coded 1 if the leader is culpable 
and 0 if he/she is non-culpable.
36
  A rebel or state leader’s culpability is determined 
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 As a robustness check, a four-point culpability scale is also created.  The four point 
scale ranges from high culpability (3), which is coded for first leaders, to non-
culpable (0), coded for leaders with no political connections to the first leader.  




by two factors: (1) whether he/she was in charge of the state/group when the war 
began, and (2) the nature of a replacement leader’s political connections with the first 
leader.  First leaders, those who preside over the start of the conflict, are considered 
culpable because they hold power at the start of the war.  As such, they are likely to 
be held directly responsible for presiding over the transition from peace to war by 
both internal audiences and opponent elites.  First leaders are considered culpable 
whether or not they actually initiate violence because they bear responsibility for 
either firing the first shot (initiators) or failing to prevent the dispute from escalating 
to violent conflict (non-initiator first leaders).
37
   
In addition to first leaders, rebel and state leaders who come to power during 
the war (i.e. replacement leaders) and share political or familial connections with the 
first leader are considered culpable.  Culpable replacement leaders inherit the first 
                                                                                                                                           
connections with the first leader at the start of the conflict, including state leaders 
who served in the cabinet of the first leader or who were members of the political 
inner circle of the first leader.  Rebel leaders who were co-founders of the 
organization and who held high-ranking positions within the organization at the start 
of the conflict also receive a culpability score of 2.  Low culpability (1) is coded for 
state leaders who share political connections with the first leader but were not part of 
the first leader’s inner circle, while rebel leaders receive a coding of 1 if they were 
high-ranking members of the group at the conflict’s start, but were not founding 
members of the organization.  Analyses using this alternative culpability coding 
scheme produce results that are consistent with those presented below.  The results 
using these alternative specifications are presented in section 4.2. 
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 A non-initiator first leader’s failure to prevent an attack through either a pre-
emptive strike or accommodative policies is likely to be viewed as a policy failure, 
responsibility for which again rests with the leader, thus ensuring that he faces a 
similar burden of responsibility as one who actually fired the first shot.  Furthermore, 
it can be difficult for constituents and even elites to identify ‘initiators’ in civil 
conflicts, as both sides may have incentives to portray themselves or the opponent as 
the aggressor, regardless of facts on the ground, and because of the information 
asymmetry characterizing the leader-audience relationship.  Thus, both rebel and state 
leaders in power at the start of conflict are likely to be assigned responsibility for its 





leader’s responsibility for the war by virtue of these political or familial connections 
to the first leader.  Both internal and opponent elites will assign them responsibility 
for the war with little or no discounting because membership in a first leader’s inner 
circle or political affiliation with that leader implies intimate knowledge of and 
influence over the decision-making process that led to conflict.  The clear ties 
between first leaders and culpable successors will be observed by internal audiences 
and adversaries alike, and both audiences will transfer blame for the conflict to these 
successors.   
Culpability transfers along political party lines for leaders of democratic states 
(Cotton 1986), and to leaders who were members of the first leader’s inner circle 
(political elites, members of the ruling family) in non-democratic states (Croco 2011).  
Replacement state leaders are therefore considered culpable if they 1) are members of 
the first leader’s political party, 2) were members of the first leader’s cabinet at the 
start of the war, 3) are family members of the first leader, or 4) were otherwise 
considered members of the first leader’s inner circle at the war’s start.  Ali Hussain 
Kafi, for example, was leader of Algeria from July 1992 until January 1994 and 
second leader in Algeria’s conflict with the MIA/FIS/AIS movement.  Kafi is 
considered culpable because he was one of five members of the High Committee of 
State (HCS), Algeria’s collective presidency, under the conflict’s first leader, 
Mohammed Boudiaf.  After Boudiaf’s assassination in June 1992, Kafi took over as 
chairman of the HCS.  As a member of Boudiaf’s inner circle at the start of the 
conflict, he is likely to be assigned co-responsibility for the state’s involvement in the 




 For rebel leaders, culpability transfers to replacement leaders who are co-
founders of the organization, family members of the first leader, or who hold high-
level positions within the organization at the start of the conflict.  Because rebel 
organizations generally have no regulated political competition analogous to that in 
democratic states, culpability transfers along the lines of political party co-
membership do not apply to rebel groups.  As with state leaders, replacement rebel 
leaders who were members of the first leader’s inner circle at the conflict’s start are 
likely to acquire a similar level of responsibility for the conflict in the minds of both 
internal and opponent-based audiences.  Thus leaders like Nicalau Lobato, second 
leader of FRETILIN during its war against Indonesia, a founding member of the 
organization, and its Vice President under Xavier do Amaral during the conflict’s first 
two years, inherits the culpability of his predecessor as a result of his path to the 
leadership position.  Similarly, Santu Larma, second leader of the Shanti Bahini in 
their war with Bangladesh over the Chittagong Hill Tracts and brother of first leader, 
Manobendro Narayon Larma, is considered culpable by virtue of his relationship with 
the movement’s first leader.   
Finally, non-culpable leaders are those who inherit an ongoing war upon 
coming to power, who share no political or familial ties with the first leader, and who 
held no position of power within the rebel organization or state government at the 
conflict’s start.  This category includes state leaders who do not share political ties 
with the first leader and who come from outside the first leader’s inner circle.  It also 
includes rebel leaders who did not hold high-level leadership positions within the 




conflict.  These leaders are considered non-culpable because they can concretely 
avoid affiliation with the first leader’s war aims and with the original decision to 
become involved in the conflict. 
In addition, replacement leaders are considered non-culpable if the first leader 
of the organization or state was a personalist leader.  Personalist regimes are those in 
which “access to office and the fruits of office depend much more on the discretion of 
an individual leader. . . .  Neither the military nor the party exercises independent 
decision-making power insulated from the whims of the ruler” (Geddes 1999, 121–2).  
That is, the personalist leader is one who successfully limits his “supporters’ 
influence on policy and personnel decisions” (Geddes 1999, 123).  This has direct 
implications for determining leader culpability, as the key to transferring culpability 
from one leader to the next is the perception among internal and opposition audiences 
that the new leader played an important role in the decision-making process which led 
to the initiation of conflict, and thus can be held responsible for the decision to go to 
war.  In regimes and rebel groups organized around a single strong-man (i.e. a 
personalist leader), the relevant audiences are likely to attribute sole responsibility for 
policy decisions to the leader himself.  Thus, even if a replacement leader held a high-
ranking position within the organization or the government at the conflict’s start, he is 
unlikely to inherit the culpability of his personalist predecessor.  In these cases, 
therefore, all replacement leaders, regardless of their political role at the start of the 
conflict or their connection to the first leader, are coded as non-culpable.  
Examples of non-culpable leaders include Pierre Nkurunziza, who was 




and Zau Mai of the KIO in Myanmar.  Nkurunziza was himself a rebel leader until 
the early 2000s, at which point he settled with the government, entered politics, and 
was elected president in 2005.  He thus held no position in government at the 
conflict’s start in the 1990s, and had no political connection to the conflict’s first 
leader.  On the rebel side, Zau Mai joined the KIA after the start of the war and did 
not hold a high-ranking leadership position within the organization for over a decade.  
He is thus considered non-culpable.  Non-culpable leaders are in charge at 
termination in 50 cases (23.6%).   
To test the effects of culpability on war outcomes (H2 and H3), the culpability 
of each leader in power at the war’s end is included in the analysis.  Because the 
analysis of war duration uses the dyad-year rather than the individual leader as the 
unit of analysis, variations on the basic culpability measure are used.  Specifically, for 
each dyad-year in the dataset, two dummy variables are created.  The first, One 
Culpable Leader, is coded 1 if either the rebel or the state leader in that given conflict 
year is culpable, and zero otherwise.  The second dummy variable, Both Leaders 
Culpable, is coded 1 if both the rebel and the state leader in the given dyad year are 
culpable, and zero otherwise.
38
  Thus, for example, in the conflict between the 
Philippines and the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, 
the New People’s Army, Both Leaders Culpable is coded 1 between 1969 and 1985, 
when culpable leaders Marcos on the state side and Jose Maria Sison (1969-1977) 
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 In some cases, a change in leadership that occurs during the year brings a leader 
with a different culpability coding to power, thereby changing the culpability coding 
for that particular conflict dyad.  The dyadic culpability codings used in the analysis 
are based on the culpability of the rebel and state leaders in power on December 31 of 
a given year, or, in cases where the conflict ends before December 31, on the 




and Rodolfo Salas (1977-1986) on the rebel side were in power.  One Culpable 
Leader is coded 1 from 1988 on, after Sison returned to power in the CPP but the 
state was led by a succession of non-culpable leaders.  Both variables are coded zero 
from 1986 to 1987, when both sides had non-culpable leaders in power.  Coding 
culpability in this way allows me to compare the effects on conflict termination of 
having just one versus two culpable leaders in power.  Table 3.6 includes descriptive 
statistics on these variables. 
 
Table 3.6 Distribution of Culpability Variable 




Unit of Analysis: Leader    
Non-Culpable (0) 133 (27.8%) 50 (23.6%) -- 
Culpable (1) 346 (72.2%) 162 (76.4%) -- 
Unit of Analysis: Conflict-Dyad Year 
No Culpable Leaders (0) -- -- 49 (5%) 
One Culpable Leader (1) -- -- 349 (34%) 
Both Leaders Culpable (2) -- -- 640 (61%) 
Total 479 212 1038 
 
 
2.5 Control Variables 
A variety of control variables are included in the analysis to account for 
several other factors expected to influence civil war termination, outcome, and the 
likelihood of concessions.  These control variables are introduced here, and further 
information on coding rules is presented in Appendix A.  Summary statistics for all 





 First, war combatants’ relative military power is accounted for in the analysis.  
A combatant’s relative strength has been hypothesized by a number of scholars to 
influence the duration of war, the likelihood of government or rebel victory, as well 
as the probability of a negotiated settlement (D. E. Cunningham, Gleditsch, and 
Salehyan 2009; DeRouen and Sobek 2004; Gent 2008; Mason, Weingarten, and Fett 
1999).  While empirical results are somewhat mixed, recent analyses that use dyadic 
measures of strength demonstrate that a rebel group’s military strength relative to the 
state significantly increases the likelihood of conflict termination, rebel victory, and 
negotiated settlement (D. E. Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009).  Therefore, 
to account for the influence of relative military capacity, I control for the strength of 
each war combatant, relative to its opponent, in tests of all three hypotheses.  Greater 
strength disparity is expected to increase the likelihood of conflict termination and 
extreme war outcomes, as evenly matched adversaries should be unable to achieve 
decisive victory militarily, and due to their relatively even bargaining power and 
evenly matched forces, will likely be unable to achieve a quick military or negotiated 
outcome. Strength imbalances are expected to decrease the likelihood of concessions, 
however, as actors at either end of the spectrum will be more likely to achieve a total 
victory or suffer a total defeat rather than engaging in political negotiations.   
Third Party Support 
Military support from third party states is also expected to influence a 
conflict’s duration and outcome by altering the relative capabilities of combatants 
(Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce 2008; Gent 2008).  I therefore control for the 




hypothesis 1, I control for the presence of balanced interventions, or foreign support 
for both combatants in a given year.  Balanced support is expected to lengthen 
conflict by offsetting any military deficiencies that may allow one side to achieve 
victory while also increasing the number of actors whose consent must be achieved 
before a negotiated solution is possible (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; D. E. 
Cunningham 2010).  In tests of hypotheses 2 and 3, I control for the presence of 
foreign troops supporting each leader during his/her tenure.  Foreign troop support is 
expected to increase the likelihood of an extreme outcome while decreasing the 
likelihood of concessions.  
Casualties (Costs of War) 
 The empirical analyses also account for the costs of war by including a 
measure of the war’s intensity, or the total number of battle-related casualties 
suffered.  Existing research suggests that higher casualty rates increase the likelihood 
of victory by either side (Gent 2008), suggesting that greater casualties will increase 
the likelihood of extreme war outcomes (H2). Existing scholarship is more mixed on 
the influence of casualties on the likelihood of negotiated outcomes, however (Gent 
2008; Walter 2002).  Walter (2002), for example, finds that increasing the costs of 
war, measured as casualties, increases the likelihood that actors engage in 
negotiations to terminate a conflict.  Casualties, however, do not increase the 
likelihood that those negotiations are successful in producing a negotiated settlement 
agreement.  I hypothesize that casualties will, instead, decrease the likelihood of 




increase the leader’s incentives to try to achieve the most favorable outcome possible 
in order to justify the human costs of war. 
Incompatibility (Stakes of War) 
 The issues at stake in the conflict are also expected to influence war outcomes.  
Existing scholarship recognizes that the two main classes of civil war – secessionist 
conflicts over territory and center-seeking or governmental conflicts fought over 
control of the central government of the state – are often characterized by 
fundamentally different conflict dynamics and thus different types of outcomes 
(Fearon and Laitin 2008).
39
  Some argue, for example, that secessionist conflicts have 
lower stakes than center-seeking conflicts, as center-seeking conflicts, by definition, 
represent existential threats to the state, while separatist conflicts allow for the 
possibility of a rebel victory without necessitating a total governmental overthrow.  In 
other words, the stakes in territorial conflicts are more divisible than those in conflicts 
over control of the central government (Walter 2002).  Others argue, on the other 
hand, that territory is often indivisible in civil war, leading to bargaining breakdowns 
and more intractable conflicts (Toft 2002, 2005).  Along these lines, existing research 
demonstrates that negotiated settlements are actually less likely in territorial conflicts, 
as these wars become so intractable that compromise is untenable (Walter 2002).  I 
therefore expect conflicts over control of the central government to be more likely to 
produce concessions than secessionist conflicts, while the effect on extreme outcomes 
is likely to be indeterminate.   
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 Fearon and Laitin (2008), for example, explicitly design a war outcomes coding 
scheme that takes into account the differences between secessionist and governmental 





The war termination model includes a control for whether the state party to 
the conflict has signed the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court 
(ICC).  This variable is included to account for an alternative source of punishment – 
international criminal prosecution – that may influence the behavior of rebel and state 
leaders involved in civil conflict.  Existing research suggests that ICC ratification is 
associated with the reduction of violence in some states, as it acts as a commitment 
mechanism, allowing states tie their hands and demonstrate their dedication to 
achieving peace (Simmons and Danner 2010).  Further, leaders hoping to avoid 
international punishment for their role in a conflict may have incentives to end the 
conflict in order to lower the risk of indictment by the ICC.  ICC signature is 
therefore expected to increase the likelihood of conflict termination.   
Leader Conflict Duration/Tenure 
A measure of each leader’s war-time tenure is also included in the analysis of 
war outcomes.  Longer conflict duration is expected to increase the likelihood of 
concessions and to decrease the likelihood of extreme war outcomes as the costs of 
war mount over time (Walter 2002).  Because the model of war duration uses yearly 
data, a counter and cubic polynomials of time are used instead of this measure of 
tenure length (Carter and Signorino 2010). 
Political Institutions 
 I control for the political institutions of the state and the rebel group as well.  
In line with existing findings on democracy, I expect democratic institutions to 




concessions at termination (D. E. Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009).  On 
the rebel side, I control for the presence of a rebel political wing.  Cunningham, 
Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2009) hypothesize that conflicts are more likely to end in 
negotiated settlement when the rebel group in question can pursue its political 
demands through means other than violence.  Specifically, when the rebel group has a 
political wing and can engage the political process as an alternative to violence, the 
conflict is more likely to end in negotiated settlement.  I expect the presence of a 
rebel political wing to decrease the likelihood of extreme outcomes for both rebel and 
state leaders, and to increase the likelihood of concessions by both sides.     
Mediation 
 I control for the presence of third party mediation in the models of war 
outcome (H2 and H3).  Existing literature suggests that mediation can facilitate 
conflict termination through negotiated settlement (Regan and Aydin 2006).  
Mediation efforts are therefore expected to increase the likelihood of concessions and 
reduce the probability of extreme war outcomes. 
Population and GDP per Capita 
 Finally, I include controls for population size and GDP per capita in the war 
termination model, as these controls have been shown to influence war termination in 
a variety of analyses (D. E. Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009; Fearon 
2004).  Larger population size is expected to decrease the likelihood of termination at 
any given time, while wealthier states are expected to fight shorter wars (i.e. increase 





III. Results: War Duration and Outcome 
Having discussed in detail the construction of the dataset and key variables 
used in the analysis, I now present the central findings regarding the effects of 
culpability on war duration and outcome.  Due to the binary nature of the dependent 
variables used to test hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, the primary results presented below are 
based on logistic regression analysis.
40
  Robust standard errors are clustered on the 
dyad episode for the duration models and on the conflict for the outcome models, to 
account for time dependence in the former and dependence across different dyads 
within the same conflict in the latter.   
 
3.1 Leader Culpability and War Duration 
Figure 3.1 presents the results of the civil war termination analysis (H1).  
Coefficient estimates with 95 percent confidence intervals are presented; confidence 
intervals that do not cross zero indicate that the relevant coefficient estimate is 
significant in a two-tailed test at a p-value less than 0.05.   
 As demonstrated in Figure 3.1, a civil conflict is significantly less likely to 
terminate in any given year when at least one culpable leader is in power, relative to 
instances when both the rebel and state leaders in power are non-culpable.  
Coefficient estimates for the One Culpable Leader and Both Leaders Culpable 
variables are negative and significant, indicating that both variables significantly 
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 Some robustness checks and secondary analyses presented later in the chapter use 
categorical dependent variables to examine the effects of culpability on the type of 
war outcome experienced.  Multinomial logistic regression models are used in these 




reduce the probability of war termination, relative to instances in which both leaders 
are non-culpable. 
 
Figure 3.1 Logit Results for Probability of War Termination 
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Logit Results for Probability of War Termination
 
 
Examining the predicted probabilities and first differences provides 
information on the substantive impact of culpability that is not provided by 
coefficient estimates alone in a non-linear model.  I use Clarify (King, Tomz, and 
Wittenberg 2000; Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003) to estimate quantities of 
substantive interest, specifically presenting predicted probabilities and first 
differences for the culpability variables.  In the empirical analysis of conflict 




year, given specified values for the explanatory variables.  First differences, or 
changes in predicted probabilities, are calculated by subtracting the predicted 
probability that the war ends when neither leader is culpable (baseline probability) 
from the predicted probability that the war ends when one (or both) leaders are 
culpable (post-change probability).  
 




As demonstrated in Figure 3.2, the predicted probability of a civil conflict 
terminating in a given year when no culpable leader is in power is 14.3 percent.  This 




both the rebel and state leaders are culpable.
41
  This represents an almost 50 percent 
reduction in the likelihood of termination when moving from zero to one culpable 
leader, and a full 67 percent reduction in the probability that a war ends when there 
are two culpable leaders in power, relative to none.  Presented differently, Figure 3.3 
shows that the moving from zero to one culpable leader leads to a 7 percentage point 
decrease in the likelihood of termination, while moving from zero to two culpable 
leaders results, on average, in a 9.6 percentage point reduction in the likelihood that 
the conflict ends. 
 
Figure 3.3 Substantive Impact of Culpability on War Termination 
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 All control variables are held at mean or modal values when calculating predicted 




Additionally, a Wald test for equivalence of coefficient estimates between 
One Culpable Leader and Both Leaders Culpable results in a Chi squared of 2.80, 
significant in a one-tailed test (p=0.094).  This indicates that the null hypothesis that a 
single culpable leader and two culpable leaders have equivalent effects on the 
likelihood of conflict termination can be rejected.  More substantively, it suggests that 
conflict termination is significantly less likely when both leaders in a conflict dyad 
are culpable, relative to instances when only one leader is culpable. 
 Overall, these results provide strong support for hypothesis 1 regarding the 
likelihood of war termination when culpable leaders are in power.  As expected, when 
at least one culpable leader holds power, wars are more difficult to terminate.  This 
effect is even more pronounced when two culpable leaders are in power, as both will 
have incentives to avoid concessions and to hold out for favorable terms of 
settlement. 
 
3.2 Leader Culpability and War Outcome 
Because hypotheses 2 and 3 focus on war outcomes, only those leaders in 
power at conflict termination are included in the analysis.  The leader-level sample 
for these empirical tests, therefore, includes 207 leader observations.
42
  The results for 
hypotheses 2 and 3 are presented in Figures 3.4 and 3.5, respectively.  As before, 
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 The total number of termination leaders is 212.  However, five observations are 
excluded from the analysis because the leaders involved settled multiple conflict 
dyads simultaneously (e.g. Burundi 2000, Cambodia 1991).  Because the same state 
leader settled with multiple rebel groups at once in these cases, his terminations are 
not considered independent events, and are included in the analysis only once rather 
than once for each warring dyad.  Thus, for example, Hun Sen of Cambodia is 
included in the dataset only once for the 1991 settlement agreement signed with both 




these figures graphically present coefficient estimates with a point and use line 
segments to represent the 95% confidence interval surrounding each point estimate.  
Coefficient estimates whose confidence intervals do not cross zero are significant in a 
two-tailed test at a p-value of 0.05.  
 
















95% Confidence Intervals Reported
 
Logit Results for Extreme War Outcomes
 
 
As demonstrated in Figure 3.4, the coefficient estimate for the impact of 
leader culpability on extreme war outcomes is positive and significant, indicating that 
culpability significantly increases the likelihood of an extreme war outcome, and 
supporting the expectations of Hypothesis 2.  Culpability, on the other hand, 
decreases the likelihood that a leader makes concessions to end a civil conflict, as 




negative and significant, as expected.  Initial results therefore confirm expectations 
regarding the impact of culpability on both H2 and H3. 
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To demonstrate the substantive impact of culpability on war outcomes, Figure 
3.6 presents the predicted probability of each outcome (extreme and concessions) 
when moving from a non-culpable to a culpable leader.  All other variables are held at 
mean or modal values when calculating these probabilities.  The left-hand side of 
Figure 3.6 shows that the likelihood of an extreme war outcome increases from a 
baseline of 19 percent to 68 percent probability when going from a non-culpable to a 




that the predicted probability of political concessions at termination falls from a 
baseline of 61 percent to just 15 percent when moving from a non-culpable to a 
culpable leader. 
  




Figure 3.7 graphically represents the change in the predicted probabilities of 
extreme outcomes and political concessions.  The first bar on the left depicts the 
change in the predicted probability of experiencing an extreme war outcome when 
moving from a non-culpable leader (baseline category) to a culpable leader, while the 
bar on the right-hand side of Figure 3.7 presents the change in the predicted 




culpable leader.  Ninety-five percent confidence intervals surrounding each of these 
changes indicate that both are significant; that is, there are qualitative differences in 
the types of outcomes culpable and non-culpable leaders preside over. 
 




 More specifically, a culpable leader is over 49 percentage points more likely 
to preside over an extreme war outcome than a non-culpable leader, holding all other 
variables constant at mean or modal values.  This represents a change from the 
baseline probability of approximately 19 percent to a post-change probability 68 
percent, or an approximately 250 percent increase in the predicted probability of an 




likelihood that a leader makes concessions to end the war.  While a non-culpable 
leader has a 61 percent probability of making concessions at termination, a culpable 
leader will make concessions on central war aims with only 15 percent probability.  
This indicates that culpable leaders are, on average, 75 percent less likely to make 
concessions at termination than their non-culpable counterparts.  These results, taken 
together, suggest that culpability has not only a strong statistical influence on the 
likelihood of both extreme outcomes and concessions-making, but that it also has a 
strong substantive impact on war outcomes. 
 
3.3 Control Variables 
It is useful to compare the impact of culpability to the effects of the control 
variables included in the models to get a sense of the relative influence of each.   This 
discussion focuses only on the results for the political concessions model (Model 3), 
but it is important to note that most controls behave as expected in the other two 
models.   
 As expected, a military strength imbalance between combatants, the number 
of casualties suffered during the leader’s tenure, and the type of incompatibility at 
issue in the war all significantly decrease the likelihood of concessions at termination.  
External troop support also decreases the likelihood of political concessions, though 
this result just misses conventional levels of significance.  Attempts at mediation and 
increasing the leader’s wartime tenure, on the other hand, significantly increase the 
likelihood of political concessions, as expected.  Controls for the presence of a rebel 




concessions, as expected, though both variables just miss standard levels of 
significance. 
 
Table 3.7 Predicted Probability and Percentage Change for Control Variables, 
Political Concessions Model 
 






















































 percentile for continuous variables) while holding all other covariates at 
mean or modal values. First differences are computed by subtracting the baseline predicted 
probability (covariate at low value) from the predicted probability following the change in 
the covariate of interest. I then divide the discrete change by the baseline probability and 
multiply by 100 to get the percentage change. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are 
presented in parentheses. 
 
 
Comparing the substantive effects of these controls to those for culpability 
demonstrates that culpability’s impact is large in relative substantive terms (see Table 
3.7).  Military strength imbalance, the number of casualties, leader wartime tenure, 




concessions by between 24 and 69 percent, while mediation, rebel political wing, 
democracy, and leader wartime tenure increase the likelihood of political concessions 
by between 25 and 70 percent.  Strength imbalance and leader conflict tenure have 
the largest effects, on par with culpability, at approximately -69 percent and 70 
percent, respectively.  While it is difficult to directly compare the substantive impact 
of variables, particularly those measured on different scales from one another, these 
results suggest that culpability’s impact on war outcomes is non-trivial; culpability 
has a significant and substantively meaningful impact on the likelihood of conflict 
termination, extreme outcomes, and political concessions, and produces an effect on 
par with or greater than the majority of control variables used to account for existing 
explanations of war termination and outcomes. 
 
IV. Robustness Checks 
The main results presented above provide strong support for the hypotheses 
developed in Chapter 2.  Leader culpability significantly decreases the likelihood that 
a conflict ends (H1) and the probability that a leader makes concessions on central 
issues at stake in the war (H3), while significantly increasing the likelihood that the 
relevant actor experiences an extreme war outcome (H2).  There are a variety of 
potential limitations and caveats to these findings, however, so in this section I 
undertake a variety of robustness checks to ensure that these findings are robust to: 
(1) changes in coding rules for the dependent variables, (2) changes in coding rules 




independence of outcomes across rebel and state actors, and (4) potential endogeneity 
of leader culpability.   
 
4.1 Alternative Dependent Variables 
The first set of robustness checks focuses on alternative measures of the 
dependent variables to ensure that the results are not sensitive to specifications used 
in the main analysis. In the first of these robustness checks, I re-run the war 
termination (H1) analysis using a four-category dependent variable, rather than the 
dummy version used in the main analysis.  Specifically, this alternative measure is 
coded 0 in any year a conflict is ongoing, 1 in the year a negotiated settlement is 
reached, 2 for years in which either the government or the rebels achieve a military 
victory, and 3 for years in which another type of termination occurs (i.e. low activity 
outcomes or ceasefires in which no formal agreement is reached).  The analysis for 
this alternative dependent variable is run on the same dyad-year dataset used for the 
analysis of Hypothesis 1, and uses a multinomial logit estimator due to the nominal 
nature of the DV.  The model also includes all controls from the main termination 
equation, including time controls and clustered standard errors.
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Because the theoretical argument developed in Chapter 2 focuses primarily on 
the difficulty in achieving a negotiated settlement when culpable leaders are in power, 
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 The analysis includes only the Both Leaders Culpable variable, rather than both 
this variable and the One Leader Culpable variable.  The One Leader Culpable 
variable is excluded because of a low number of observations in some of the outcome 
categories, making it impossible to run the analysis with this variable included.  The 
effect of the key independent variable, therefore, should be interpreted as the impact 
when both leaders are culpable, relative to cases in which either one or neither leader 




this test treats negotiated settlement as the base category for comparison to all other 
outcome types.  The theoretical expectation is that culpability will increase the 
likelihood that a conflict continues (0), relative to settling peacefully, and that a 
military victory by one side (2) will be more likely than a peace agreement when 
culpable leaders are in power.  Expectations are somewhat less clear with regard to 
the comparison between negotiated settlement and the ‘other’ category (3), which 
includes low activity outcomes and ceasefires.  While culpable leaders may hope to 
avoid this type of ambiguous outcome because it could be viewed by winning 
coalition members as a failure to achieve wartime goals, these leaders may actually 
prefer a low activity/ceasefire outcome to a negotiated settlement, as it allows the 
leader to avoid making explicit or overt concessions and to argue that the current lull 
in violence is actually an opportunity for regrouping and rearmament.  I thus expect 
culpability to weakly increase the likelihood of ‘other’ outcomes relative to 
negotiated settlements.         
Figure 3.8 presents the coefficient estimate for each comparison category for 
the Both Leaders Culpable variable from this model.  As this figure demonstrates, 
when both leaders in a civil conflict are culpable, continuation is significantly more 
likely than termination via negotiated settlement.  Similarly, victory by one side in the 
conflict is significantly more likely than a peace agreement when both leaders are 
culpable.  Finally, a low activity/ceasefire outcome is more likely than a negotiated 
settlement when both leaders are culpable, as evidenced by the positive coefficient 




statistically significant. A full table of results for this model is presented in Appendix 
C. 
 
Figure 3.8 Multinomial Logit Results for War Termination 
Other vs. Peace Agreement
Victory vs. Peace Agreement
Ongoing vs. Peace Agreement
-1 0 1 2 3 4
 
Coefficient Estimates for Both Leaders Culpable
Note: N=1038
95% Confidence Intervals Reported
Comparison Category: Negotiated Settlement
 




 These results indicate, as expected, that settlement of civil conflict through 
peace agreement is the least likely outcome type when both rebel and state forces are 
led by culpable leaders.  Under these conditions, both leaders will have incentives to 
avoid concessions that could leave them vulnerable to punishment, and will therefore 






Alternative Measurement Rules for Extreme Outcomes and Political Concessions 
 The second set of robustness checks in this section uses alternative measures 
of the dependent variables used to test Hypotheses 2 and 3.  In the main results, 
Extreme Outcomes were coded for leaders who experienced a major victory, total 
victory, or total defeat.  To ensure that the results are not sensitive to changing this 
variable specification, I reran the analysis using variations on this coding of extreme 
outcomes.  First, I recoded extreme outcomes to include both major and total victories 
and major and total defeats.  Second, I recoded this variable more strictly, to exclude 
major victory/defeat and include only total defeat/victory in the extreme outcome 
category.   
   
Figure 3.9 Culpability Coefficient Estimates for Alternative DV Specifications, 
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The coefficient estimates for culpability from these alternative models are 
included in the top half of Figure 3.9 below.  The coefficient estimate represented by 
the red dot is the original coding, while those represented by yellow triangles are 
those for the alternative DV measures.  As shown in Figure 3.9, the results are robust 
to these changes in measurement of extreme outcomes; culpability continues to 
significantly increase the likelihood of an extreme outcome, regardless of whether 
that is measured by including or excluding major victories and defeats. 
 The bottom half of Figure 3.9 displays the results using an alternative measure 
of Political Concessions (H3).  In the main results, the political concessions variable 
was coded 1 for leaders who made concessions on central issues at state in the war.  
In this robustness check, I recoded this variable to include all concessions, rather than 
limiting concessions to those made on substantive issues.  Thus, this alternative 
measure of concessions includes all major-issue concessions from the original 
variable, as well as those related to more procedural or secondary issues in the 
conflict.  The original coefficient estimate for concessions is represented by the red 
dot in the lower half of Figure 3.9, while that for the alternative measure of 
concessions is represented by the yellow rectangle in the lower half of Figure 3.9.  As 
these results demonstrate, culpability has a slightly weaker, yet still negative and 
statistically significant impact on the likelihood of concessions when this variable 
incorporates all types of concessions.  Culpable leaders are less likely to make any 
concessions to terminate conflict than their non-culpable counterparts, even if those 





Alternative War Outcome Variables 
Finally, this section includes two alternative dependent variables to capture 
some of the more fine-grained effects of leader culpability on war outcomes.  First, 
rather than categorizing war outcomes in terms of the existing categories discussed 
above, they can usefully be categorized according to two criteria: (1) whether they are 
militarily imposed or ‘willingly’ negotiated, and (2) whether they are favorable or 
unfavorable.  Conceiving of civil war outcomes according to these two criteria 
suggests an outcome variable with four distinct categories: (1) military loss, (2) 
negotiated loss, (3) negotiated win, and (4) military win.  This conception of war 
outcome is particularly salient for the theory developed in Chapter 2, as one important 
implication of the theory is that culpable leaders will avoid willingly conceding to 
their opponents.  That is, culpable leaders should be particularly unlikely to 
experience negotiated loss outcomes in civil war.  They should be willing to settle 
through agreement if they are able to extract concessions from their opponent through 
negotiations, on the other hand.  Additionally, they should be particularly hopeful of 
achieving a military win, as this is likely the best way to avoid punishment.  Finally, 
based upon the theory developed in Chapter 2, culpable leaders should be more likely 
to suffer a military loss than to agree to a negotiated loss, as the incentive to gamble 
for resurrection will lead these leaders to forego making negotiated concessions in the 
hope that a more favorable outcome can be achieved militarily, but this gamble will 
not always pay off.  I therefore expect culpability to increase the likelihood of all 




To test these propositions, I code a new four-category outcome variable.  A 
leader is coded as experiencing a military loss (DV=1) if his outcome is categorized 
as status quo, minor loss, major loss, or total defeat, and he does not sign a peace 
agreement.  A negotiated loss (DV=2) is coded for leaders who sign peace 
agreements and whose outcome is coded as status quo, partial loss, major loss, or 
total defeat.  A negotiated win (DV=3) is coded for leaders who achieve partial, 
major, or total victories through negotiated agreement.  Finally, a military win 
(DV=4) is coded for leaders who do not sign peace agreements and whose outcomes 
are categorized as partial, major, or total victories.  Using this 4-category outcome 
variable, I run a multinomial logit model, using negotiated loss as the baseline 
category for comparison.  The results for leader culpability are presented in Table 3.8 
below.  A full results table, including all control variables, is included in Appendix C.  
 
Table 3.8 Multinomial Logit Results for Civil War Outcome, Negotiated Loss 
Base Category 
 Military Loss vs. 
Negotiated Loss 
Negotiated Win vs. 
Negotiated Loss 
Military Win vs. 
Negotiated Loss  
Culpability 1.053 1.237 1.845 
 (0.633) (0.520) (0.683) 
 0.096 0.017 0.007 
Observations 207   




As expected, culpability has a positive coefficient for all three comparisons; 
that is, culpability increases the likelihood of military losses, negotiated wins, and 
military victories, relative to negotiated losses.  Culpability’s impact is statistically 




While the effect of culpability is slightly weaker for the negotiated loss versus 
military loss comparison, the coefficient estimate is significant in a two-tailed test at a 
p-value of 0.1.  These results indicate, as expected, that culpable leaders are least 
likely to settle for a negotiated loss.  The threat of punishment makes culpable leaders 
unable to willingly concede on major issues at stake in conflict.  They are more likely 
to forego settlement opportunities, terminating via military means, or to fight to a 
point where they can extract concessions from their opponent, thereby achieving a 
favorable outcome.    
 The final alternative dependent variable robustness check focuses on 
culpability’s influence on favorable war outcomes.  In Chapter 2, I hypothesized that 
culpable leaders would fight harder to achieve favorable outcomes in order to avoid 
punishment.  While I expect this incentive to gamble for resurrection to ultimately 
result in more extreme outcomes because leaders’ gambles will not always pay off, 
this argument also has implications for the likelihood of favorable war outcomes.  
Specifically, measureable factors, most notably combatants’ relative strength, are 
likely to influence whether a leader’s gamble pays off, resulting in a favorable war 
outcome, or fails, leading to a military defeat.  I therefore expect culpability to have a 
conditional impact on the likelihood of favorable outcomes.  When combatants are 
relatively weak, the culpable leader’s incentive to fight harder and forego settlement 
opportunities may not be enough to overcome his group’s relative weakness.  For 
combatants who are either at parity with or stronger than their opponents, on the other 




outcomes, as these leaders have both the incentive and the ability to extract 
concessions from their opponents.   
 To test this proposition, I create a favorable outcome dummy variable coded 1 
if a leader achieves a partial, major, or total victory, zero otherwise.  I interact the 
culpability measure with a 3-category measure of the group’s relative strength.  The 
relative strength variable is coded 0 if the group is weaker than its opponent, 1 if the 
group is at parity with the opponent, and 2 if the group is stronger than its opponent.  
Because this model includes an interactive term in a non-linear model, I move 
directly to the first differences to determine the statistical significance and substantive 
impact of the interaction between culpability and relative strength.  A full results table 
for this model is provided in Appendix C. 
 Figure 3.10 graphically depicts the change in the predicted probability of a 
favorable war outcome when moving from the baseline non-culpable leader to a 
culpable leader, at different levels of relative strength.  As expected, when a 
combatant group is weaker than its opponent, culpability has no significant impact on 
the likelihood of a favorable outcome.  While the first difference is positive, the 95 
percent confidence interval includes zero.  Culpability significantly increases the 
likelihood of a favorable war outcome, on the other hand, when combatant groups are 
at parity with their opponents.  Under these circumstances, the incentive to hold out 
for a favorable settlement or a military victory is likely to pay off because culpable 
leaders have greater military might backing them up.  This effect is even stronger for 
culpable leaders whose groups are stronger than their opponents.  When this is the 




percentage points, as opposed to the approximately 20 percentage point increase for 
culpable leaders at parity.  
 





4.2 Alternative Culpability Specifications 
The second set of robustness checks focuses on the possibility that the results 
for war outcomes are sensitive to the specific coding rules for leader culpability.  To 
account for this possibility, I run the outcome analyses on three alternative measures 
of culpability.  First, I create an alternative culpability dummy variable that is coded 




personalist leaders.  Whereas in the original coding scheme replacement leaders who 
follow personalist first leaders are coded as non-culpable, in this alternative coding 
scheme, replacement leaders following personalist leaders are only coded as non-
culpable if they share no political or familial connections with the first leader.  Using 
these coding rules, the number of culpable leaders in power at termination increases 
from 158 to 164.    
 The second alternative culpability coding scheme takes into account the extent 
of a leader’s culpability, rather than treating all leaders as either culpable or not.  
Specifically, the leader’s level of culpability is coded on a four-point scale, based 
upon how closely associated he/she is with the first leader and the decision to go to 
war.  All first leaders are coded as highly culpable (3) because they officially preside 
over the start of the conflict.  Non-culpable (0) continues to be coded for leaders who 
share no political connections with the first leader or who follow personalist first 
leaders. The important distinction with this coding scheme is that replacement leaders 
are coded as either moderately culpable (2) or low culpability (1).  Moderate 
culpability (2) is assigned to replacement leaders who share close political 
connections with the first leader at the start of the conflict, including state leaders 
who served in the cabinet of the first leader or who were members of the political 
inner circle of the first leader.  Rebel leaders who were co-founders of the 
organization also receive a culpability score of 2.  Low culpability (1) is coded for 
state leaders who share political connections with the first leader but were not part of 




high-ranking members of the group at the conflict’s start, but were not founding 
members of the organization.   
 The final alternative measure of culpability uses the same four-category scale 
to measure culpability, but does not code all post-personalist leaders as non-culpable.  
Instead, it treats replacement leaders who follow personalist first leaders as moderate 
or low culpability leaders if they share political connections with the first leader.  
Post-personalist leaders are only coded as non-culpable if they share no 
political/familial connections with the first leader.  The distributions for these two 
four-category culpability measures are presented in Table 3.9. 
 
Table 3.9 Distribution of Alternative Culpability Measures 
Level of Culpability Alternative Three Alternative Four 
High Culpability 206 (43%) 206 (43%) 
Moderate Culpability 75 (16%) 86 (18%) 
Low Culpability 65 (14%) 65 (14%) 
Non-Culpable 133 (28%) 122 (25%) 
 
   
The results of statistical tests using these alternative culpability measures are 
presented in Figure 3.11.  This figure presents the coefficient estimates for the 
original culpability variable (red dot), as well as all three alternative measures (yellow 
triangles), for the Extreme Outcomes equation and the Political Concessions equation.  
As these results demonstrate, culpability continues to have a significant, positive 
impact on the likelihood of extreme outcomes for all three alternative measures.  The 
impact of culpability using the alternative dummy variable is nearly identical to the 




culpability demonstrate that as a leader’s level of culpability increases, his or her 
likelihood of experiencing an extreme outcome also significantly increases. 
The results for the political concessions equation presented in the bottom half 
of Figure 3.11 also confirm that the results are not sensitive to changes in the coding 
rules for culpability.  The alternative dummy measure of culpability continues to 
significantly decrease the likelihood of concessions, similar to the result using the 
original measure of culpability.  Further, the four-category versions of culpability are 
also significant and negative, as expected.  As a leader’s level of culpability increases, 
the probability that he makes political concessions at termination significantly 
decreases.     
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Culpability over Time 
 One additional possibility is that culpability’s impact changes over time.  
Specifically, culpability may affect a leader’s expectations of punishment most early 
in his or her tenure.  Over time, the culpable leader’s expectation of punishment for 
poor war performance may decrease for two reasons: first, the leader may consolidate 
power over time, increasing the security of his hold on political power and decreasing 
the possibility of removal, regardless of war performance.  Second, leaders may 
anticipate that as they build a multifaceted reputation over time, audience members’ 
incentive to punish the leader for the war may be counteracted by an interest in 
maintaining benefits provided by the leader’s prowess in other issue areas.  This 
suggests that culpability’s impact on war outcomes and concessions may decrease 
over time. 
To test for the possibility that culpability’s impact decreases over time, I 
interact culpability with the natural log of leader wartime tenure.  Figure 3.12 graphs 
the change in the predicted probability of extreme outcomes (top graph) and political 
concessions (bottom graph) when moving from the baseline non-culpable leader to a 
culpable leader, across different values of leader wartime tenure.  As the graph for 
Extreme Outcomes indicates, culpability has its largest impact when leaders have just 
come to power, and the size of this effect gradually decreases over time.  Culpability 
remains a significant predictor of extreme war outcomes until wartime tenure reaches 
approximately 127 months (ln tenure = 4.85), or about 10.5 years.   
The conditional impact of culpability on political concessions exhibits a 




of political concessions at termination for leaders with a short wartime tenure.  The 
size of culpability’s impact actually increases slightly as tenure increases, and exerts 
its largest impact of about a 44 percentage point decrease in the probability of 
concessions when wartime tenure is about 5.75 months (ln tenure=1.75).  The size of 
culpability’s impact then decreases gradually from this maximum, but remains 
significant until tenure reaches just over 115 months, or 9.5 years (ln tenure=4.75).   
 




Overall, the results for both models demonstrate that culpability’s impact is 




tenures.  Culpability only becomes insignificant for leaders who have been in power 
for close to or just over a decade.  Leaders whose wartime tenures are greater than 
these cutoffs comprise a small percentage (approximately 10 percent) of the data.  
This insignificant result, therefore, should be interpreted with caution, as insufficient 
data rather than a discernible trend in the data may be responsible for this result. 
 
4.3 Alternative Modeling Strategies 
It is also possible that the results are sensitive to the specific modeling 
strategies used in the main analyses presented above.  To ensure that this is not the 
case, this section presents results of statistical tests using alternative model and 
sample selections.  First, I rerun the conflict termination analysis using a Cox 
proportional hazards model instead of the logistic regression model used in the main 
analysis.  The Cox survival analysis models the time to a given event, in this case 
conflict termination, without making any restrictive assumptions about the shape of 
the hazard over time.  One important assumption of the Cox model is that of 
proportional hazards (PH).  The model essentially assumes that the survival curves 
for two strata based on different values of a given independent variable are 
proportional over time.  A test of the PH assumption based on Schoenfeld residuals 
reveals that one variable in the model, ICC signatory status, does violate the PH 
assumption.  I therefore interact this variable with the natural log of time in the model 






Table 3.10 Cox Duration Results for Civil War Duration 
 Hazard Ratio S.E. P-Value 
One Culpable Leader 0.579 (0.166) 0.057 
    
Both Leaders Culpable 0.388 (0.105) 0.000 
    
Strength Disparity 0.958 (0.153) 0.790 
    
ICC Signatory 4.069 (1.108) 0.000 
    
ICC Signatory X Time(ln) 0.591 (0.103) 0.002 
    
Balanced Interventions 0.742 (0.153) 0.148 
    
Casualties (ln) 0.908 (0.036) 0.016 
    
Democracy 0.648 (0.202) 0.165 
    
Population(ln) 0.767 (0.064) 0.001 
    
GDP Per Capita (ln) 1.076 (0.104) 0.448 
Observations 1038   




 The results of this model, presented in Table 3.10, are largely consistent with 
those presented in the main analysis.  The hazard ratios for both the one leader 
culpable variable and the both leaders culpable variable are less than one, indicating 
that they reduce the likelihood of conflict termination, relative to instances in which 
both leaders are non-culpable. Both variables are significant, furthermore, though the 
significance of only one leader being culpable is slightly weaker than that in the 
original model.  Finally, the hazard ratio for one culpable leader is 0.579, indicating 
that moving from no culpable leaders to one culpable leader decreases the likelihood 
of termination, on average, by over 40 percent.  The hazard ratio of 0.388 for both 




impact on the likelihood of termination, on average reducing the probability of a 
conflict ending by over 60 percent.      
 Figure 3.13 graphs the survival function for war duration derived from the 
results of the Cox model.  This graph depicts the probability that a conflict continues 
over time when no culpable leader is in power versus when either one or two culpable 
leaders maintain political office.  All control variables are held at mean or modal 
values when calculating these predictions.  The dashed, yellow line represents the 
probability of conflict survival when both leaders are culpable, the red dash-dot line 
depicts the probability of conflict survival when either the rebel or the state leader is 
culpable, and the solid blue line shows the probability of the conflict continuing when 
neither leader is culpable.  As expected, the probability that a conflict continues is 
highest when two culpable leaders are in power across all time periods, while the 
probability of conflict survival is lowest across all time periods when no culpable 
leaders are in power.  For a conflict in its tenth year, for example, the probability that 
the war continues is nearly 50 percent if both leaders are culpable.  This falls 20 
percentage points to a 30 percent chance of continuation when only one leader is 
culpable, and drops to just a 15 percent probability of the conflict continuing, another 
50 percent reduction, when no culpable leaders are in power.  Overall, therefore, 
these results confirm those of the logit model presented in the main results section, 
and reinforce the result that culpability significantly decreases the likelihood of 










Alternative Models of War Outcomes 
 The main results for war outcomes and concessions (H2 and H3) use the 
leader as the unit of analysis, pooling all rebel and state leaders in one model.  This 
modeling decision raises two possible critiques.  First, the results may be driven by 
one type of leader rather than both; it may be the case, for example that culpable state 
leaders behave as expected, while culpable rebel leaders do not, or vice versa.  
Second, using the leader as the unit of analysis may introduce bias into the statistical 
results because state and rebel leaders’ decisions regarding when and how to end a 




conflict without at least the tacit agreement of his opponent unless he achieves a total 
victory over his opponent.  Thus, outcomes across leaders involved in the same 
conflict dyad are, to a certain degree, linked.  The tests presented in this section 
account for both of these possibilities. 
 First, to ensure that one type of leader is not driving the findings presented 
above, I rerun the analyses of extreme outcomes and political concessions for rebel 
and state leaders separately.  Figure 3.14 presents the coefficient estimates for 
culpability when using these two separate samples.   
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These results confirm that for both rebel and state leader samples, culpability 




expected, that culpability significantly decreases the likelihood of concessions for 
both types of leaders.  The coefficient estimate for state leaders is slightly smaller 
than that for rebels, but in both cases, culpable leaders are significantly less likely to 
make concessions at termination than their non-culpable counterparts.  These results 
demonstrate that the results are not driven by a single leader type, confirming instead 
that culpability influences war outcomes for both rebel and state leaders.   
 The second test in this section accounts for the non-independence of outcomes 
across state and rebel leaders by rerunning both the extreme outcomes analysis and 
the political concessions analysis using bivariate probit regression models.  
Statistically speaking, because opponent leaders’ decisions on when and how to 
terminate a war are unlikely to be fully independent of one another, there may be 
dependence in the error terms across the two relevant samples.  If this is the case, 
failure to account for this linkage can introduce bias into statistical results.  The 
bivariate probit model accounts for this, identifying the level of correlation in the 
error terms.   
 The results of these models, presented in Table 3.11, demonstrate two things.  
First, the rho parameter identifying the level of correlation in the error terms across 
the two subsets of leaders is relatively small and is insignificant in both models.  This 
suggests that there is not significant correlation in the error terms across rebel and 
state leaders, and their war termination decisions can be modeled as independent of 






Table 3.11 Bivariate Probit Results 
 DV: Extreme 
Outcomes 




























      
















      































      
























































































Observations 106  106 
 
 
Second, even using this statistical model, culpability remains a positive, 




political concessions for both rebel and state leaders.  These results indicate, 
therefore, that the modeling strategy used in the main analysis is appropriate, while 
also demonstrating that the results are robust to this alternative modeling choice. 
 
4.4 Potential Endogeneity of Leader Culpability 
Finally, it may be the case that the results presented above are biased due to 
endogeneity.  That is, a leader’s responsibility for the war may not exert an 
exogenous effect on war outcomes.  Specifically, if non-culpable leaders are more 
likely to come to power when the war is going poorly, and are therefore more likely 
to capitulate or make concessions that affect war termination and outcomes, the 
observed impact of culpability may in fact be due to unobserved factors rather than 
the leader’s culpability per se.  Statistically, the error term and independent variable 
of interest (culpability) may be correlated, which can lead to biased and inconsistent 
results.  
It is reasonable to expect leader change to be affected by recent conflict 
history, with leaders performing poorly in the war more likely removed from office 
than those whose war performance is positive.  It is less clear, however, whether the 
culpability of replacement leaders would be systematically related to the previous 
leader’s war performance.  A cursory overview of the data shows that leaders who 
leave office because of poor war performance are often replaced by culpable 
successors, suggesting that endogeneity may not be a serious problem for the 
culpability variable.  Of the 237 replacement leaders in the dataset, 106, or 45% are 




going poorly, and of those 76 leaders, 32 are culpable.  Thus, 42% of the replacement 
leaders who come to power while the war is going poorly are culpable, a percentage 
which is quite close to the average across all replacement leaders.  While this initial 
examination of the data suggests that culpability is likely not endogenous to war 
performance, further testing is necessary to systematically rule out bias due to 
endogeneity.  This section addresses the potential endogeneity issue using three 
different strategies. 
First, I use matching in order to more directly assess the causal impact of the 
treatment variable, culpability (e.g. Hill 2010).  Essentially, matching allows the 
researcher to pre-process the data so that for each ‘treated’ observation, there is at 
least one ‘untreated’ or control observation that is similar on the other covariates.  In 
other words, matching increases the similarity between observations in the treatment 
(culpable leaders) and non-treatment (non-culpable leaders) groups.  This helps 
address endogeneity to the extent that one can measure the variables influencing 
treatment assignment, or the likelihood that a given leader is culpable.
44
 
 Many different matching techniques are available.  The specific technique 
used for this robustness check is coarsened exact matching (CEM), developed by 
Iacus, King, and Porro (2011, 2012). CEM involves temporarily ‘coarsening’ all 
relevant variables into substantively meaningful categories, exact matching on these 
categories, and then retaining the uncoarsened values of matched observations for 
analysis.  More specifically, CEM involves five steps.  First, I create a new dataset 
including the controls and treatment variable from the original models.  Second, these 
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 If unobserved variables systematically influence treatment assignment, matching by 




data are coarsened into substantively meaningful categories.  Dummy variables 
remain two-category variables, while continuous variables are recoded into 
categorical variables.
45
  Third, strata, or all possible combinations of the coarsened 
variables, are created, and each observation is assigned to a stratum.  Fourth, these 
strata values are assigned to the original, uncoarsened data, and any strata that do not 
contain at least one treated and one un-treated observation (i.e. one culpable leader 
and one non-culpable leader) are dropped.  Finally, I rerun the analysis using the 
matched data, excluding unmatched observations. 
 The results of models run after this CEM pre-processing procedure are 
presented in Table 3.12.  The first column presents results for war termination, the 
second for extreme war outcomes, and the final column presents the results for the 
likelihood of concessions.  As demonstrated in Table 3.12, culpability remains a 
significant predictor of all three outcomes of interest when using the matched data.  
Culpable leaders are significantly less likely to end a war, more likely to experience 
extreme war outcomes, and less likely to make concessions, than their non-culpable 
counterparts.  Importantly, the extreme outcomes and concessions models include a 
measure of the battlefield situation at the start of each leader’s tenure, coded as 
negative (-1), status quo (0), or positive (1).  Matching on this variable and including 
it in the analysis help ensure that the observed influence of culpability is not simply a 
result of how the war is going when a leader first comes to power.  These results thus 
provide preliminary evidence to suggest that the observed effect of culpability is not 
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endogenous.  However, to the extent that unobserved variables influence culpability, 
these results are limited in their ability to mitigate bias.   
 
Table 3.12 Logit Results using Matching 
























































































































Matched Observations 741 113 113 
Estimates based on Logit. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
 
As a second step toward addressing the potential endogeneity problem, I 
estimate a logistic regression model on the subset of leaders who come to power 




leaders are more likely to come to power under unfavorable circumstances that force 
them to make concessions or end a conflict.  The dependent variable in this model is a 
dummy variable indicating whether or not the replacement leader in question is 
culpable.  The key independent variables in this model are (1) the battlefield situation 
(i.e. how the war was going before the replacement leader came to power), and (2) 
whether the last leader was punished as a result of the war.  I also include controls for 
whether there are term limits in place, whether the last leader was a transitional 
leader, whether the state is a democracy, and whether the last leader was a personalist 
leader. 
 














95% Confidence Intervals Reported
 






If the observed impact of culpability on war outcomes were endogenous, both 
of the key independent variables – the battlefield situation and the prior leader’s fate – 
should be significant, negative predictors of the dependent variable, replacement 
leader culpability.  Significant results would indicate that culpable replacement 
leaders are less likely to come to power when states are faring poorly in war or when 
prior leaders were punished as a result of the conflict.  As the results presented in 
Figure 3.15 indicate, however, this is not the case.  Neither the battlefield situation 
variable nor the predecessor punished variable is a significant predictor of the new 
leader’s culpability.  These results suggest, therefore, that replacement leaders are not 
any more likely to be non-culpable than culpable when the war is going poorly.  This 
result provides additional evidence in support of the exogeneity of leader culpability.     
However, this test also has inherent limitations.  Most importantly, because 
the unit of analysis is the leader change, the results tell us only that when there is a 
leader change, the new leader’s culpability is unrelated to the battlefield situation.  It 
does not, however, tell us whether poor battlefield performance in general increases 
the likelihood that a leadership change occurs in which a non-culpable leader comes 
to power.  This question is at the heart of the potential endogeneity issue, and cannot 
be answered sufficiently by examining the non-random sample of observations in 
which a leadership change does occur.   
To overcome this limitation, I undertake a final analysis in which I examine 
the relationship between wartime performance and the likelihood that a leadership 
change bringing a non-culpable leader to power occurs.  To carry out this analysis, I 




African conflicts.  These data come from the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset 
(GED), version 1.5 (Melander and Sundberg 2013).  The GED identifies every battle 
between a given state and rebel group, and records, for each battle, the number of 
deaths suffered by each side.  The data are available only for conflicts in Africa 
between 1989 and 2010.  The sample for analysis therefore includes 66 distinct 
combatants across 47 different conflict dyads, all from African conflicts between 
1989 and 2010. Using these events data, I created a combatant-month dataset that 
records the number of battles fought by each combatant in each month, as well as the 
number of deaths suffered by each combatant in each month.  This dataset, therefore, 
captures each combatant’s battlefield performance throughout the entire course of the 
conflict, post-1989.  
The dependent variable for the analysis is a dummy variable recording, for 
each combatant month, whether a change in leadership occurred which brought a 
non-culpable leader to power.  Specifically, this variable is coded 1 for any month in 
which a new, non-culpable leader takes power.  It is coded 0 for all months in which 
no leader change occurred, as well as all months in which a leader change occurred, 
but the new leader was culpable. This dependent variable allows me to predict 
whether poor wartime performance significantly increases the likelihood that a non-
culpable leader takes power, which is the central endogeneity concern. 
The key independent variables in this analysis proxy the leader’s wartime 
performance.  The first measures whether the group suffered higher or lower than 
average battle deaths in the last month, relative to its monthly average from the 




month are higher or lower than its average deaths per battle over the past 12 months.  
Each of these measures, therefore, gets at how the group is faring in the conflict, 
relative to recent conflict history.  Higher deaths/deaths per battle than recent history 
indicates higher costs of conflict and poorer war performance, while lower deaths or 
deaths per battle than recent history suggests stronger war performance and lower 
costs.   
Both measures are logged to reduce the influence of a small number of 
outliers.  A value of 0, therefore, indicates that last month’s deaths average (or deaths 
per battle) is equal to that from the previous year (i.e. status quo war performance).  
Values less than 0 indicate that the group suffered fewer deaths last month than its 
average over the last year (i.e. favorable war performance).  Finally, values greater 
than 0 indicate that the group suffered more deaths, or more deaths per battle, last 
month than its average over the past year (i.e. poor war performance).  Based on these 
measures, if non-culpable leaders are more likely to come to power when wars are 
going poorly – that is, if culpability is endogenous to war performance – then these 
variables will have a positive, significant effect on the dependent variable, leader 
change to non-culpable. 
Table 3.13 presents the results of two models using the two different measures 
of war performance.  Model one includes the measure of relative battle deaths, while 




battle.  Rare events logistic regression is used to estimate these models, as leadership 
change to non-culpable is a rare event in the data.
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Table 3.13 Rare Events Logit Results for Leader Change to Non-Culpable 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Last Month Deaths Relative to 





   
Last Month Deaths Per Battle 












   




   













   






   















Observations 4088 3631 
Estimates based on Rare Events Logit. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on  
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As demonstrated in Table 3.13, neither measure of war performance has a 
significant impact on the likelihood that a non-culpable leader comes to power.  In 
fact, both variables have negative coefficient estimates, which is opposite what one 
would expect if poor war performance increased the likelihood of leadership change 
to non-culpable leaders.  These results, therefore, provide further evidence that 
culpability is not endogenous to war performance.  Poor war performance, measured 
as higher deaths and higher deaths per battle than recent conflict history, does not 
significantly increase the likelihood that a new non-culpable leader comes to power.  
While these results are based upon a relatively small number of cases, the combined 
evidence from all three tests for endogeneity provide strong support for the 
exogeneity of leader culpability.    
 
V. Implications and Remaining Questions 
The results presented in this chapter provide strong support for the theoretical 
expectations developed in Chapter 2.  Statistical tests using an original dataset on the 
leaders of a global random sample of civil wars between 1980 and 2010 demonstrate 
that a leader’s responsibility for the war has a significant and substantively large 
impact on war termination and outcome.  War termination is significantly less likely 
when culpable leaders are in power, while extreme outcomes are significantly more 
likely under the same conditions.  Additionally, culpable leaders are significantly less 
likely to make concessions at termination than non-culpable leaders.  These results 
are robust to a variety of alternative variable and model specifications, and hold up 




 These results provide important new insights into the determinants of civil 
war termination and outcome, and suggest an important new avenue for research in 
the civil conflict literature.  While leader-based analyses have become prominent in 
the interstate conflict literature, the influence of leader-specific incentives has 
received much less attention in studies of internal war.  The results presented in this 
chapter clearly indicate that leaders’ personal incentives significantly influence war 
termination, outcome, and the willingness to make concessions in order to terminate a 
conflict.  These results thus highlight the importance of leaders in civil conflict 
processes.   
 While these results provide strong support for the theory developed in Chapter 
2, an important question remains.  Chapter 2 argued that a culpable leader’s increased 
fear of punishment was the central factor leading him to gamble for resurrection, 
extending conflict in the hope of victory.  This argument implies that culpable leaders 
face a higher probability of punishment following unfavorable war outcomes than 
non-culpable leaders.  This remains an open question, however, as the tests 
undertaken in this chapter do not directly test the mechanism underlying the 
theoretical argument.
47
  This remaining question is examined in the next chapter.  I 
test hypotheses on the likelihood and severity of punishment for culpable versus non-
culpable leaders, conditional on war performance.  Expectations are that leaders 
viewed as responsible for the war will be more likely to experience punishment 
following poor war performance than non-culpable leaders. 
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 An additional remaining question is whether culpability’s impact is conditional on 








The previous chapter presented results that provide strong statistical support 
for the hypothesized relationships between leader culpability and war duration and 
outcome.  However, this statistical evidence, while supportive of the relationships 
hypothesized in Chapter 2, tells us little about the underlying mechanism driving the 
correlations between leader culpability and war duration/outcome.  This chapter, 
therefore, presents additional statistical analysis to test the mechanism underlying the 
relationship between leader culpability and civil war dynamics. 
 Specifically, I argued in Chapter 2 that a culpable leader has incentives to 
continue a losing war, fighting to achieve a military victory, because he has a higher 
expectation of punishment following poor war performance than a non-culpable 
leader who performs similarly poorly in civil conflict.  Because they bear 
responsibility for the decision to go to war and the original war aims established at 
the start of the conflict, culpable leaders cannot easily avoid the personal political 
consequences of defeat.  Non-culpable leaders, on the other hand, can more easily 
shift blame onto prior culpable leaders, and can therefore more easily avoid 
punishment should they preside over unfavorable war outcomes.  It is this underlying 




expectations regarding the relationship between culpability and war termination and 
outcomes. 
 In this chapter, I quantitatively test this theoretical mechanism by examining 
whether culpable leaders do, in fact, face a higher risk of punishment as a result of 
poor or non-favorable war performance.  This chapter proceeds as follows.  In the 
first section, I review the research design and data used to test this hypothesis, 
including discussion of original data on leader punishment and war performance 
collected specifically for this empirical test.  I then present the statistical results for 
the effect of culpability on the probability of leader punishment.  Next, I present a 
variety of secondary analyses to demonstrate the robustness of the results to 
alternative coding rules and model specifications.  Finally, I conclude by examining 
the implications of these findings for the dissertation’s key theoretical argument. 
 
II. Research Design and Data 
Testing the relationship between leader culpability and the likelihood of 
punishment requires additional original data collection, beyond that discussed in the 
previous chapter.  After reviewing the hypothesis that is the focus of this chapter, this 
section discusses the data structure and research design used for the subsequent 
empirical tests and discusses the new data collected to test the effects of leader 






Chapter 2 presented one secondary hypothesis regarding the impact of a 
leader’s responsibility for the war, or culpability, on that leader’s likelihood of facing 
punishment as a result of the war.  To review, this hypothesis is the following: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Culpable leaders are more likely than their non-culpable counterparts 
to be punished following non-favorable war performances. 
 
2.2 Dataset and Unit of Analysis 
To test the relationship between leader culpability and the likelihood of 
punishment for poor war performance, I use the full dataset of 479 leaders – both 
termination and non-termination leaders – involved in the 120 civil conflict dyad 
episodes covered by the data.
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  The 25 leaders who remain in power and whose 
conflicts are ongoing as of the end of the observation period (2010) are excluded from 
the analysis, as they are not yet ‘eligible’ for post-tenure or post-war punishment.  
Seven additional observations are excluded from the analysis because (1) there was 
no single identifiable leader during that period of conflict, and therefore no individual 
for whom to code punishment (4 observations), (2) the conflict continued under a 
different dyad but with the same leaders in power (2 observations), or (3) no 
information was found regarding the leader’s post-conflict fate (1 observation).  The 
resulting dataset includes 447 observations with the leader as the unit of analysis.   
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 Existing research demonstrates that limiting the sample to only those leaders in 




2.3 Dependent Variable: Leader Punishment 
No existing studies in the quantitative civil war literature examine the fate of 
leaders involved in intrastate conflict.  Thus, no cross-national data sources on leader 
punishment as a result of civil war exist.  To test this hypothesis, therefore, I collected 
new data through original research on the fate of rebel and state leaders involved in 
civil conflicts.  Information used to code leader punishment came from a variety of 
primary and secondary sources, including secondary histories of each war, conflict 
anthologies/encyclopedias that include summaries of each conflict and information on 
the individuals involved, and a variety of news sources that provide coverage of 
major events throughout the course of each conflict.  A list of sources consulted is 
included in the bibliography.  
 As discussed in Chapter 2, leaders involved in civil conflicts face potential 
punishment from two sources: their internal audiences (i.e. winning coalitions) and 
their wartime opponents.  In addition, punishment can take a variety of forms, ranging 
from the relatively benign (e.g. loss of political power) to the relatively severe (e.g. 
death/assassination).  More specifically, I code a leader as facing war-related 
punishment if he or she experiences any of the following as a result of the war: 1) 
major fractionalization of the group he/she represents, 2) loss of political 
power/office, 3) exile, 4) imprisonment, or 5) death.
49
  
                                                 
49 Major fractionalization is included as a form of punishment because it represents a 
significant reduction in the leader’s support base, and as a result, a significant 
decrease in his or her bargaining and fighting capacity.  As a robustness check (see 
section 4.2 below), I exclude fractionalization, recoding leaders who suffer this fate 
as non-punished leaders.  As described below in Section 4.2, the results are robust to 




 Coding this variable involves two important steps: first, I identify what 
happened to each leader after his or her wartime tenure ended, and second, if the 
leader suffered any type of punishment, I determine whether that punishment 
occurred as a result of the war.  This second step represents an important departure 
from some existing literature (e.g. Goemans 2000), which codes punishment if a 
leader loses power within a year of the war’s end, regardless of the cause of that loss 
of power.  As Croco (2011) notes, it is inappropriate to assume that all leaders who 
leave office or face any other type of punishment within a given time-period have 
done so because of the war.  Hassan Al-Bakr of Iraq, for example, left office during 
that country’s conflict with the KDP due to ill health, not as a result of internal or 
opponent-based punishment.  Similarly, Ehud Barak, Prime Minister of Israel at the 
end of the first Hezbollah conflict, resigned in March 2001, just 10 months after the 
end of the conflict in Southern Lebanon.  The majority of sources agree, however, 
that Barak’s resignation had little to do with the Hezbollah conflict and is instead 
attributable to failures in negotiations with the PLO.  In my dataset, therefore, no 
punishment is coded for Barak as a result of the Hezbollah conflict.  For each leader 
in the dataset, punishment is coded if a majority of sources consulted agree that the 
war was a major underlying or precipitating cause of the punishment faced.      
As mentioned above, punishment can take a variety of forms.  First, major 
fractionalization occurs when a leader remains the head of his group nominally, but 
the group experiences a major split in which the majority of the group’s 
followers/fighters no longer view the original leader as legitimate.  In other words, 




away from the faction of the former leader and toward a new leadership, thereby 
marginalizing the former leader.  Major fractionalization is coded, for example, for 
Etienne Karatasi, leader of Palipehutu during its struggle against the Burundian 
government in the early 1990s.  After Karatasi’s failure to extract any concessions 
from the government, he remained the nominal head of Palipehutu, but was largely 
sidelined as an important figure in the movement when the FNL split from his 
political wing at the end of fighting in 1992.  Karatasi continued to claim leadership 
of Palipehutu from his base abroad in Denmark, but the locus of power among 
Palipehutu followers shifted to the FNL faction, headed initially by Cossan Kabura. 
   Second, loss of political power is coded for rebel and state leaders who lose 
their leadership position as a result of the war but suffer no additional, more severe, 
consequences.  Thus, for example, Nepalese Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala 
resigned in July, 2001, admitting in a national broadcast that his failure to defeat the 
country’s CPN-M insurgency was the reason for his resignation. 
 Exile is coded for leaders who, in addition to losing political power, are forced 
to leave the country as a result of their role in the war.  Both Momoh and Kabbah of 
Sierra Leone, for example, were ousted in military coups and forced to flee the 
country.  Momoh was ousted and forced into exile in Guinea in April 1992, when 
mid-level members of the military overthrew him due to dissatisfaction caused by the 
conflict with the RUF.  Kabbah, similarly, fled to Guinea the day after being ousted in 
a coup led by Koroma.  The latter cited Kabbah’s inability to settle the RUF conflict 




 Fourth, imprisonment is coded for leaders who lose power and are 
incarcerated as a result of the war.  Michael McKevitt, leader of the Real IRA 
(RIRA), a splinter group that emerged from the PIRA following the Good Friday 
Agreement in 1998, was arrested in 2003, convicted, and sentenced to over 10 years 
in prison for his role in the bombings and attacks carried out by the RIRA.  Somewhat 
more unofficially, Pol Pot, leader of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, was captured 
and imprisoned by one of his top commanders, Ta Mok, after attempting unsuccessful 
purges within the group.  He was put ‘on trial’ internally in July 1997, and sentenced 
to house arrest for life. 
 Finally, death is coded for leaders who are killed or assassinated as a result of 
the war.  This can happen internally, as with Karrim Kassem, leader of Iraq in the 
early 1960s, who was deposed and killed in a coup led by members of the Iraqi 
military largely because of the Kurdish rebellion.  Alternatively, punishment by death 
can occur at the hands of the opponent.  Thus, Sadegh Sharafkandi of the KDPI in 
Iran was assassinated by Iranian agents while abroad in Berlin in September 1992. 
Based on these coding rules, each leader in the dataset is coded according to 
the most severe type of punishment he or she faced.
50
  Figure 4.1 provides descriptive 
information on the distribution of punishment types across the 190 leaders in the 
dataset who experienced some type of war-related punishment.  As demonstrated, 
loss of political power is the most common form of punishment in the dataset, 
followed by death and imprisonment. 
                                                 
50 In many cases, a leader experiences more than one type of punishment.  For 
example, a leader who faces exile, imprisonment, or death also faces, by definition, 
loss of political power.  I code a leader’s punishment type as the most severe form of 








 In the main analysis presented below, these different categories of punishment 
are collapsed into a single dummy variable, coded 1 if the leader in question faced 
any type of punishment for his role in the war, and 0 otherwise.  As Figure 4.2 below 
demonstrates, 190, or approximately 43 percent of leaders in the dataset experienced 
some type of war-related punishment.  The other 257 leaders, or 57 percent, were not 
punished as a result of the war.  When breaking this down according to leader type 
(i.e. state versus rebel), Figure 4.2 shows that punishment is more common among 
rebel leaders than state leaders.  Over 50 percent of rebel leaders experience war-
related punishment, while for state leaders, punishment occurs in approximately one 









2.4 Theoretical Variables of Interest: Leader Culpability and War Performance 
In Chapter 2, I hypothesized that culpable leaders who perform poorly in war 
will face a higher expectation of punishment than non-culpable leaders who perform 
poorly in war.  This hypothesis suggests an interactive effect in which culpability’s 
impact on a leader’s likelihood of punishment is dependent upon that leader’s war 
performance.  Therefore, the key explanatory variable in this section is the interaction 
between culpability and war performance.  Culpability was discussed in detail in the 




he/she was in power at the start of the conflict (first leaders) or if he/she shares 
political or familial ties with a non-personalist first leader.  See Chapter 3 for more 
detailed coding rules on this variable.  
War Performance 
 To code each leader’s war performance, I collected original data identifying 
how the war was going at the end of each leader’s tenure.  Specifically, for each 
leader in the dataset, I coded his/her war performance as poor (-1), status quo (0), or 
favorable (1).  A coding of ‘poor war performance’ is assigned to any leader whose 
combatant group suffered significant setbacks on the battlefield, or who made 
substantial concessions to the opponent, over roughly the last one to two years of 
his/her wartime tenure.
51
  A leader’s war performance is coded as ‘status quo’ if his 
group failed to make significant military (or negotiating) progress, while also 
avoiding significant setbacks on the battlefield or at the negotiating table.  Finally, a 
coding of ‘favorable war performance’ is assigned to any leader who achieved 
substantial battlefield success and/or significant concessions from the opponent. 
For leaders in power at war termination, I used information provided by the 
data collected on war outcomes (discussed in Chapter 3) to code war performance.  
Termination leaders who achieved partial, major, or total victories received a 
‘favorable war performance’ coding.  Termination leaders who achieved status quo 
outcomes were coded as ‘status quo’ performers on the war performance variable.  
                                                 
51 The rough one to two-year window is used code all three categories of war 
performance.  Using this general guideline ensures that the coding captures the 
leader’s recent war performance; it is expected that recent performance has a greater 
impact than more distant successes or failures.  For leaders in power less than one 
year, the battlefield situation at the start of their time in office is compared to that at 




And finally, leaders whose war outcomes are coded as minor, major, or total defeats 
received a coding of -1, or ‘poor’, on the war performance variable.   
For leaders not in power at termination, additional original research was 
necessary to determine each leader’s war performance, as no existing data sources 
provide this information cross-nationally.  For the 235 non-termination leaders in the 
dataset, therefore, I consulted a variety of primary and secondary sources to 
determine the extent of battlefield and negotiating-table progress over the course of 
each leader’s tenure.  A list of sources used to code this variable is included in the 
bibliography.  The resulting war performance variable is distributed as follows: 164 
leaders (37%) receive a -1, or poor performance coding, 130 (29%) receive a 0, or 
status quo coding, and 153 (34%) receive a 1, or favorable performance, coding.       
 Finally, to account for the hypothesized conditional impact of culpability on 
punishment, I interact leader culpability with the above described war performance 
variable. This interaction term takes on values of -1, 0, or 1.   
 
2.5 Control Variables 
The model of leader punishment also includes several controls for other 
factors likely to influence a leader’s probability of facing war-related punishment.  
Specifically, I control for the severity of the conflict, the leader’s wartime tenure, 
whether the leader is based locally or abroad, whether he/she faces term limits, and 
whether that particular leader is a transitional leader.  Theoretical expectations for 
each of these variables are discussed in this section, while more detailed coding 




 First, the severity of conflict is expected to increase the likelihood of leader 
punishment.  As the severity of conflict increases, as measured by battle deaths, the 
costs of conflict shouldered by the domestic populace also increase.  In line with 
existing research, I expect increasing costs of war to increase the likelihood that a 
leader faces punishment (Goemans 2000).  Second, a leader’s wartime tenure is 
expected to decrease the likelihood of punishment, as a longer tenure may indicate a 
tighter hold on power, and thus greater resilience to attempted removal from power 
and a variety of other punishments that go along with loss of office (Croco 2011; 
Thyne 2012).  
 Third, I include a dummy variable controlling for whether the leader is based 
domestically or abroad.  While all state leaders are coded as domestically-based, 
several rebel leaders lead their organizations from bases abroad.  Hasan di Tiro and 
the other top leadership of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Indonesia, for 
example, led the group for decades from their headquarters in Sweden.  I expect 
leading from abroad to reduce the likelihood of punishment, as leaders are insulated, 
in particular, against various forms of physical punishment. 
 Finally, I include controls for term limits and transitional leaders.  Leaders 
with these constraints are expected to be less likely to face punishment, as there are 
established limitations on their time in office.  As a result, both internal and 
opponent-based audiences may have less incentive to attempt to remove or otherwise 
punish the leader, as he/she will be expected to step down from power on his/her 






Having discussed the construction of the dataset and key variables used in the 
analysis, I now present the central findings regarding the conditional impact of 
culpability on leader punishment.  Due to the binary nature of the dependent variables 
used to test hypothesis 4, the primary results presented in this section are based on 
logistic regression analysis.
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  Robust standard errors are clustered on the conflict to 
account for dependence across different dyads within the same conflict.   
 
3.1 Leader Culpability and Punishment 
Figure 4.3 presents the results for the analysis of the likelihood of leader 
punishment (H4).  Coefficient estimates with 95 percent confidence intervals are 
presented; confidence intervals that do not cross zero indicate that the relevant 
coefficient estimate is significant in a two-tailed test at a p-value less than 0.05.   
 As expected, the coefficient estimate for leader culpability is positive while 
that for war performance is negative, suggesting that culpability increases the 
likelihood of punishment while more favorable war performance is associated with 
less punishment.  However, because these variables are included in an interactive 
term in a non-linear model, neither the direction of impact nor the significance of the 
coefficient estimates for the interactive term and its constituent parts can be discerned 
based on the coefficient estimates alone (Ai and Norton 2003).  I therefore turn to the 
                                                 
52 Some of the robustness checks presented later in the chapter use an ordinal 
dependent variable to examine the effects of culpability on the severity of leader 




first differences and predicted probabilities to determine the impact of leader 
culpability on the probability of punishment, conditional on leader war performance. 
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 Figure 4.4 graphically presents the predicted probability of leader punishment 
for culpable versus non-culpable leaders, conditional upon war performance.  As this 
figure demonstrates, culpability increases the likelihood of punishment, regardless of 
the group’s fortunes on the battlefield.  The probability of punishment increases from 
38 percent to 79 percent when moving from non-culpable to culpable for leaders who 
suffer setbacks on the battlefield, from 25 to 51 percent when moving from non-




percent when moving from non-culpable to culpable for leaders who make battlefield 
progress.  These results also demonstrate that the likelihood of punishment decreases 
as war performance improves for both culpable and non-culpable leaders.       
 




 The first differences presented in Figure 4.5 provide further evidence in 
support of Hypothesis 4.  This figure presents the change in the predicted probability 
of leader punishment for non-culpable versus culpable leaders.  It clearly 
demonstrates that culpability significantly increases the likelihood of punishment for 
leaders who suffer setbacks on the battlefield and for those who fail to make 




of punishment for leaders who suffer poor war performance by 41 percentage points, 
or approximately 108 percent, while increasing the probability of punishment by 27 
percentage points (also 108 percent) for leaders who experience status quo outcomes.   
 
 




As the far right-hand side of Figure 4.5 demonstrates, on the other hand, 
culpability has no significant impact on the likelihood of punishment for leaders who 
are able to achieve battlefield successes.  All leaders who preside over favorable war 




successful culpable leaders are 7 percentage points, or about 46 percent, more likely 
to suffer punishment than their non-culpable counterparts, this change is not 
significant.  Thus, as predicted by H4, culpability significantly increases the 
probability of punishment for leaders who fail to perform favorably in war, but has no 
significant impact on punishment for leaders who are successful in conflict. 
  Overall, these results provide strong support for Hypothesis 4.  As expected, 
culpable leaders who are unable to achieve favorable outcomes or make battlefield 
progress are significantly more likely to face punishment than non-culpable leaders 
who perform similarly poorly in war.  Leaders who achieve battlefield successes, on 
the other hand, have a relatively low probability of punishment, regardless of whether 
they are culpable for starting the conflict or not.  By confirming the underlying 
mechanism developed in Chapter 2, furthermore, these results also provide additional 
support for the relationship between leader culpability and war outcomes.  By 
demonstrating that culpable leaders are, in fact, more likely to face punishment for 
poor war performances, these results support the argument in Chapter 2 that culpable 
leaders are likely to be more sensitive to the threat of punishment, which, in turn, 
affects their war termination decisions.       
 
3.2 Control Variables 
The control variables included in the model discussed above also generally 
behave as expected.  The direction of influence for all controls is as expected; 
increasing battle deaths (i.e. costs of war) increases the likelihood of punishment, 




likelihood that a leader faces war-related punishment.  Battle deaths and transitional 
status, however, are the only two control variables that have a statistically significant 
impact on the likelihood of punishment. 
 
 
Table 4.1 Predicted Probabilities and Percentage Change for Control Variables 
 




































 percentile for continuous variables) while holding all other covariates at 
mean or modal values. First differences are computed by subtracting the baseline predicted 
probability (covariate at low value) from the predicted probability following the change in 
the covariate of interest. I then divide the discrete change by the baseline probability and 
multiply by 100 to get the percentage change. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are 
presented in parentheses. 
 
 
 Substantive results for the control variables are presented in Table 4.1.  
Moving from low to high battle deaths reduces the likelihood of punishment by 
approximately 11 percentage points, or just over 51 percent.  Being designated a 
transitional leader, on the other hand, reduces the likelihood of punishment by 19 
percentage points, or over 77 percent.  The effects of leader tenure, leader location, 




approximately 25, 27, and 5 percent, respectively.  While it is difficult to directly 
compare the substantive impact of variables, particularly those measured on different 
scales, these results suggest that culpability’s conditional impact on war outcomes is 
non-trivial; culpability has a significant and substantively meaningful impact on the 
likelihood of punishment, and produces an effect on par with or greater than the 
majority of control variables used to account for other determinants of leader 
punishment. 
 
IV. Robustness Checks 
This section includes a variety of robustness checks designed to ensure that 
the results presented above are robust to variations in the dependent variable, 
independent variables, and sample selection.  As all models are non-linear and 
include interaction terms, I forego presentation of coefficient estimates, instead 
presenting first differences for each model, as these provide a clear interpretation of 
the statistical significance and substantive impact of culpability, conditional on leader 
war performance. 
 
4.1 Sources of Punishment 
The first robustness check accounts for the possibility that the relationship 
between culpability and punishment is driven by punishment from one particular 
source, or audience.  That is, punishment by winning coalition members may be 
influenced by culpability and war performance while opponent-executed punishment 




of punishment, and to show that culpability influences both, Figure 4.6 presents the 
changes in predicted probabilities of internal and opponent-based punishment 
separately, rather than pooled together as in the primary results presented above.   
 





The left-hand side of Figure 4.6 presents the change in the predicted 
probability of internal punishment when moving from a non-culpable to a culpable 
leader, at different levels of war performance.  The right-hand side of Figure 4.6, on 




punishment when moving from a non-culpable to a culpable leader, conditional on 
war performance. 
As demonstrated in Figure 4.6, culpability significantly increases the 
likelihood of both internal and opponent-based punishment for leaders who either 
perform poorly in war or who fail to make substantial gains (i.e. those who achieve 
only the status quo).  As expected, on the other hand, culpability has no significant 
effect on the likelihood of punishment for leaders who achieve battlefield successes, 
as evidenced by the confidence interval crossing zero in the far right-hand bar of each 
graph.  Further, while the first differences for internal punishment are somewhat 
larger than those for opponent-based punishment, the baseline probability of 
opponent-based punishment is also smaller (8 percent baseline probability versus 12 
percent baseline probability of internal punishment).  Therefore, while the first 
differences are slightly smaller, the percentage change in the probability of opponent-
based punishment is on par with that for internal punishment.  These results indicate, 
therefore, that culpability’s impact is consistent across the two sources of punishment, 
that the main statistical results discussed above are not driven by one source or the 
other, and that it is important to account for both types of punishment in leader-based 
theories of civil conflict dynamics and outcome.         
 
4.2 Types of Punishment 
The second set of robustness checks disaggregates different types or severities 
of punishment in the measurement of the dependent variable.  These robustness 




influenced by culpability.  It may be the case, for example, that culpable leaders are 
more likely to face loss of political office than non-culpable leaders, but that more 
severe forms of punishment, including exile, imprisonment, and death, are simply 
driven by war performance rather than culpability.  That is, severe punishment may 
be no more likely for poor-performance, culpable leaders than it is for poor-
performance, non-culpable leaders. 
 To test for this possibility, Figure 4.7 presents the results of two models that 
focus only on the more severe types of punishment.  First, the left-hand graph in 
Figure 4.7 presents the change in the predicted probability of severe punishment (i.e. 
exile, imprisonment, or death) for culpable versus non-culpable leaders, conditional 
on war performance.  The right-hand side of Figure 4.7 presents the change in the 
predicted probability of very severe punishment (i.e. imprisonment or death only) 
when moving from non-culpable to culpable leaders, conditional on their war 
performance. 
 As these graphs demonstrate, culpability’s impact on severe forms of 
punishment is similar to its effect on punishment in general; whether one focuses on 
exile, imprisonment and death (left-hand graph), or just the latter two categories 
(right-hand graph), culpability significantly increases the likelihood of severe 
punishment for leaders who fail to achieve battlefield successes, while having no 
significant impact on the likelihood of severe punishment for leaders who perform 
favorably in the war.  These results confirm that culpability’s impact on punishment 









 To create a more complete picture of the potential divergent effects of 
culpability on different severities of punishment, Figure 4.8 below presents the results 
of an ordered logit model in which the dependent variable is a three-category variable 
coded 0 if the leader is not punished, 1 if the leader faces moderate punishment (i.e. 
group fractionalization or loss of political power/office), and 2 if the leader suffers 
severe punishment (i.e. exile, imprisonment, or death).
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53 Ordered logistic regression models assume proportional odd across response 
categories.  Violating this assumption, also called the parallel regression assumption, 
can lead to biased results.  It is therefore necessary to test for violation of the 
proportional odds assumption.  A likelihood ratio test of the proportionality of odds 
for the entire model produces a Chi2=5.31 with a p value of 0.38, indicating no 









 The first differences presented in Figure 4.8 indicate that culpability 
significantly increases the likelihood of both moderate and severe punishment for 
leaders who either perform poorly in the war or who manage only to maintain the 
status quo.  Interestingly, culpability has a substantively large impact on the 
likelihood of severe punishment for leaders who perform poorly in the war, while 
having a much smaller, though still statistically significant, influence on the 
likelihood of moderate punishment.  Culpability actually has a larger impact on 
                                                                                                                                           
each variable individually, produces no significant test statistics, indicating that none 




moderate punishment for status quo leader than for poor-performance leaders, while 
the opposite is true for culpability’s impact on severe punishment.  Importantly, as 
hypothesized in H4, culpability has no significant influence on the likelihood of either 
moderate or severe punishment when leaders perform favorably in the conflict.  
 Finally, to ensure that the results are robust to excluding fractionalization as a 
form of punishment, I recode the dependent variable to equal one for leaders who lose 
power, are exiled, imprisoned, or killed as a result of the war, and zero otherwise.  
This variable specification thus excludes fractionalization as a form of punishment, 
recoding leaders who suffer this fate as unpunished.  The substantive results for the 
logit model run on this dependent variable are presented in Figure 4.9.   
 






As this graph demonstrates, the results are robust to this change in 
specification; culpability continues to significantly increase the likelihood of 
punishment for both poor and status quo performers, while having no significant 
impact on the likelihood of punishment for leaders who perform favorably in war. 
 Taken together, these results indicate that the relationship between culpability 
and leader punishment is not driven by one particular type of punishment.  
Culpability significantly increases the likelihood of both moderate and severe 
punishment when leaders are unable to achieve gains on the battlefield during their 
tenure.  Additionally, the results remain consistent when recoding the dependent 
variable to exclude fractionalization as a form of punishment.  These robustness 
checks indicate, as a whole, that the results are robust to changes in specification of 
the dependent variable. 
 
4.3 Alternate Measures of War Performance and Culpability 
In this section, I present robustness checks using alternative measures of the 
key independent variables.  First, Figure 4.10 presents result of a model run with an 
alternative measure of leader culpability.  This alternative variable is coded one for all 
first leaders and for replacement leaders who share political/familial connections with 
the first leader, as with the original culpability variable, but does not adjust for the 
regime type of the first leader.  That is, it does not code replacement leaders who 
follow personalist first leaders as non-culpable.  Chapter 2 provides additional details 










 As demonstrated by the first differences presented in Figure 4.10, the results 
remain robust to this change in specification of culpability.  Culpable leaders who 
perform poorly or maintain the status quo are significantly more likely to be punished 
than non-culpable leaders who experience the same outcomes.  Culpability has no 
significant influence, on the other hand, for leaders who make progress on the 
battlefield.    
 In the second variation on the key independent variables, I use an alternate 
measure of war performance, based on the war outcome scale discussed in Chapter 3.  
Specifically, this variable measures war outcome on a 5-point scale from major defeat 




termination, and the model therefore is run on only termination leaders, with an N of 
207 instead of the 447 observations included in all other models.  Despite this 
limitation, the results remain supportive of the hypothesized relationship between 
culpability and punishment.  As demonstrated in Figure 4.11, culpability significantly 
increases the likelihood of punishment for leaders who suffer either major defeats or 
partial losses, as well as for those leaders who manage only to maintain the status 
quo.  Culpability has no significant impact, on the other hand, for leaders who are 
able to achieve favorable outcomes – either partial or major victory – in their 
respective conflicts.  These results, therefore, confirm those using the three-category 
war performance variable.  
 






4.4 Accounting for Potential Differences between State and Rebel Leaders 
Finally, it is important to confirm that the results are not driven by either rebel 
or state leaders exclusively.  That is, does the relationship between culpability and 
punishment hold for both state and rebel leaders, or is one group of culpable leaders 
less susceptible to punishment than the other?  
 
 





 Figure 4.12 provides the substantive results for two separate models, the first 




culpable state and culpable rebel leaders are significantly more likely to face 
punishment than their non-culpable counterparts if they suffer battlefield losses 
during their war-time tenure.  The change in the predicted probability of punishment 
for poor-performance leaders is significant in both models.  Additionally, the size of 
the change in the likelihood of punishment is similar for both rebel and state leaders 
who suffer battlefield losses, with just under a 40 percentage point increase in the 
likelihood of punishment for both groups when moving from non-culpable to 
culpable leaders.   
The impact of culpability for rebel and state leaders who maintain the 
battlefield status quo is also largely confirmatory of the expected results, though with 
some minor exceptions.  Culpability has a substantively large and statistically 
significant impact on the likelihood of punishment for rebel leaders who maintain the 
status quo.  Culpability’s impact among state leaders with status quo performances, 
on the other hand, is less strong; culpability increases the likelihood of leader 
punishment among this group, but the effect just misses statistical significance at a 
0.05 level.  This suggests that state leaders who maintain the status quo may be less 
susceptible to punishment than rebel leaders who perform similarly in war; state 
leaders may be better insulated from internal removal or attempts at punishment by 
the opponent under these circumstances, whereas all rebel leaders who fail to make 
battlefield gains, whether they suffer losses or simply maintain the status quo, are 
susceptible to internal removal and opponent decapitation attempts.  Finally, in line 
with the main results and H4, culpability has no significant impact on the likelihood 




 Overall, these results largely confirm H4 for both rebel and state leaders, 
while suggesting one potential caveat to that relationship.  Specifically, rebel leaders 
may be more susceptible to punishment for status quo outcomes than state leaders.  It 
is important to note, however, that the split-sample results are based on a relatively 
low-N, and should therefore be treated as suggestive rather than confirmatory. 
 
V. Conclusion 
The results presented in this chapter provide strong support for the theoretical 
mechanism developed in Chapter 2.  Statistical tests using original data on rebel and 
state leaders, the types and sources of punishment they face as a result of war, and the 
favorability of their war performances demonstrate that a culpable leader who fails to 
make progress in war is significantly more likely to be punished than a non-culpable 
leader who performs similarly poorly in war.  In other words, culpability’s 
conditional impact on leader punishment is both significant and substantively large. 
These results, furthermore, are robust to a variety of alternative variable and 
model specifications.  Culpability significantly increases the likelihood of both 
internal punishment and punishment by the opponent, it has a significant effect on 
both severe punishment and more moderate forms of punishment, and remains a 




and war performance.  Finally, the results are largely consistent for both rebel and 
state leaders, indicating that culpability’s impact is not limited to one type of leader.
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 These results provide additional evidence in support of the theoretical 
argument developed in Chapter 2.  They confirm that culpable leaders are more often 
punished than non-culpable leaders for poor war performance.  These results thus 
highlight an important source of variation in the expectations of leaders during civil 
war, and in so doing, provide support for the argument that culpable leaders will 
behave differently in civil war than non-culpable leaders.  Culpable leaders should, 
because of the heightened risk of punishment, be more likely to fight longer and 
experience extreme outcomes than non-culpable leaders, and should also be less 
willing to make concessions to end a conflict, out of fear that doing so will invite 
punishment.  The next chapter delves further into the mechanisms underlying the 
theoretical argument through qualitative analysis of the civil war in Angola between 
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 An additional robustness check is included in Appendix B, in which I test the 









The quantitative analysis presented in chapter 3 demonstrated that leader 
culpability significantly influences civil war termination and outcomes, providing 
strong statistical support for the hypotheses developed in chapter 2.  These results are 
limited, however, in that they only confirm that culpability is consistently associated 
with war termination and outcomes, saying nothing about why culpable leaders 
behave differently than non-culpable leaders.  Chapter 4 provided additional 
quantitative evidence as a first step toward addressing this question about the causal 
relationship between culpability and wartime behavior, showing that culpability also 
influences the likelihood that leaders face punishment for poor war performance.  In 
this chapter, I supplement the statistical findings from the previous chapter by 
undertaking a more detailed, qualitative analysis of an individual case in order to 
determine whether the desire to avoid punishment is, in fact, the mechanism causing 
culpable leaders to prolong conflicts, gamble for resurrection, and avoid making 
concessions to their wartime adversaries.     
Specifically, this chapter examines the civil war in Angola between 
government forces and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola 
(UNITA) from 1975 to 2002.  It focuses, in particular, on factors influencing 




phases of the conflict.  I chose the Angolan case from the 102 civil conflict dyads in 
the dataset because the change in UNITA’s leadership in February 2002 provides a 
critical node, allowing for a controlled, within-case comparison of the periods before 
and after the death of UNITA’s first leader, Jonas Savimbi.  This node thus 
distinguishes between the period in which a culpable leader headed UNITA and that 
in which a non-culpable leader, Paulo Lukamba Gato, led the rebel organization.  The 
UNITA case provides an ideal venue for within-case comparison, because major 
settlement attempts were made both during Savimbi’s tenure and after his death.  The 
fact that serious attempts at negotiated settlement occurred during both periods allows 
me to comparatively analyze the differences between the settlement processes with a 
culpable versus a non-culpable rebel leader.   
This before and after research design, also termed diachronic comparative 
analysis (Lijphart 1971), maximizes comparability across units by controlling for a 
variety of factors, both observable and unobservable, that are consistent over time 
within a single case, in this instance the Angolan conflict.  This type of within-case 
comparison generally offers greater comparability across units than comparison of 
two or more different cases, thus offering a viable solution to the control problem in 
comparative case analysis and allowing the researcher to more easily isolate the 
causal effects of the key independent variable (A. L. George and Bennett 2005; 
Lijphart 1971).  Within-case comparison, however, cannot achieve total 
comparability, as a single country, group, or leader is not exactly the same over time.  
That is, more than one variable is likely to change at a time.  I therefore supplement 




processes that occurred both before and after Savimbi’s death.  This process tracing 
helps identify the plausible causal chain that links leader culpability to threat of 
punishment to war termination (A. L. George and Bennett 2005, 177). 
Practical considerations also led to the selection of UNITA’s war with 
Angola.  First, this conflict ended over a decade ago, in 2002.  Other cases under 
consideration for analysis included the conflict in the Philippines between the state 
and the MILF rebel group.  This conflict, however, is ongoing, so does not provide 
sufficient historical data to draw definite conclusions about the effects of leader 
culpability on war termination or outcome.  Because the Angola civil war ended a 
decade ago, there has been enough time since the conflict’s end to determine that the 
final agreement reached in 2002 did, in fact, settle the conflict.  Second, the UNITA 
conflict was chosen because it provides an ideal test case for the leader culpability 
theory relative to important alternative explanations for civil war termination, most 
notably the economic incentives and commitment problems models of conflict 
termination.   
This chapter proceeds as follows.  I begin by providing a brief overview of the 
origins and early years of the Angolan civil war.  I then discuss Savimbi’s 
vulnerability to punishment, specifically examining both the internal and external 
threats to his tenure and physical safety.  The fourth section assesses how those 
threats to Savimbi’s life and leadership influenced his decision-making and the 
prospect for peace during three major settlement attempts in 1989, 1991, and 1994.  
The fifth section discusses Savimbi’s downfall and the major shift in UNITA strategy 




four and five thus use process tracing and controlled comparison of the periods before 
and after Jonas Savimbi’s death in 2002 to identify culpability’s causal impact on the 
dynamics of negotiation, settlement, and implementation of agreements, 
demonstrating the importance of leaders’ expectations of punishment for the 
settlement of civil war.  Section six addresses potential alternative explanations for 
the trajectory of the Angolan civil war, and the final section concludes.   
 
II. Origins of the Angolan Conflict 
The Angolan civil war grew out of Angola’s bloody independence struggle 
against Portugal, which lasted from 1961 until the fall of the Portuguese regime in 
1974.  During the conflict with Portugal, three primary armed groups emerged: the 
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Front for the 
Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and UNITA.  Unlike independence movements in 
neighboring Mozambique, these three groups failed to unify into a united opposition.  
While each espoused an Angolan nationalist platform, they drew support primarily 
from three distinct segments of Angolan society, so claims of representative 
nationalism were often viewed with suspicion.  The MPLA’s backing came primarily 
from the Mbundu, and its power was concentrated in the Angolan capital, Luanda.  
MPLA was largely urban, and composed mainly of mestico and assimilado: Angolans 
who were educated and not marginalized in colonial society (Guimaraes 1998).  The 
FNLA, on the other hand, drew its support from the Bakongo ethnic group, and was 




developed in 1966 as a representative of the largest ethnic group in Angola, the 
Ovimbundu (Guimaraes 1998). 
 A combination of these ethnic differences, political disagreements (MPLA 
espoused a Soviet-style, single-party state, UNITA a socialist platform with multi-
party democracy, and FNLA a capitalist economic/political program), and personal 
rivalries among the leaders of the three groups ensured that the MPLA, FNLA, and 
UNITA remained rivals throughout the anti-colonial struggle.  At times, these inter-
group rivalries even took precedence over the fight against Portugal, leading the three 
groups to undermine one another to improve their own prospects.  In the so-called 
‘Timber’ affair, for example, Savimbi allegedly struck a deal with Portuguese forces: 
in exchange for information on the MPLA, Portugal agreed not to attack UNITA 
forces in the Eastern zone and released Savimbi’s father from prison (Guimaraes 
1998, 82).  
 Thus, as the colonial era came to a close, the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA 
failed to create a united front for the transition to independence.  The Alvor Accord of 
January 15, 1975 set the date for independence, recognized the MPLA, FNLA, and 
UNITA as “the sole legitimate representatives of the people of Angola”, and 
established that these three groups along with representatives of the departing 
colonial power should form a transitional government.  However, prospects for a 
peaceful transition were dashed almost immediately.  When Angola became 
independent on November 11, 1975, it essentially had three governments: the MPLA, 
with Cuban support, controlled the capital, Luanda, but little else, UNITA exerted 




provinces with South African assistance, and the FNLA ruled in the north, backed by 
Zairian forces (James 1992; Malaquias 2007).  From this backdrop, the Alvor Accord 
and the transitional government it established were quickly done away with.  The 
MPLA expelled FNLA and UNITA from Luanda, driving the country back into civil 
war (Malaquias 2010).   
The FNLA suffered serious setbacks at the hands of MPLA almost right away, 
and partially as a result, lost the backing of its external allies, Zaire and the United 
States.  FNLA was defeated by 1976, and the remnants of the group deserted founder 
and leader Holden Roberto.  Roberto was forced into exile and remained there for 15 
years, only returning to Angola in 1992 to run in the presidential elections, where he 
secured only 2 percent of the vote and finished a distant fourth (Agence France-
Presse 2007).     
This left UNITA as the only significant remaining opponent of the MPLA.  
Jonas Savimbi, who had started his insurgent career in the FNLA, and had attained 
the rank of Secretary General of the movement, as well as foreign minister for its 
government in exile (Guimaraes 1998), is likely to have taken keen notice of 
Roberto’s demise as a lesson for his own political trajectory as, on the heels of the 
FNLA’s defeat in 1976, MPLA forces almost defeated UNITA as well.  The US 
pulled funding for UNITA after news of the CIA’s covert support of the rebel 
organization was leaked to the New York Times in December, 1975 (Guimaraes 
1998).  The loss of US support left UNITA with only South African backing.  The 
apartheid regime’s pariah status worked against UNITA, tipping the balance at the 




South Africa subsequently negotiated with the MPLA government, and agreed to 
withdraw forces to within 50 miles of the Namibian border.   
With the routing of FNLA forces, the loss of CIA funding, and the withdrawal 
of South African troops, MPLA fighters and their Cuban supporters were able to take 
the offensive against UNITA (James 1992).  Between February and August 1976, 
Savimbi’s forces were forced to retreat into remote corners of the country (Weigert 
2011).  Close to defeat, UNITA insurgents dispersed.  Savimbi was not dissuaded, 
however.  He regrouped his forces for a four-day conference on May 10, 1976, and 
issued the Cuanza River Manifesto, which reasserted UNITA’s commitment to 
guerrilla struggle, stating that a protracted insurgency would eventually prevail over 
the MPLA and its Soviet and Cuban allies (James 1992, 105; Weigert 2011, 64).  
Thus, faced with imminent defeat, Savimbi remained obstinate.  He regrouped and re-
imagined his forces, committing to a long and difficult guerrilla struggle rather than 
accepting defeat or seeking a settlement on unfavorable terms.  Ultimately, this 
decision would result in 25 more years of armed conflict in Angola.  
 
III. Internal and External Threats to Savimbi 
Jonas Malheiro Savimbi is one of the most influential figures in post-colonial 
Angolan history.  Born to Ovimbundu parents in August, 1934, in Munhango, 
Moxico Province, Angola, Savimbi went on to study in Portugal in the 1950s.  It is 
likely during his stay in Europe that Savimbi met Holden Roberto, who was already a 
rising figure in Angola’s anti-colonial struggle, having founded the UPA, which later 




and Savimbi decided to leave his studies to begin his career as a member of Roberto’s 
rebel organization.  Savimbi became Secretary General of the FNLA before 
eventually leaving the organization in 1966 over disagreements with Roberto.  Upon 
his departure from FNLA, Savimbi founded UNITA, the organization which he 
would lead for 36 years.   
 
3.1 Internal Challenges to Savimbi’s Leadership 
Jonas Savimbi has at times been portrayed as a cult-like figure who ruled 
UNITA with an iron fist.  While Savimbi was undoubtedly a charismatic leader, these 
depictions belie the true complexities of UNITA’s inner workings, as well as the, at 
times, tenuous nature of Savimbi’s position within the organization.  Instead, 
UNITA’s history is punctuated by periodic threats, both latent and more immediate, 
to Savimbi’s leadership, beginning as early as the pre-independence period, during 
the insurgent organization’s infancy.
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  As discussed in the previous chapters, threats 
to a war-time leader can take many forms, from electoral defeat to assassination.  This 
section discusses the sources of internal threats faced by Jonas Savimbi, as well as the 
forms those threats took, throughout his 36 year tenure as President and Commander 
in Chief of UNITA.   
Over the several decades of its operation in Angola, UNITA developed a 
relatively complex political organizational structure alongside and overlapping its 
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 The fact that Savimbi has often been portrayed by international observers as a 
highly secure rebel leader, despite these threats, serves to highlight the importance of 
internal threats for the vast majority of rebel leaders who are often less secure in their 




military structure.  At the national level, the party was led by a Central Committee, 
the top members of which constituted the Political Bureau.  These bodies varied in 
size over the years, but in 1990 consisted of approximately 55 and 20 members, 
respectively (James 1992, 101).  Below these national-level institutions, UNITA was 
organized into 22 regions led by Political Commisars, who generally served 
simultaneously as military commander and political head of that region.  Below the 
regional Commisar came the District Committee, the Village Committee, and finally 
the Cell, made up of just a handful of individuals.  Party Congresses were held 
approximately every four years, beginning in 1966 (Weigert 2011).
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  At these 
Congresses, all members of the Central Committee faced (re)election, including 
Savimbi (James 1992).  Attendance at Part Congresses varied as the size of the 
organization fluctuated, from 45 delegates at the first congress in 1966 to a high of 
3200 delegates representing all provinces of Angola at the 1991 Party Congress 
(James 2004).  This rather broad representation, and the election process built into 
each party congress, suggests that Savimbi was, to some extent, dependent upon 
broad, popular support within the organization to retain his leadership position.  That 
is, this institutional structure allowed for the possibility of electoral removal.  In 
practice, however, Savimbi won re-election at every Party Congress beginning in 
1966 (James 2004).  Savimbi maintained relatively consistent support among low and 
mid-level UNITA members (i.e. the majority of voters at Party Congresses), even 
while his popularity waxed and waned in the higher echelons of the organization.   
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 In addition to the regular Party Congresses, UNITA held three Extraordinary 
Congresses, and the Central Committee and Political Bureau held annual conferences 




 The greater threats to Savimbi’s leadership within the rebel organization 
stemmed from elite-level UNITA political and military leaders, with whom Savimbi 
often had serious political and strategy disagreements throughout the course of the 
conflict. Weigert (2011) notes that Savimbi’s power was dependent upon fragile 
compromises between UNITA militants and moderates, whose “polarized positions 
frequently had resulted in direct challenges to Savimbi’s leadership” (Weigert 2011, 
6).  These challenges began during the anti-colonial phase of the conflict, and 
continued, periodically intensifying, throughout the post-colonial civil war. 
 Further, the challenges emanating from the higher-echelons of UNITA’s 
political/military organization were generally ‘irregular’ in nature, in that they 
involved means beyond the electoral mechanisms available for his removal.  
Specifically, during Savimbi’s tenure as leader of UNITA, he faced assassination 
attempts from within the organization, defections of key members of the organization, 
and several instances in which splinter factions either arose or appeared imminent.  
While the threat posed by assassination attempts is quite clear, fractionalization and 
defections also posed a real danger to Savimbi, as they threatened to not only weaken 
the organization by dividing it, making it – and by extension Savimbi – more 
vulnerable to government attack, but also threatened Savimbi’s legitimacy among 
remaining cadres in the rump UNITA organization.       
 The first attempt on Savimbi’s life occurred in the organization’s early years, 
and is likely to have colored Savimbi’s subsequent approach to internal monitoring 
and security.  In June 1967, just a year after establishing UNITA, Savimbi was 




June 1968.  After a year in exile, Savimbi returned to an organization that had 
fragmented into three semi-autonomous groups and was suffering from serious 
weapons and supplies shortages, which undermined group morale and led some 
members of the organization to question his leadership.  As a result of these early 
splits in the organization, Savimbi faced his first internal assassination attempt in 
September 1968, when three shots were fired at him by unnamed assailants (Weigert 
2011, 37).  Savimbi survived the attack, but his tenuous position was further 
weakened by the attempt on his life, and just one month later in November 1968, a 
top UNITA commander, Samuel Chyala, defected to the FNLA with 150 UNITA 
insurgents.  This defection was followed by another just a few months later, when 
Tiago Sachilombo defected to the Portuguese in April 1969 (Weigert 2011, 38).   
 Subsequent alleged assassination plots were thwarted in 1972, 1982, 1986, 
and 1989.  Jose Calundungo, a former FNLA commander who joined UNITA during 
the anti-colonial struggle, was imprisoned in 1972 for six months on charges of 
plotting to assassinate the UNITA head (Weigert 2011, 55).  In 1982, several high-
ranking UNITA members, including founding member Samuel Chiwale, foreign 
secretary Jorge Sangumbe, and chief of staff Valdemar Chindondo, were accused of 
attempting to overthrow Savimbi.  They were publicly beaten, Chiwale was demoted, 
and the latter two were executed as a result.  A third coup attempt was thwarted in 
1986, when UNITA general Geraldo Nunda was arrested after challenging Savimbi’s 
leadership as well as his ties to foreign leaders (Weigert 2011, 101).  Finally, Tito 
Chingunji, UNITA’s former Washington representative, was executed in August 




efforts to oust Savimbi as UNITA’s president either by ‘defaming him abroad’ or by 
‘attempting to poison him in Jamba’” (Weigert 2011, 108–9).  While the true extent 
of the threat posed by each of these plots is uncertain, it is clear that Savimbi took the 
threats seriously, responding harshly to specific instigators of coup attempts against 
him.    
 These alleged coup attempts were symptomatic of a growing discord within 
UNITA, which escalated in the late 1980s as the group entered negotiations for the 
first time, and remained a serious problem for Savimbi throughout the remainder of 
his tenure.  During party congresses as early as 1982, delegates expressed their 
readiness to negotiate peace with the government.  This was reaffirmed at each 
subsequent party congress until the end of the conflict (James 2004). This growing 
majority consensus around negotiations and peace, however, was at odds with a 
strong group of veteran militants within the organization who advocated continued 
military struggle.  These divisions became more noticeable to the outside world 
beginning in 1988, when younger party members, linked to UNITA foreign secretary 
‘Tito’ Chingungi, pushed for a negotiated settlement while Savimbi advocated 
continued fighting.  Savimbi dealt with this challenge to his leadership harshly, 
recalling Chingungi to UNITA headquarters and executing him for advocating peace 
talks on terms not accepted by Savimbi (Weigert 2011, 101).  
 This event in the late 1980s was followed by increasing dissention as UNITA 
negotiated the Bicesse and Lusaka accords in the early 1990s.  Several high-ranking 
members of the organization defected throughout this period, sometimes taking low 




established in the Bicesse Accord, two top UNITA ministers, Tony Fernandes and 
Miguel Puna fled party headquarters in Jamba and announced their formal defection.  
These key defections were followed by additional desertions by a spat of high-raking 
UNITA military commanders, who then joined the ranks of the newly-created FAA.  
This instability at the top of the organization, along with recent brutal executions of 
alleged coup plotters, served to further divide UNITA’s ranks.  Analysts suggest that 
these divisions played a key role in Savimbi’s electoral loss just months later in 
September 1992 (Weigert 2011).
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 Savimbi’s internal position remained tenuous throughout the remainder of the 
decade.  The failure of the Bicesse Accords and Savimbi’s electoral loss seriously 
undermined the aura of power and control that the rebel leader had carefully 
cultivated over the past three decades.  Deep fissures within UNITA again became 
apparent leading up to and after the signing of the Lusaka Protocol in 1994, whose 
terms were not as favorable to the rebel organization as the Bicesse Accords had 
been.  This ultimately manifested, in 1998, with serious splits in the organization.  
Five UNITA officials led by Jorge Valentim and Eugenio Manuvakola denounced 
Savimbi and called for an interim replacement President until the next party congress.  
These officials named their movement UNITA-Renovada (UNITA-R), a faction 
which ultimately drew relatively little support from the rank and file, but did succeed 
in instigating other breaks in the rebel organization.  By October 1998, it became 
clear that Savimbi no longer controlled the segment of the organization that had 
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 The defections of military leaders from UNITA to the FAA also threatened 
Savimbi because these former UNITA members had intimate knowledge of 
Savimbi’s military strategies and tactics, and within a few months were leading 




embraced parliamentary positions provided in the peace agreement.  Abel 
Chivukuvuku, head of UNITA’s seated parliamentarians, refused to acknowledge any 
allegiance to Savimbi, indicating that the organization may have split into three 
distinct factions (Weigert 2011, 137).   
 
3.2 Opposition-Based Challenges to Savimbi’s Leadership 
Internal challenges were not the only, nor at times the most imminent, threat 
to the UNITA leader.  From the earliest stages of the Angolan civil war, a major 
component of the MPLA’s strategy involved targeting Savimbi the individual, based 
upon the expectation that decapitating the organization – i.e. removing its symbolic 
and operational head – would render it weak, ineffective, and easily defeated.  This 
strategy, importantly, was not private information.  As early as November 1978, in a 
speech given on the third anniversary of Angola’s independence, President Neto 
publicly indicated that the MPLA’s strategy for dealing with UNITA was to continue 
the war with the aim of capturing Savimbi (James 1992, 134). 
 The MPLA government implemented this strategy in two ways; the first 
military and the second political.  First, FAPLA forces and Angolan police forces 
made several attempts upon Savimbi’s life throughout the course of the war.  Second, 
the MPLA leadership consistently excluded Savimbi from proposed amnesty 
programs that would allow the rest of the rebel organization to reintegrate into 
Angolan society without fear of prosecution.   
Reported attempts by MPLA forces to capture or kill Savimbi surfaced in the 




reported that MPLA forces had been close to capturing Savimbi in late March 1978, 
and that the UNITA leader had only escaped because South African soldiers were 
able to reach him before MPLA units did (James 1992, 134).  Similar reports arose in 
1984 and 1990; in the former case, ANGOP reported that Savimbi had been killed 
during a raid by FAPLA forces on Jamba, the Free Angola capital established by 
UNITA.  The statement, which was denied by UNITA representatives, turned out to 
be false.  A similar report by ANGOP in 1990 indicated that Savimbi had been 
wounded in a FAPLA bombing attack on Jamba (James 1992, 134–5).  While this 
report also turned out to be false, it suggests that targeting Savimbi personally 
remained an important element of MPLA’s military strategy.  
Savimbi-centered attacks were not limited to the military forces.  In 1992, the 
so-called ‘Ninja’ element of the police force (i.e. a newly created riot police unit 
made up of demobilized FAPLA commandos following the Bicesse Accords) was 
implicated in an alleged MPLA plot to assassinate Savimbi.  A scuffle between police 
and UNITA personnel outside of Savimbi’s Huambo residence in August 1992 
reaffirmed fears that the MPLA intended to decapitate the rebel organization prior to 
elections scheduled for late 1992 (Weigert 2011, 107). 
The MPLA even armed their civilian supporters in Luanda, which served to 
undermine Savimbi’s security.  Members of several Angolan political parties voiced 
concerns to UNAVEM II officials in early 1992 regarding the proliferation of 
weapons among pro-government civilians, particularly in Luanda, an MPLA 
stronghold (Anstee 1996, 55; also see Weigert 2011, 107).  Despite UN pressure to 




sticking point after the failure of Bicesse and during attempts to implement the 
Lusaka Protocol, as UNITA officials continually denounced the UN’s failure to 
disarm pro-MPLA civilians and stop persistent violence against UNITA members and 
supporters (Weigert 2011, 135). 
 Politically, the MPLA’s strategy consistently implied a zero-tolerance stance 
towards Savimbi.  As early as the mid 1980s, government officials proposed an 
amnesty program for UNITA, including members of the group’s leadership, but 
explicitly excluded the option of amnesty for Savimbi himself (James 1992).  This 
policy was echoed during the Gbadolite negotiations in June, 1989 and ultimately 
undermined the negotiations.  Savimbi’s status continued to act as a stumbling block 
in negotiations throughout the 1990s.  Attempts in early 1998 to revive the faltering 
Lusaka Protocol led the MPLA government to recognize Savimbi’s ‘special status’ as 
leader of the opposition and to introduce legislation allowing Savimbi to retain a four-
hundred-member bodyguard (Weigert 2011, 133), but these concessions were short-
lived.  By October 1998, the MPLA-dominated National Assembly revoked 
Savimbi’s special status, and instead labeled him a ‘war criminal’ and issued a 
warrant for his arrest (El-Khawas and Ndumbe 2007, 111).  This about-face, Weigert 
argues, “proved to be the crossing of a rhetorical Rubicon that eventually led to three 
more years of brutal hostilities” (Weigert 2011, 10).
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 The MPLA’s decision to brand Savimbi a war criminal was politically significant, 
given the international context in 1998.  The Rome Statute establishing the ICC had 
just been finalized in June of that year, the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda’s (ICTR) scope was expanded in April 1998 via UN Security Council 
resolution 1165, which created a third trial chamber, and the International Criminal 




 The multiple instances of explicit attempts by the MPLA to assassinate or 
capture Savimbi, as well as the MPLA’s consistent, non-compromising political 
stance toward Savimbi, provide clear evidence that throughout the conflict, a core 
component of the MPLA’s strategy was based on eliminating Savimbi as a 
prerequisite for defeating the UNITA threat.  Evidence suggests, furthermore, that 
Savimbi took this threat seriously.  He refused to attend the signing of the Lusaka 
Protocol in 1994, for example, citing concerns for his personal safety, and sent 
UNITA representative Eugenio Manuvakola in his stead (Weigert 2011, 121).  
During the tense post-Lusaka years, furthermore, Savimbi continually refused to take 
up his vice-presidential position or to move his residence to Luanda, again out of fear 
for his personal well-being. 
 
IV. UNITA Under Savimbi and the Failure of Settlement Attempts 
The core questions explored in this section focus on whether, and how, the 
internal and opponent-based threats to Savimbi’s life and leadership discussed above 
influenced the course of the civil war in Angola.  It examines the role that threats of 
internal and external punishment had on Savimbi’s decision-making during each 
major settlement attempt during his tenure as rebel leader in the Angolan civil war.  
This analysis demonstrates that Savimbi’s vulnerability to punishment played an 
important role at key junctures in undermining attempts to both reach agreement (at 
Gbadolite) and to implement settlements already agreed upon (Bicesse and Lusaka 
                                                                                                                                           
commenced trials four years earlier. This politically-charged rhetoric, given the 




agreements).  Savimbi’s incentives to avoid punishment and maintain his position of 
power thus played a critical role in extending the Angolan civil war for 27 years.  
 
4.1 The Gbadolite Negotiations: The First Major Opportunity for Settlement 
The Angolan civil war during the 1970s and 1980s was heavily influenced by 
external dimensions.  As the country emerged from colonialism, the MPLA-
controlled government became a Soviet Cold War client.  Support for the MPLA also 
came from Cuba, who formed an alliance with the MPLA in 1965 and between 1975 
and 1991 sent tens of thousands of Cuban troops to Angola to support the MPLA’s 
forces (E. George 2005).   
UNITA, for its part, received significant external backing as well.  South 
African support returned to UNITA after a brief hiatus in the early 1970s, and with it, 
UNITA was able to expand its guerrilla activity throughout most of the country and 
develop conventional forces as well.  United States’ support of UNITA, which had 
occurred covertly during the 1970s, resumed in the mid-1980s with the initiation of 
the Reagan Doctrine, designed to ‘roll back’ communism in the Third World and 
contain Soviet influence.  One of the main components of this policy was US support 
for anti-communist insurgencies world-wide, including UNITA.  A ban on US 
support for UNITA was lifted in 1985, with almost immediate effects on the conflict: 
new weapons from the US negated MPLA air-superiority (James 2004).   
 The late 1980s, however, ushered in a new international context, as the USSR 
attempted to end Cold War entanglements and draw down its international 




the signing of the New York Accords, in which Cuba agreed to a phased withdrawal 
from Angola and South Africa agreed to terminate support for UNITA (James 2004).  
Faced with the impending withdrawal of international support, and strong 
international pressure, Savimbi and dos Santos agreed to the first major negotiations 
since the start of the civil war in 1975.  In May 1989, dos Santos presented a peace 
plan that included national reconciliation, a relatively important concession to 
UNITA.  However, the plan envisaged incorporation of UNITA into the MPLA, 
UNITA’s acceptance of the Angolan constitution calling for a Marxist one-party 
state, and importantly, exile for Savimbi (Weigert 2011, 92). 
A month later in June 1989, a summit was held at Gbadolite in which 
Savimbi, dos Santos, and 18 African heads of state met.
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  The results of the 
Gbadolite summit were vague, however.  A communiqué issued suggested that the 
two sides had agreed to form a commission to conduct further negotiations and had 
agreed upon a general desire for peace and reconciliation, but the meeting produced 
no consensus on the modalities for peace.  Following the Gbadolite summit, MPLA 
officials claimed that agreement had been reached on the provisions for Savimbi’s 
exile.  This assertion created a firestorm immediately.  UNITA spokespersons 
vigorously rejected these statements, asserting that no such agreement had been 
reached (James 2004, 64–5; Weigert 2011, 93).   
Additional meetings made no headway.  MPLA and UNITA officials refused 
to meet in the same room, and indirect talks proved unable to break the negotiating 
stalemate.  Participants at an eight-nation summit in Harare, Zimbabwe in August 
                                                 
59
 Savimbi and dos Santos never met in the same room; both men refused direct 




1989 backed the MPLA peace plan, including the provision requiring Savimbi’s 
exile, and Savimbi subsequently refused to attend a second heads of state meeting in 
Kinshasa the next month.   
Savimbi’s refusal to accept the terms offered him in these rounds of 
negotiations spelled the end of this attempt to end the conflict.   The diplomatic 
initiatives at Gbadolite carved out no space for Savimbi in a post-conflict Angola, and 
thus proved unacceptable to him.  Further, vague promises of national reconciliation 
were not a strong enough foundation upon which Savimbi could sell the negotiations 
as a success to UNITA members, particularly at a time when internal dissention in the 
organization was increasing (see section 3.1).   
Importantly, party stances adopted at two UNITA Party Congresses held in 
August 1986 and September 1989 provide an excellent way to gauge to what extent 
Savimbi’s response to the Gbadolite proposals reflected the wishes of the majority of 
his winning coalition.  In 1986, delegates to the Party Congress authorized the 
leadership to seek peace negotiations and national reconciliation.  In 1989, an 
extraordinary Party Congress reaffirmed this stance; over 3000 delegates voted for 
direct negotiations with the MPLA, a ceasefire, support for a transitional government, 
revision of the constitution, and support for free and fair elections. 
This internal push for negotiations may have facilitated Savimbi’s attendance 
at the Gbadolite negotiations, but despite internal UNITA support for settlement, the 
terms offered were unacceptable to Savimbi.  He recognized that settlement on the 
MPLA’s proposed terms would be viewed as a policy failure by UNITA members 




concerted push for his removal.  Further, acceptance of the Gbadolite proposals 
would have essentially guaranteed an end to Savimbi’s political power both as head 
of UNITA and at the national level, as the MPLA’s proposals envisaged direct 
punishment in the form of immediate exile for the UNITA leader.  Given the 
Gbadolite terms, therefore, Savimbi went against his party’s stated wishes, acting as 
an unfaithful agent by rejecting the MPLA’s peace proposals and returning to war. 
 
4.2 Bicesse Accords: First Signed Agreement 
While the Gbadolite Declaration failed to produce any genuine steps toward 
peace, far-reaching changes in the global balance of power would, by 1991, produce 
another ripe moment for settlement of the Angolan civil war.  Between 1989 and 
1991, Cuban troops gradually withdrew from Angola and South African intervention 
was terminated in accordance with the 1988 New York Accords.  The collapse of the 
Soviet Union facilitated the withdrawal of Soviet and US support for the MPLA and 
UNITA, respectively, as well.  In September 1990, the USSR suggested that all 
parties accept the ‘triple zero’ proposal, according to which the Soviets and US would 
stop supplying the MPLA and UNITA, and both combatant groups would agree not to 
seek weapons from abroad (James 2004).  The relatively rapid disentanglement of 
foreign governments from the Angolan conflict corresponded with diplomatic 
initiatives by Portuguese, American, and Soviet mediators, beginning in April 1990, 
to reignite dialogue between dos Santos and Savimbi (Malaquias 2010).   
These mediation efforts bore fruit on May 31, 1991, when the MPLA and 




fire, creation of a national army with equal representation of both combatant groups, 
and cantonment of existing forces.  UNITA also agreed to recognize the Angolan 
government and dos Santos prior to the holding of multi-party, national elections in 
September 1992, which UNITA would contest (James 2004; Weigert 2011, 100).    
The optimism of early 1991 was dashed within 18 months, however, as the 
country plunged back into civil war by late 1992.  Understanding why the Bicesse 
Accords collapsed so quickly and spectacularly requires understanding what Savimbi 
believed would come of the accord, and the vulnerabilities he faced when his 
expectations were not met.  The first years of the 1990s were UNITA’s strongest 
militarily.  The rebel group had switched from guerrilla tactics to conventional forces, 
and had enjoyed many successes against the MPLA, particularly as Cuba ratcheted 
down its involvement in the conflict.  Savimbi entered the Bicesse negotiations, 
therefore, from a position of strength.  For Savimbi, the agreement’s provision calling 
for national elections was an opportunity.  He believed he would win the election, and 
take national-level political power via the ballot box rather than the bullet.  Perhaps as 
a portent of events to come, Savimbi told British television just one week before the 
September 1992 elections: “If I lose, then the elections were rigged and I will send 
my men back to the bush to fight again.  We will not accept defeat” (quoted in El-
Khawas and Ndumbe 2007, 106).  UNITA thus entered the elections with optimism 
and high expectations.    
 Savimbi’s failure to win the 1992 elections, therefore, came as a shock to 
UNITA and its leader, and ultimately triggered the crumbling of the Bicesse Accords 




to 40 percent, but because neither side achieved a majority, a second round of voting 
was required.  Before this could take place, however, Savimbi denounced the early 
vote tallies as fraudulent and, a day later on October 5, 1992, 11 UNITA generals 
announced their withdrawal from the newly created Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) 
(Weigert 2011, 111).  On October 7, Savimbi left Luanda for Huambo, a UNITA 
stronghold.  He refused to return to the capital to negotiate terms for the second round 
of voting.   
Savimbi’s electoral loss spelled the end of the Bicesse Accords for two 
reasons.  First, because UNITA and Savimbi himself entered the elections with the 
expectation of victory, defeat was viewed as a major failure which threatened to 
heighten internal divisions within UNITA and to dislodge Savimbi from his 
leadership of the organization.  Major divisions within UNITA, which first became 
visible in the late 1980s, intensified as the Bicesse Accords were negotiated and came 
into force.  In an August 1990 interview, Savimbi acknowledged these divisions, 
stating that “it is when a movement believes that it is going to win that it must be 
careful.  Both friends and enemies form splinter groups.  On the eve of victory you 
find discord” (quoted in Weigert 2011, 102).  This statement suggests that Savimbi 
saw threats to his leadership emanating from many sources within the UNITA 
organization, and was unable to fully trust even his close advisors or top 
commanders.   
The increase in executions within and defections from the organization 
suggests that Savimbi did indeed feel vulnerable, which manifested in attempts to 




Costa Fernandes, one of UNITA’s co-founders, and Miguel N’Zau Puna, UNITA’s 
deputy leader for nearly 24 years, defected from the organization.  Importantly, both 
were considered potential replacements for Savimbi in the event of his fall from 
power (James 1992, 135–6).  In public statements after their defections, both accused 
Savimbi of executing prominent UNITA figures (Malaquias 2010, 306). 
Thus, Savimbi likely calculated that accepting the electoral loss would 
directly threaten his tenure.  The organization supported the peace process, as 
evidenced by the seventh UNITA party congress’s support for the electoral process 
and the terms of the Bicesse Accords in March 1991 (James 2004).  But the optimism 
of the early 1990s created high expectations.  UNITA members expected to defeat the 
MPLA at the polls.  Savimbi’s loss in the presidential election and UNITA’s loss in 
the legislative contest, therefore, represented a major failure for which Savimbi would 
take the blame.  It also threatened to exacerbate already serious tensions within the 
organization, as UNITA was confronted with its own political limitations and 
miscalculations.  Rather than accept the electoral defeat which would have seriously 
weakened Savimbi, the rebel leader instead blamed his electoral defeat on fraudulent 
elections, and adopted a more militant position.     
In addition to the internal threats that undermined the Bicesse accords, the 
MPLA’s creation of the ‘Ninja’ police unit which targeted Savimbi directly, and its 
strategy of arming the citizenry in Luanda and the resulting ‘All Saints Massacre,’ 
served to further convince Savimbi that returning to Luanda to negotiate the terms of 




Savimbi’s decision to leave Luanda after the September 1992 election results 
were announced, and his refusal to return to negotiate terms for run-off elections, 
reflected a growing perception of his vulnerability to attack by the MPLA and its 
supporters.  Savimbi’s residence in Huambo had come under attack from state police 
forces just one month prior to the elections, in an apparent assassination attempt 
(Weigert 2011).  Further, on October 31, 1992, MPLA soldiers and civilian 
supporters launched a pogrom termed the ‘All Saints Massacre’ against Ovimbundu 
and Bakongo civilians and UNITA members living in Luanda, killing thousands.  
Among the dead were UNITA Vice President Jeremias Chitunda and Savimbi’s 
nephew, Elias Salupeto Pena, whom Savimbi had sent in his stead to negotiate terms 
for the run-off election with the MPLA.  In the event, both men were pulled from 
their convoy and shot in the head by MPLA military/police forces (James 2004; 
Weigert 2011).   
The violence against UNITA party members and, in particular, MPLA-
sanctioned attacks on high-ranking party officials in Luanda, sent a clear message to 
Savimbi that a return to Luanda and to negotiations was unsafe.  The UNITA leader 
instead returned to war, and by mid-November 1992 had seized 50 of Angola’s 164 
municipalities (Weigert 2011, 112).  International mediators’ attempts to reignite 
negotiations failed when, in February 1993, Savimbi refused to attend peace talks in 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, claiming repeatedly that his delegation could not travel safely 
from Angola to Ethiopia without the threat of MPLA attack (James 2004).  This 




In sum, Savimbi used the externally-driven peace process in 1991-92 as an 
attempt to gain national-level political power through the electoral process, rather 
than through the use of force.  When he lost national elections in September 1992, 
unmet expectations and heightened divisions within UNITA, as well as the increased 
threat posed by MPLA forces and supporters, led Savimbi to denounce the election 
results and the peace process more generally.  He instead adopted a hard-line 
approach rhetorically and militarily, launching major offensives around the country 
by late November and early December 1992. 
 
4.3 Lusaka Protocol: Second Peace Agreement 
Large-scale, conventional fighting characterized the two years following the 
failure of the Bicesse Accords.  UNITA quickly overran much of the country, even 
briefly threatening government positions in Luanda, in late 1992 and early 1993.  
This offensive gave way to a slow process of MPLA forces gradually beating back 
UNITA gains (Malaquias 2010, 309).   
Concurrently, international mediators worked hard to formulate a new 
negotiated settlement to replace the failed Bicesse Accords.  Several rounds of 
negotiations in Lusaka, Zambia, produced the outline of an agreement that retained 
some key elements of the Bicesse Accords while modifying others.  The most 
important difference perhaps grew out of the Bicesse Accord’s failure; while the 1991 
agreement had called for national elections to determine the post-war political 
landscape, the new agreement specified that UNITA would become a junior partner 




governorships in three provinces.  Savimbi was also offered a vice presidential 
position, though the powers of this position, and the rules of succession, were not 
clearly spelled out.  The Lusaka accord, therefore, spelled out UNITA and Savimbi’s 
roles in post-war Angola rather than risking leaving these important decisions to 
elections as had been done in 1991.  Militarily, the Lusaka Protocol called for 
cantonment and disarmament of UNTIA forces, the integration of 20,000 UNITA 
soldiers into a 120,000 strong national army, and the allotment of 5,000 positions in a 
new police force to former UNITA fighters (James 2004; Weigert 2011, 119–20).       
 Once again, perceived threats to Savimbi’s political power and personal safety 
from both internal and opponent-based sources undermined implementation of the 
peace agreement.  On the eve of the Lusaka Protocol’s official signing in November 
1994, deeper fissures than had previously occurred within the UNITA party 
organization threatened Savimbi’s hold on power.  Following a government offensive 
on November 17, Savimbi ordered Eugenio Manuvakola, UNITA’s chief negotiator, 
to leave Lusaka immediately without informing mediators or MPLA representatives.  
In a blatant display of insubordination, Manuvakola refused Savimbi’s order and 
remained in Lusaka (Weigert 2011, 120–1).   
Manuvakola’s defiance simultaneously demonstrated two things.  First, it 
highlighted the deep divide within the rebel organization between moderates, in favor 
of settlement, and hard-liners, in favor of continued conflict.  The moderates 
constituted a majority of voting members of UNITA throughout this period, as party 




ceasefires, and a variety of other peace-facilitating measures (James 2004).
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  Despite 
the party congresses’ obvious desire for peace, however, Savimbi remained 
committed to the military struggle, even as negotiations proceeded.  Second, 
Manuvakola’s defiance demonstrated Savimbi’s weakening control over his 
subordinates.  When Manuvakola refused to leave Lusaka and return to Angola, 
Savimbi was left with little choice but to relent and send the chief negotiator the 
necessary credentials authorizing him to represent UNITA at the negotiating table.  
To refuse would have revealed Savimbi’s weakness, possibly resulting in an internal 
coup.   
The circumstances under which UNITA and Savimbi agreed to the Lusaka 
Protocol thus set it up for failure.  Savimbi was against the accord from its inception, 
and had incentives to maintain an intransigent stance given the growing internal 
discord in the rebel organization and his own increasing vulnerability.  In an early 
1996 meeting with UN representatives, Savimbi expressed fear that the compromises 
made in the Lusaka Protocol were too extensive to ensure his political survival, 
stating: “[I] told them victory would come and now [I] tell them to give up their 
weapons …. Before I had prestige to protect me, but it is being lost” (quoted in 
Weigert 2011, 124).  This shocking admission suggests that Savimbi believed the 
terms of settlement negotiated in 1994 were not favorable enough for Savimbi to 
justify the costs of war to his internal audience, and he was therefore fearful of 
internal punishment.  He therefore had strong incentives to avoid termination on these 
terms, and to continue the war in hope of a better outcome.  
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 Manuvakola, a moderate, would later leave the organization, forming a splinter 




At the same time, the threat posed by MPLA forces leading up to and after the 
signing of the Lusaka Protocol served to further undermine Savimbi’s commitment to 
the negotiated settlement.  On heightened alert since the failure of the Bicesse 
Accords, Savimbi did not attend the Lusaka negotiations, nor was he willing to travel 
to Zambia to sign the agreement in person in November 1994.  Savimbi cited 
concerns for his personal safety as the impetus for his refusal to attend the ceremony; 
he believed his plane would be shot down by government aircraft should he attempt 
to travel to Lusaka (James 2004, 90).   
Savimbi’s concerns for his personal and political safety remained a major 
stumbling block to implementation of the peace agreement over the next several 
years.  Forward progress on establishing the government of national unity envisaged 
in the agreement, for example, was delayed multiple times in 1996 and 1997 because 
UNITA insisted upon clearly determining Savimbi’s political role in the new regime 
before moving forward (El-Khawas and Ndumbe 2007, 109).  Savimbi was initially 
offered the post of vice president, but the actual authorities allotted to this position, 
and the rules of succession, remained ambiguous, and Savimbi ultimately rejected the 
post out of fear that this ambiguity would allow the MPLA to effectively sideline him 
or worse (El-Khawas and Ndumbe 2007; Weigert 2011).  Savimbi insisted upon 
being recognized as the president of the largest opposition party, a role which carried 
with it a special status, security detail, and would strengthen his political position for 
the next presidential elections.  Until this status was conferred upon him, UNITA 
refused to send deputies to the legislative assembly or to in any way participate in the 




the National Assembly finally passed legislation conferring upon Savimbi the special 
status he desired; this legislation gave Savimbi certain privileges and immunities, a 
salary and a house in Luanda, a large security team, and access to the President for 
consultations (“Jonas Savimbi Absent Despite Special Status” 1997).   
 In clear evidence that Savimbi himself had been the major stumbling block to 
implementation of the Lusaka accord, UNITA deputies accepted their positions in the 
national assembly and were sworn into office on the very next day.  Only two days 
later, two and a half years after the Lusaka Protocol’s signing, UNITA joined the 
unity government (El-Khawas and Ndumbe 2007, 109–10).  Ominously, however, 
Savimbi did not attend the swearing in ceremony.  He remained, instead, at his 
stronghold in Bailundo, once again citing fear for his personal safety as the chief 
reason for his absence (“Jonas Savimbi Absent Despite Special Status” 1997).    
 Ultimately, the optimism of April 1997 was to be short-lived.  Internal turmoil 
within the UNITA ranks pushed Savimbi toward a more intransigent stance, and 
Savimbi’s persistent fear of attack by government forces stalled progress toward 
implementation of the Lusaka accord.  UNITA failed to make key demobilization 
deadlines, and Savimbi repeatedly postponed the handover of key UNITA 
strongholds including Andulo, Bailundo, Mungo, and Nharea, as well as his planned 
move to Luanda (Weigert 2011, 134).  By August 1998, Savimbi stopped cooperating 
with Portugal, Russia, and the United States – the countries overseeing the peace 
process (James 2004).  A week later, moderate elements of the organization 
denounced Savimbi and broke away, forming a splinter group called UNITA- 




Savimbi’s unwillingness to implement the Lusaka Protocol’s key provisions and his 
failure to cooperate with moderates within the organization had saved him from a 
potential coup, but came at the cost of further fracturing of the rebel organization. 
 Low level attacks escalated from this point, and by December 1998, the 
MPLA government had launched new offensives against UNITA positions and 
branded Savimbi a war criminal and international terrorist (James 2004; Malaquias 
2010).  On July 24, 1999, the government issued an arrest warrant for Savimbi, 
charging him with armed rebellion, sabotage, and slaughter.  At the MPLA’s fourth 
party congress in December 1998, dos Santos reaffirmed the MPLA belief that 
Savimbi must be targeted in order to achieve piece, stating, “The only way to attain 
definitive peace today is to isolate Dr Savimbi and his warmongering wing 
domestically, and internationally, as well as to neutralize him politically and 
militarily” (quoted in James 2004, 107–8). 
 The internal and opponent-based threats to Savimbi’s life and leadership 
throughout this period thus served to undermine his ability to commit to the Lusaka 
Protocol.  Internal dissention against Savimbi’s rule was at an all-time high by the 
mid-1990s, and threats emanating from the MPLA reinforced the UNITA leader’s 
insecurity.  Savimbi’s vulnerability ultimately led him to reject the government’s vice 
presidential offer, to continually hold up demobilization of his forces, and to reject a 





V. Savimbi’s Death and the Memorandum of Understanding: Peace Achieved 
Whereas the previous section detailed the important influence that Savimbi’s 
vulnerability to punishment had on the course of the Angolan civil war and the failure 
of settlement attempts in 1989, 1991, and 1994, this section demonstrates that threats 
to the UNITA leadership were much less severe after Savimbi died and was replaced 
by a non-culpable leader, Paulo Lukamba Gato.  Negotiating dynamics and the 
prospects for and pace of implementation changed dramatically after Savimbi’s death 
in 2002, allowing Angola to finally achieve a lasting settlement to its 30 years of civil 
war.    
 
5.1 Savimbi’s Continued Intransigence Despite Dwindling Prospects for Victory 
The final stage of the Angolan civil war lasted from 1998, with the official 
failure of the Lusaka Protocol, until 2002, when the conflict was finally terminated.  
Unlike the post-Bicesse period in which a strong UNITA was able to make significant 
gains against the government, after the breakdown of Lusaka, Savimbi’s forces were 
weakened and on the defensive.  MPLA forces gradually gained the upper hand over 
UNITA by cutting off the rebel group’s access to many of the diamond mines which 
had provided the insurgents’ primary source of funding since the end of the cold war.  
In addition, the government implemented a controversial ‘scorched earth’ policy, in 
which they forcibly removed civilian supporters of UNITA from the countryside in 
order to isolate the rebel group from its support base.   
 In light of these developments, Savimbi restructured and redeployed his forces 




25 years earlier in 1976, Savimbi abandoned conventional tactics.  Instead of seeking 
settlement or negotiations with the MPLA, he maintained his defiant political stance 
and moved toward a mobile guerrilla strategy against the MPLA (James 2004).  At 
the same time, Savimbi vanished from government radar.  He abandoned his 
headquarters at Bailundo and embraced the benefits of secrecy and mobility that 
guerrilla tactics provide (Weigert 2011, 153). 
This period was thus characterized by increased intransigence on the part of 
Savimbi, even while his forces gradually lost the strategic advantage and MPLA 
fighters closed in on him.  Savimbi’s observed behavior is consistent with the 
expectations for culpable leaders discussed in the previous chapters; as the likelihood 
of victory decreased, Savimbi obstinately refused to concede or to countenance a 
post-conflict Angola in which he did not play a central political role.  For Savimbi, 
the threats to his physical security and political fortunes should he concede were too 
severe.  The strategy that provided him the best hope was to continue to fight, even as 
the walls closed in around him.       
Opponent-based threats to Savimbi were particularly serious as MPLA forces 
gained the upper hand.  Throughout this period, the MPLA’s central goal remained 
the capture or killing of Savimbi, as, after several failed settlement attempts, this was 
believed to be the key to ending the conflict.  Savimbi’s success in evading 
government offensives led the MPLA, in January 2001 and again in December of that 
year, to float the idea of reviving the Lusaka Protocol as a basis for new negotiations.  
The MPLA’s stance on Savimbi, however, remained unaltered.  Angola’s defense 




never negotiate with Savimbi” (quoted in Weigert 2011, 159).  Dos Santos, similarly, 
indicated that Savimbi’s options were ‘surrender, capture, or death’ (Weigert 2011, 
170).  It is possible, therefore, that the proposed revival of negotiations reflected an 
intentional government strategy of isolating Savimbi, undermining his support within 
UNITA by once again highlighting his unwillingness to act as a faithful agent and end 
the costly conflict.  
Savimbi, for his part, also remained intransigent.  In a telephone interview 
given in June 2001, Savimbi rejected the idea of declaring a unilateral ceasefire or of 
unilaterally disarming and demobilizing UNITA troops.  He also said he would refuse 
to serve as one of Angola’s two vice presidents, as the roles were largely ceremonial.  
In declining this prospective position, Savimbi drew upon the Zimbabwean case, in 
which ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo accepted a similar post after suffering setbacks 
against government forces, and proceeded to be quickly marginalized by 
Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe (Weigert 2011, 166).  This intransigence in 
the face of mounting military pressure by government forces suggests that Savimbi 
was well aware of the fate that awaited him if he willingly gave up the fight.    
Throughout late 2001 and early 2002, MPLA forces gradually tightened the 
net surrounding Savimbi.  A breakthrough finally occurred on February 22, 2002, 
when government forces ambushed Savimbi and his bodyguards in a remote part of 
Moxico Province, near the Zambian border (Garztecki 2003, 45).  The long-time 






5.2 Post-Savimbi UNITA and the Memorandum of Understanding 
Savimbi’s death marked an important turning point in the Angolan civil war.  
After his death, and the death from illness of UNITA’s vice president Antonio Dembo 
just days later, UNITA’s remaining senior political officials and military commanders 
rallied around Secretary General Paulo Lukamba Gato.  This constituted a remarkable 
show of unity, given the significant disagreements between UNITA militants and 
moderates that had plagued the rebel organization over the past decade.  In line with 
contingency plans crafted in 1997 in the case of Savimbi’s death, the internal and 
external wings of the party together created a Management Commission.  The 
Commission was headed by Gato and included 13 other members: 9 generals, Foreign 
Secretary Alcides Sakala, external representative Isaias Samakuva, and Ernesto 
Mulato (Weigert 2011, 172).     
The Management Commission promptly contacted Angolan government 
officials to discuss new peace talks and an end to hostilities.  On March 13, 2002, 
UNITA announced a suspension of hostilities, and government forces reciprocated on 
the same day, ordering the FAA to cease all offensive operations against the rebels.  
Talks followed, and the government proposed a blanket amnesty for all UNITA 
soldiers, which was approved unanimously by parliament on April 2, 2002 (James 
2004; Weigert 2011, 173). 
 Negotiations proceeded rapidly, and on April 4, 2002, a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) was signed, formally ending the civil war.  In addition to the 
amnesty already approved for all UNITA soldiers, the agreement called for the 




police force and 5000 into the national military, and vocational training for those 
entering civilian life.  A mixed commission consisting of UNITA and MPLA 
members was established to oversee this demobilization and reintegration process.  
On the political front, the MOU reaffirmed the terms established at Lusaka in 1994; 
UNITA would participate in all levels of government through appointment to 
ministerial and ambassadorial posts, as well as governorships.  Interestingly, the 
MOU was negotiated directly, rather than through international mediators, in contrast 
to both the Bicesse Accords and the Lusaka Protocol (James 2004, 98). 
 In a major departure from previous experience in Angola, implementation of 
the MOU proceeded rapidly and with relative ease.  Between April and June, 2002, 
nearly 80,000 UNITA soldiers entered demobilization camps throughout Angola 
(James 2004).  By August 2, 2002, the UNITA army was formally disbanded, and 
FAA officers, government officials, and UNITA representatives met in Luanda to 
officially declare the civil war over (Weigert 2011, 174).  By November 2002, the 
joint military commission established in the MOU to oversee the April ceasefire and 
implementation of the MOU was disbanded, declaring its work completed.  
 The rapid negotiation and implementation of the MOU stands in stark contrast 
to previous experience with the Gbadolite negotiations, the Bicesse Accords, and the 
Lusaka Protocol.  Not only did UNITA’s approach to negotiations change drastically 
almost immediately upon Savimbi’s death, but the process and prospects for 
implementation pre and post-Savimbi also differed significantly.  These distinct 
differences can be attributed to the change in UNITA leadership, from a highly 




non-culpable leader who faced minimal threat of punishment internally and 
externally. 
 Paulo Lukamba Gato joined UNITA in 1975, after the group had begun its 
fight against the MPLA.  He started his insurgent career at the lower levels of the 
organization, gradually rising through the ranks to General.  By the 1990s, Gato had 
reached the upper levels of UNITA’s political/military structure, and was a member 
of UNITA’s delegation to both the Addis Ababa and Lusaka peace negotiations, also 
serving briefly as UNITA representative to Europe (James 2004, 88).  Despite his 
involvement in multiple peace processes, however, Gato was known as a hardliner 
within the organization, advocating a militant strategy rather than a moderate one.  In 
1995, Gato became Secretary General of UNITA, the third highest post in the 
organization.  He would hold this position until the 2002 deaths of Savimbi and 
Dembo. 
Unlike Savimbi, Gato faced little resistance or reason to fear for his physical 
of political fate internally.  Remaining members of the party leadership – those from 
whom Savimbi had perceived threats against his reign for decades – fell quickly into 
line behind Gato and his decision to push forward with negotiations and settlement of 
the conflict, despite the fact that the terms of settlement were less favorable than 
those offered in either 1992 or 1994.  The deep divide between militants and 
moderates that had threatened Savimbi’s power and led to splits in the organization 
receded when Gato took power, largely because Gato, as a former militant, adopted a 
moderate position and pushed for peace upon coming to power.  As a result, UNITA-




leader in July 2002, clearing the way for UNITA proper to transform into a legal 
political party, and for the two factions to reunite (James 2004).   
 Additionally, Gato faced little threat of punishment from MPLA forces.  The 
government’s strategy throughout the conflict, and particularly in its final stages, was 
to target Savimbi personally, as his removal was seen as the key to ending the 
conflict.  Gato, despite his history of advocating a militant policy toward the state, 
thus faced no imminent threat of decapitation by the MPLA once he ascended to the 
leadership of UNITA.  His security in this regard was evidenced by the unanimous 
April 2
nd
 passage of legislation granting amnesty to all UNITA members, including 
high-ranking officials and members of the party leadership, including Gato himself.  
Thus, lacking the same internal and external punishment-based incentives to continue 
advocating a hard-line that a culpable leader would face, Gato was willing and able to 
negotiate peace with the state, and more importantly, to credibly commit to 
implementing that peace, something his predecessor was never able to do.     
 
VI. Alternative Explanations for Conflict Dynamics and Settlement in Angola 
The previous sections have detailed the influence that a leader’s incentive to 
avoid punishment has on the dynamics of negotiation, implementation of agreements, 
and conflict termination.  In this section, I examine possible alternative explanations 
for the observed trajectory of the Angolan civil war, focusing specifically on leading 
explanations of war duration and termination from existing literature.  
Some existing explanations have little or no bearing on the Angola case, and 




alternative explanations.  For instance, the veto player model of civil war duration 
argues that a greater number of combatants with veto power render conflict more 
difficult to terminate due to difficulty in satisfying all combatants during negotiations.  
This theory cannot explain the Angolan case, as there were only two warring parties 
throughout the vast majority of the conflict.  Further, only two combatant groups – 
UNITA and MPLA – were involved in the peace negotiations that took place in 1989, 
1991, 1994, and 2002.  With no variation on this key variable – the number of 
combatant groups – the veto player theory cannot explain why negotiations failed in 
1989, 1991, and 1994 but succeeded in 2002. 
 Second, theories arguing that third party interveners influence war duration 
and outcome are also ill-equipped to explain the Angolan civil war, despite claims 
that this conflict was an important Cold War proxy conflict though much of the 70s 
and 80s.  Existing studies argue that balanced interventions extend wars (Balch-
Lindsay and Enterline 2000), that interveners with independent agendas lengthen 
conflict (D. E. Cunningham 2010), and that loss of third party support facilitates 
termination (Fearon and Laitin 2008).  The Angolan conflict involved several external 
actors during its first 15 years.  South Africa and the United State supported UNITA, 
while Cuba and the Soviet Union aided the MPLA with weapons and troops.  Given 
that all external support was withdrawn by the early 1990s, however, the presence of 
balanced interveners with independent agendas cannot account for why the conflict 
continued well into the 2000s.  Relatedly, the withdrawal of foreign support in the 
late 1980s/early 1990s should have, according to these theories, led to the termination 




negotiations at Gbadolite in 1989 and Bicesse in 1991, successful settlement was not 
achieved.  These theories of third party support, therefore, are insufficient to explain 
the duration and termination of the Angolan civil war.  While they may shed some 
light on why the conflict lasted through the 1980s, and why the combatants agreed to 
negotiate in 1989, they cannot explain why those negotiations failed, or why the 
conflict continued for another 13 years.    
 The following sections explore additional alternative explanations for the 
trajectory of the Angolan civil war in more detail.  
 
6.1 Economic Model of Conflict 
An economic-based explanation for the duration and termination of Angola’s 
civil war, at first blush, provides a more plausible alternative to the leader 
culpability/punishment theory discussed above.  Angola is a resource rich country, 
with significant diamond resources in particular.  Diamond reserves in Angola are 
estimated at 180 million carats, and deposits are principally located in the Lunda 
Norte and Lunda Sul provinces in central and northeastern Angola, areas controlled 
by UNITA throughout most of the 1990s.   
 Until the end of the Cold War, diamonds played little role in the Angolan civil 
war, as external benefactors supplied UNITA and the MPLA with the weapons and 
funding they needed to fight.  After the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the 
Cold War caused the relatively rapid withdrawal of foreign support, however, UNITA 
was forced to find other sources of funding.  The illicit sale of diamonds provided the 




mining and selling diamonds, providing the rebel organization with between 400 
million and 600 million US dollars per year (Malaquias 2007).  
 However, while resource looting played an important role in the conflict by 
allowing the combatants to fund their war efforts, the evidence suggests that resource 
wealth did not lead Savimbi to prefer war over peace, as a rebellion-as-business 
model would suggest (Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom 2004).  Peace negotiators 
anticipated the complications that could have arisen due to the loss of resource 
wealth, and in an effort to avoid these potential pitfalls, drafted peace accords that 
would enable rebel leaders to continue to reap the economic benefits of diamond 
production during peacetime (Ross 2004a).  Specifically, the Lusaka Protocol offered 
Savimbi a position in charge of Angola’s natural resources.  Furthermore, the 
termination of conflict promised increased diamond production, as mines abandoned 
due to conflict would be reopened and new ones developed.  Ross (2004a) concludes, 
based on this evidence, that the failure of the Lusaka accord cannot be explained by a 
wartime looting model of conflict.    
 Furthermore, claims that Savimbi grew personally rich off of the sale of 
conflict diamonds are unsubstantiated.  Numerous accusations have been made that 
Savimbi and other high-ranking UNITA leaders held personal diamond caches in 
Angola or in sympathetic African capitals and perpetuated the conflict as a way to 
maintain wealth derived from diamond mining operations . However, no secret 
accounts to this effect have been found; there is currently no evidence that Savimbi or 
his family derived significant financial benefit from UNITA’s diamond mining 




 Finally, the economic model of conflict cannot easily explain the last few 
years of conflict in Angola.  By 1999, MPLA forces had managed to retake several 
diamond mines, and UN sanctions against UNITA hampered the rebel organization’s 
ability to sell its existing diamond stockpiles.  This loss of funding, however, did not 
lead to a change in Savimbi’s goals or strategy.  Rather, he maintained his 
intransigent stance toward the state and did not seek a settlement deal despite the 
dwindling prospects for continued personal economic profit.  While this loss of 
funding certainly contributed to UNITA’s military decline, the economic profit model 
of conflict duration cannot account for Savimbi’s behavior over the last three years of 
conflict.     
 
6.2 Commitment Problems, Security Guarantees, and Power-Sharing 
Commitment problems associated with disarming and demobilizing 
combatants after the 1991 and 1994 settlement agreements provide a second possible 
alternative explanation for the trajectory of the Angolan conflict.  Existing literature 
on conflict settlement and recurrence notes the often extreme difficulty that civil war 
combatants have in terminating their conflicts, as the processes of disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration are simultaneously necessary to achieve peace and 
threatening to combatant groups because they reduce their ability to defend 
themselves should the opponent renege on the agreement.   
At first glance, this seems to be a plausible explanation for the failures of both 
the 1991 and 1994 peace agreements in Angola.  Both the Bicesse and Lusaka 




of fighters.  And in both cases, there were problems and delays with this process.  
Funding and supply shortages delayed the construction of cantonment sites after the 
Bicesse Accords were signed, and both sides hesitated to carry through on the full 
demobilizations called for in the peace agreement.  By mid-1992, 85 percent of 
UNITA soldiers had checked in at assembly sites, but only 4 percent had 
demobilized.  On the government side, only 37 percent of government forces had 
been cantoned, about half of whom were demobilized (Weigert 2011, 107).  UN 
monitors declared the demobilization process flawed, and warned against the dangers 
of proceeding with elections despite incomplete demobilization.  Similarly, following 
the Lusaka accord, delays plagued the demobilization process.  By February 1996, 
only 8,200 UNITA soldiers were in cantonment sites, or less than half the number 
Savimbi originally promised would report by that date (Weigert 2011, 123).  While 
this pace accelerated by the end of 1996, optimism was tempered by reports from 
defecting UNITA commanders that Savimbi retained a secret army dispersed 
throughout the country’s central and northeastern provinces (Malaquias 2010).   
Despite this evidence of problems surrounding the demobilization processes 
after both the Bicesse and Lusaka agreements, a commitment problem-based 
explanation is lacking.  Most importantly, this theory cannot explain why the 2002 
settlement succeeded where the 1991 and 1994 agreements failed.  As discussed 
previously, demobilization proceeded relatively rapidly and largely without incident 
in 2002, in contrast to 1991 and 1994.  The ease of demobilization and disarmament 
in 2002, relative to 1991 and 1994, and the general success of the settlement 




and design of each settlement agreement.  Existing research indicates that third party 
security guarantees and multiple dimensions of power sharing are necessary to 
ameliorate commitment problems associated with implementation of peace 
agreements (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, 2007; Walter 2002).  When these provisions 
are included in settlement agreements, they are expected to be more likely to 
successfully terminate a civil war.   
The 1991 and 1994 agreements in Angola included both security guarantees 
from third parties and power-sharing across a range of issues.  The Bicesse Accord 
transformed UNTIA into a legal political party and called for national elections that 
would integrate UNITA into national politics.  It also established a new national 
military and police force; the proposed national army would be composed of equal 
numbers of MPLA and UNITA forces, ensuring equitable power-sharing in the 
security sector.  Further, the 1991 accord established a joint commission that included 
representatives from Portugal, the US, and the USSR to oversee the political process 
and ceasefire, and deployed a UN verification operation, UNAVEM II, mandated to 
monitor demobilization and disarmament of forces.
61
  The 1994 agreement, similarly, 
included power-sharing provisions and third party security guarantees, and even 
included a separation of forces provision that existing research suggests can facilitate 
settlement (Mattes and Savun 2009).  Specifically, the agreement called for (1) the 
withdrawal of UNITA forces from specific locations to allow for UN monitoring and 
verification in these areas, (2) proportionate integration of UNITA forces into the 
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 While this mission was not mandated with the power to enforcement the 
agreement, Walter (2002) argues that verification should be enough to facilitate 
credible commitments and deter defection when combatants are relatively evenly 




national army and police force, (3) UNITA participation at all levels of government, 
including assured participation in the national assembly, ministerial portfolios, 
governorships, and diplomatic missions, and (4) verification and monitoring of the 
ceasefire by a UN peacekeeping force (UNAVEM III).     
Despite these peace-facilitating provisions, however, both the 1991 and 1994 
agreements failed.  The 2002 agreement, on the other hand, reaffirmed the political 
power-sharing provisions established in 1994, but revised the military integration 
provisions.  Rather than 20,000 UNITA troops integrating into the national army and 
5,000 into the police force, UNITA was granted only 5,000 slots in the army and 40 
law enforcement positions (James 2004).   Rather than several thousand UN troops 
and observers, as had been in the country following the 1994 accord, the UN’s 
presence in Angola in 2002 consisted of only 30 observers, tasked with monitoring 
troop quartering areas and coordinating humanitarian efforts (Paulo 2004).  These 
provisions, particularly those dealing with military integration and UN monitoring, 
were substantially weaker and less favorable from a peace-facilitating perspective 
than those included in the previous two agreements.  And yet, in contrast to the 
expectations of existing theories focused on the amelioration of commitment 
problems through power sharing and security guarantees, the 2002 agreement 
succeeded in ending the war.   
This calls into question the applicability of these existing explanations to the 
Angolan case, and suggests that models focused on commitment problems more 
generally have failed to account for variation in the severity of commitment problems 




Lusaka agreements were insufficient to solve the Angolan conflict in 1991 and 1994 
when commitment problems were particularly severe due to Savimbi’s vulnerability 
to punishment.  In 2002, on the other hand, commitment problems were not 
exacerbated by a culpable leader, and a much less robust settlement agreement 
succeeded in ending the civil war.    
 
6.3 Relative Power 
The final alternative explanation for the termination and outcome of the 
Angolan civil war is based upon the relative power of the combatants in the war.  
Existing theories in the civil conflict literature make several predictions about the role 
of relative power in conflict termination.  In particular, this body of literature argues 
that a relative balance of power between combatants makes wars more likely to 
terminate, as military stalemate raises the costs of war and produces uncertainty, 
making combatants less willing to risk a decisive loss (D. E. Cunningham, Gleditsch, 
and Salehyan 2009; Walter 2002).
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 This prediction is not borne out by the evidence from Angola, however.  
Throughout the 1980s, external support offset any power differential between 
combatants, allowing both to continue to resist terminating the war.  Additionally, 
throughout the early and mid-1990s, UNITA forces had been built up to the point 
where they were able to take and hold territory, win conventional battles against 
government forces, and countenance a military victory against the state.  Importantly, 
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this military strength allowed UNITA to achieve military successes upon breaking the 
Bicesse and Lusaka accords, and indicates that they were unwilling to settle for a 
negotiated agreement as these models predict.  The relative parity between UNITA 
and the MPLA during the 1980s and much of the 1990s may have played a role in 
facilitating negotiations in 1989, 1991 and 1994, but it cannot explain, based on these 
existing theories, why those negotiations failed to produce a lasting peace.   
 Additionally, theories of civil war outcome suggest, straightforwardly, that 
stronger actors are likely to achieve better outcomes in war.  Given that UNITA 
suffered a slow and steady military decline between 1999 and 2002 and was on the 
defensive by the time the war ended, this theory could explain why the outcome 
UNITA achieved in 2002 was less favorable than the proposals of 1991 and 1994, 
when state and rebel forces were better matched.  This cannot explain, however, why 
UNITA’s negotiating strategy and willingness to commit to a settlement agreement 
changed so drastically when the organization’s leadership changed in 2002.  
UNITA’s prospects were grim in 2001 and early 2002, before Savimbi’s death, but 
the UNITA head remained intransigent, resisting any attempts to renew negotiations.  
Upon Savimbi’s death, however, the organization embraced negotiations, and was 
able to implement the agreed upon settlement deal.  This about-face in the 
organization’s willingness to negotiate and implement a settlement agreement is not 
easily explained by the relative power model, but can be explained as a result of the 
culpable leader theory developed in this dissertation.    
The leader incentives theory thus provides a more complete explanation for 




settlement attempt, as well as why UNITA’s strategy changed when the 
organization’s leadership changed from culpable Savimbi to non-culpable Gato.   
 
VII. Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the impact of leader culpability and the threat of 
punishment from internal and opponent-based audiences on the course of the civil 
war in Angola.  Specifically, controlled within-case comparison and process tracing 
of four distinct settlement attempts during the Angolan conflict were undertaken to 
isolate the role that the threat of punishment and the leader’s incentive to avoid 
punishment played during each major settlement attempt.   
The results of this qualitative analysis demonstrate that both the internal and 
external threats that culpable leader Jonas Savimbi faced during his tenure as head of 
UNITA undermined the group’s ability to reach agreement in 1989 and to implement 
settlement agreements in 1992 and 1994.  In contrast, non-culpable leader Paulo 
Lukamba Gato faced significantly less threat of punishment from both internal and 
opponent-based sources, and as a result was able to reach agreement with the MPLA 
in 2002 and implement that agreement over the next few months. 
The results further demonstrate that common alternative explanations for civil 
war duration and outcome are less well-equipped to explain the course of the Angolan 
civil war.  Multi-actor models and theories that focus on the role of third parties have 
little applicability to the Angolan case, while more plausible alternative explanations 




explanations focused on the relative strength of combatants all suffer from important 
limitations that render them unable to fully account for the conflict’s trajectory. 
The discussion of the Angolan civil war in this chapter thus provides 
additional support for the leader incentives model of conflict termination developed 
in this dissertation.  By tracing the process through which a culpable leader’s fear of 
punishment influenced wartime decisions, undermined settlement attempts, and led 
that leader to act as an unfaithful agent, this discussion bolsters the statistical analysis 
of the theoretical mechanism from the previous chapter and lends further credence to 











Why do some civil wars end quickly while others drag on for years or even 
decades?  Furthermore, why do some combatants agree to compromise outcomes 
while others fight to a military end?   
 Understanding the determinants of civil war duration and outcome is critically 
important for scholars and policymakers alike, given the high costs of internal 
conflict.  Civil wars are not only more common and more deadly that interstate war, 
but involve a number of other costs for civilian populations, national and global 
economies, regional stability, and international actors.  Given that civil wars are often 
long, deadly, destructive, and prone to recur, better understanding the determinants of 
when and how they end is necessary to help facilitate rapid and successful 
termination of ongoing conflicts. 
 Existing explanations for civil war termination and outcome focus on a variety 
of country and dyad-level factors expected to influence the costs of war, relative 
bargaining strength, the profitability of conflict, and factors that facilitate credible 
commitments to peace.  These existing theories, however, have difficulty explaining 
why some conflicts continue despite high costs, low profitability, or robust settlement 
agreements that include a variety of mechanisms designed to enhance actors’ abilities 




important determinant of combatant wartime behavior by failing to explicitly account 
for the high-risk nature of civil conflict for the leaders involved.  Given that nearly 
half of all civil war leaders experience some type of punishment as a result of war, 
leaders’ expectations of punishment and their incentives to avoid it are likely to 
influence their wartime decision-making.       
 
II. Theoretical Argument 
To address these critical gaps in our understanding of civil war termination, 
this dissertation developed a theory of civil war termination that focuses explicitly on 
the incentives that rebel and state leaders have to avoid punishment in the context of 
civil conflict.  Building upon a basic principal-agent framework and drawing insights 
from credible commitment theories of civil war, I argued that rebel and state leaders’ 
incentives to retain political power and otherwise avoid punishment are important 
determinants of combatant wartime behavior. 
 The central theoretical claim posited in Chapter 2 argued that culpable leaders 
– those viewed as responsible for their group’s participation in the war – face a higher 
expectation of punishment following unfavorable war outcomes than their non-
culpable counterparts.  This threat of punishment emanates from both internal and 
opponent-based audiences, and influences the culpable leader’s utility for settlement.  
Specifically, the culpable leader will have a lower utility for settlement on 
compromise or losing terms than a non-culpable leader, who can more easily evade 
responsibility for poor war performance by avoiding association with the original 




utility for settlement on unfavorable terms generates perverse incentives for the 
culpable leader to extend losing wars in a gamble for resurrection, through which he 
hopes to turn the tide, achieve a favorable outcome, and avoid punishment. 
A culpable leader’s lower utility for termination and incentives to gamble for 
resurrection are expected to influence wartime behavior, and thus war termination and 
outcomes, in several ways.  First, I hypothesized that culpable leaders will be less 
likely to terminate a conflict than their non-culpable counterparts, instead choosing to 
prolong ongoing wars in order to avoid internal and adversary-based punishment.  
The heightened threat of punishment will also influence war outcomes; culpable 
leaders will forego compromise settlement opportunities, choosing to continue the 
fight in the hope of achieving a military victory and avoiding punishment.  This 
military gamble will sometimes pay off, allowing the culpable leader to achieve 
victory where a non-culpable leader would have settled for less, while at other times, 
the gamble will fail and culpable leaders will suffer more negative war outcomes than 
their non-culpable counterparts.  Thus, culpable leaders are more likely to experience 
major victories and total defeats – extreme war outcomes – than non-culpable leaders.  
Additionally, culpable leaders are less likely to make concessions on key issues at 
stake in the war than their non-culpable counterparts, who can more easily 
disassociate themselves with the war aims established at the start of the conflict and 
thus avoid punishment for conceding on one or more of those central issues.  Finally, 
I hypothesized, in line with the underlying mechanism developed in chapter 2, that 




non-culpable leaders, as the latter can more easily avoid attributions of responsibility 
for poor war outcomes. 
 
III. Empirical Findings 
Chapters 3 through 5 test the theoretical argument developed in chapter 2 
using both quantitative and qualitative methods.  First, chapter 3 tests the hypotheses 
on war termination and outcome using an original dataset of rebel and state leaders of 
a global random sample of civil conflicts ongoing between 1980 and 2010.  The 
results are supportive of the hypothesized relationships; as expected, civil conflicts 
are significantly less likely to terminate when culpable leaders are in power.  
Additionally, culpable state and rebel leaders are more likely to experience extreme 
outcomes than non-culpable leaders, and are less likely than non-culpable leaders to 
make concessions on central war aims at termination. These results are robust to a 
variety of alternative variable measurements, model specifications, modeling 
strategies, and tests for potential endogeneity problems.  
Chapters 4 and 5 use both quantitative and qualitative evidence to test the 
underlying causal mechanism in my theoretical argument, that culpable leaders are 
more likely to be punished for poor war performance than their non-culpable 
counterparts.  Chapter 4 tests this mechanism quantitatively using an original dataset 
on the fate of every rebel and state leader in my sample, as well as original data on 
each leader’s war performance.  Statistical results provide strong support for my 
theoretical expectations.  As expected, culpable leaders who perform poorly in war 




similarly poorly in war, and these results are robust to a variety of alternative 
specifications and modeling strategies.           
Finally, chapter 5 supplements the quantitative analyses of chapters 3 and 4 
with qualitative evidence from the civil war in Angola between 1975 and 2002.  
Using within-case comparison of the periods before and after UNITA leader Jonas 
Savimbi’s death in 2002, as well as process-tracing of the settlement attempts 
between UNITA and the Angolan government in 1989, 1991, 1994, and 2002, I 
examine the role that culpability and the resulting threat of punishment played in 
extending the Angolan conflict and undermining negotiated settlement agreements.  
Case evidence from Angola demonstrates that the threat of both internal and 
opponent-based punishment influenced Savimbi’s decision-making at critical 
junctures in the Angolan civil war, and ultimately undermined efforts to establish a 
lasting peace.  Non-culpable UNITA leader Paulo Lukamba Gato, who came to 
power after Savimbi’s death, faced significantly lower threats of both internal and 
opponent-based punishment than his predecessor, and as a result, was able to commit 
to a final settlement agreement in 2002 after 27 years of civil war.    
 
IV. Implications and Contributions 
This project makes several important contributions to existing scholarship on 
civil war termination, and has implications for policy-makers seeking to facilitate 
peaceful settlement of ongoing conflicts. 
 First and foremost, as the first study in the civil war literature to take leaders’ 




far-reaching implications for scholarly understandings of civil war termination and 
outcome.  The strong quantitative and qualitative support for my theoretical argument 
demonstrates that existing explanations focused on dyad or country-level factors are 
valuable but incomplete.  This dissertation advances existing literature by recognizing 
that leaders have personal incentives independent of the interests of the groups they 
represent, and identifying the conditions under which dyad and country-level factors 
will be eclipsed by those personal incentives.  Given the frequency with which rebel 
and state leaders involved in civil conflict are punished, incorporating leaders’ 
expectations of punishment into a theoretical explanation for civil conflict behavior 
fills a major gap that existing research on intrastate war termination had failed to 
address.  
 Second, the dissertation’s theoretical argument has important implications for 
existing theories of civil conflict termination, particularly those focused on the costs 
of conflict and commitment problems.  First, scholars who argue that high costs of 
conflict promote negotiations and peaceful settlement cannot explain why some civil 
wars continue and some negotiations fail despite extremely high costs of conflict.  
Taking leader incentives and culpability into account provides a theoretical 
explanation for this empirical anomaly.  The theory developed in this dissertation 
recognizes that leaders have independent interests and that, at times, culpable leaders 
have incentives to continue costly conflicts in order to avoid punishment, despite the 
fact that this goes against the interests of the groups they represent.  This theory thus 
provides a theoretical mechanism to explain why negotiations sometimes fail and 




conflict increase, thereby increasing the culpable leader’s expectation of punishment, 
culpable leaders will have incentives to continue and even escalate the war in an 
attempt to achieve victory as a way to avoid punishment.  This suggests that culpable 
and non-culpable leaders will respond differently to the costs of war, and provides a 
potential caveat or conditionality in the relationship between the costs of war and war 
termination that existing theories have failed to account for.    
Similarly, existing research on commitment problems as a barrier to civil war 
settlement cannot explain why some settlements fail despite robust credibility-
enhancing provisions, while others succeed with relatively few mechanisms to 
combat incentives to renege.  In other words, these existing theories cannot explain 
variation in the prevalence or severity of commitment problems either across conflicts 
or over time within the same war.  The leader incentive-based theory developed in 
this dissertation addresses this limitation by identifying a potential source of variation 
in the severity of commitment problems.  Specifically, I have argued that 
commitment problems will be particularly severe when culpable leaders are in power, 
due to the heightened risk of punishment that these leaders face.  This provides an 
explanation for cases that existing theories cannot easily account for, such as the 
Angolan civil war, where settlements with robust mandates failed when a culpable 
leader was in power, while an agreement with relatively few mechanisms to generate 
credible commitments succeeded under a non-culpable rebel leader.  
This project also makes important data contributions. First, I developed an 
original dataset on rebel and state leaders during civil conflicts between 1980 and 




information on civil war leaders’ time in power, culpability, and post-tenure fates.  
These new data can be used in a variety of applications in future research on civil 
conflict.  Second, I have developed a novel coding scheme for war outcomes that 
identifies the favorability of the war outcome for each warring actor, relative to its 
original war aims.  This new measure overcomes major limitations in existing data by 
eliminating the ambiguity of existing coding schemes that group together all 
outcomes of a particular type, and by better accounting for how satisfied each actor is 
with the post-conflict status quo.  This new coding scheme not only provides more 
fine-grained information on the outcome of war, but provides a measure that can 
better account for the prospects of post-conflict stability. 
Finally, this project offers important insights for the policy community.  
Specifically, the results indicate that mediation strategies aimed at facilitating timely 
settlement of civil wars should address the personal security concerns influencing 
leaders’ behavior.  Settlement proposals cannot be expected to succeed if mediators 
do not explicitly address the vulnerabilities of culpable leaders, providing them a 
more favorable post-conflict scenario than they can expect to achieve through 
continued conflict.  This is likely a difficult strategy to implement, however, as 
conciliatory offers towards culpable leaders are likely to be highly unpalatable to a 
variety of domestic and international actors, and culpable leaders will be willing to 
take on high-risk strategies in the hope of achieving victory.   
Mediation efforts in the current Syrian civil war, for example, have thus far 
proven fruitless.  Syrian president and culpable leader Bashar al-Assad faces almost 




opponents national-level political power.  As a result, mediation efforts by Kofi 
Annan last spring collapsed, and renewed diplomatic initiatives by UN special envoy 
to Syria Lakhdar Brahimi last fall failed to produce any progress towards peace.  
Instead, Assad doubled-down on the war effort, turning to increasingly brutal tactics 
toward opponents and civilians alike, including bombardments of Aleppo and the 
suburbs of Damascus, and more recently, the use of chemical weapons against his 
own citizenry.  While Assad’s gamble appears to have succeeded, at least in the short 
term, in shifting momentum toward the Syrian regime, the international community 
continues to seek a negotiated settlement to the conflict.  But world leaders’ calls for 
renewed Syrian peace talks last week at the G-8 are likely to fall on deaf ears.  With 
the exception of Russia, all major international powers envisage a peace deal in which 
Assad steps down and hands over the reins of power to his political opponents.  The 
international community is thus currently unwilling to consider a settlement that 
would secure Assad’s physical security or provide him security against removal from 
power.  Given the incompatibility of Assad’s interests with existing proposals, 
international mediation efforts are unlikely to succeed, and more robust international 
intervention may be needed to bring the Syrian civil war to a timely end.    
 
V. Conclusion 
In early 1996, faced with a faltering peace process, a splintering rebel 
organization, and an opponent intent on ending his career as a rebel, UNITA leader 
Jonas Savimbi told UN representatives in Angola that he feared for his own well-




124).  This brief moment of unfiltered honesty provides a glimpse of what, I argue, is 
in fact a pervasive concern underpinning the strategic decision-making of rebel and 
state leaders during civil war.  Fear of both internal and opponent-based punishment, 
and the desire to avoid it, influences the wartime decisions of culpable leaders and as 
a result, their willingness to end a war and to settle for compromise outcomes.   
 This dissertation has provided extensive evidence that culpable leaders, 
because of their heightened expectation of punishment, are likely to fight longer, to 
experience more extreme outcomes, and to avoid making concessions to end a war.  
As such, it demonstrates the importance of taking leader incentives and characteristics 
into account when developing a comprehensive explanation for civil war termination 
and outcome, as I have attempted to do in the preceding pages.  Future analyses 
should continue to unpack the black box of civil war, examining in further depth the 





















A Appendix: Measurement of Control Variables 
 
 
Relative Power: Data on the relative strength of combatants are adapted from 
Cunningham Gleditsch and Salehyan’s (2009) Non-State Actors dataset.  These 
existing data measure a rebel group’s strength relative to the state on a five point 
scale; rebel groups are coded as much weaker, weaker, at parity, stronger, or much 
stronger than the state.  Using this existing measure, I assign each rebel and state 
actor in the dataset a score from 0 (much weaker) to 4 (much stronger) depending 
upon its strength relative to its adversary.   
In the analysis, two different variations on this scale are used.  First, to test 
hypothesis 1 predicting conflict termination and using a dyadic data structure, I 
measure the strength disparity between combatants.  This variable receives a 0 if the 
state and rebels are at parity, a 1 if one combatant group is stronger than the other, 
and a 2 if one combatant is much stronger than the other.  To test hypotheses 2 
(extreme outcomes) and 3 (concessions), I generate a dummy variable coded 1 for 
extreme strength imbalances between adversaries.  This variable receives a 1 if the 
relevant actor is either much weaker or much stronger than its opponent, while 
receiving a 0 if the combatant is weaker, at parity, or stronger than the opponent.   
 
Third Party Support: Data on military support is adapted from the UCDP External 
Support Dataset (Pettersson 2011).  Two different variables are included in the 




coded 1 if both combatants in the dyad receive foreign military support in a given 
year.  This variable receives a value of 0 for any year in which one or neither 
combatant receives foreign support.  Tests of hypotheses 2 and 3 include a dummy 
variable coded 1 if the relevant state or rebel leader received external support in the 
form of foreign troops at any time during his conflict tenure, and zero otherwise.    
 
Battle-Related Casualties: To measure battle-related deaths, I use data from the 
UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset v.5-2012 (Sundberg 2008), which provides 
yearly information on the total number of battle deaths suffered (both rebel and state) 
in each warring dyad.  The variable used in the conflict termination analysis measures 
the total number of casualties suffered each year, while the variable used in the 
outcome equations (H2 and H3) and the punishment equation (H4) measures the total 
number of fatalities suffered during each leader’s tenure.
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  For leaders who either 
enter or leave power in the middle of the year, that year’s total is divided between the 
leader who exits power and the leader who takes his place according to the number of 
months each was in power during the year.
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  This variable is logged due to its 
skewed distribution. 
 
                                                 
63
 This includes both rebel and state battle deaths during the leader’s tenure.  The 
existing data sources do not distinguish between deaths suffered by the rebels and the 
state. 
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 By dividing the total yearly death count according to the number of moths the 
leader was in power, this coding rule assumes a constant casualty rate throughout the 
year.  While this may not always be the case, data limitations prevent a more exact 
distribution of deaths across leaders who take power or exit leadership positions in 




Democracy: To measure democracy, I use data from the Polity IV project (Marshall 
and Jaggers 2010), which measures a state’s level of democracy on a scale from -10 
to 10.  The variable used in the analysis is a dummy variable coded 1 if the state 
receives a 7 or higher on the polity2 scale, and zero otherwise.  This variable is 
measured yearly for the termination equation, and is coded based upon the polity2 
score at the end of each leader’s tenure for the war outcome equations. 
 
Incompatibility (Stakes of War): The variable used to measure the stakes of war is 
taken from the UCDP Dyadic Conflict Dataset (Themnér and Wallensteen 2012).  It 
is coded 0 for governmental (i.e. center-seeking) conflicts and 1 for secessionist 
conflicts.    
 
ICC Signatory: The ICC signatory variable included in the war termination analysis 
is measured with a dummy variable coded 1 in the year a state signs the Rome 
Statute, and in each subsequent year.  The variable receives a zero in all other dyad 
years.  Information used to code this variable is available from the ICC’s website.  
 
Rebel Political Wing: To measure the presence of a rebel political wing, I use a 
dummy variable from Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan’s (2009) Non-State 
Actor dataset.  This variable is coded 1 if the rebel group involved in the conflict has 





Mediation: This variable measures whether third party mediation attempts were 
made during each leader’s tenure.  The variable is coded 1 if mediation was present, 
and 0 if no mediation attempts were made.  Data on the occurrence of mediation is 
adapted from the Civil Wars Mediation Dataset (DeRouen, Bercovitch, and 
Pospieszna 2011). 
 
Population: The state’s population is also included as a control in the termination 
equation.  Data on national-level population come from the Penn World Table 
Version 7.1 (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2012), which provide information on state 
population between the years 1950 and 2010.  The natural log of population is used in 
the analysis to account for the highly skewed nature of the variable, and is measured 
yearly. 
 
GDP Per Capita: Country-level gross domestic product per capita is also included as 
a control in the termination equation.  These data also come from the Pen World 
Table Version 7.1 (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2012).  The natural log of GDP per 
capita is included in the empirical analysis, and is measured yearly. 
 
Leader Conflict Tenure/Duration: The measure of leader conflict tenure is a count 
of the number of months the relevant leader presides over the conflict.  The natural 






Time Controls (War Duration model only): A counter for the number of years 
since the start of the war is included in the war termination model, along with the 
squared and cubed terms of this counter.  These time controls are included to account 
for duration dependence.    
 
Leader location: This is an indicator variable used in the punishment equation (H4) 
to identify where the leader is based.  This variable is coded 1 if the leader lives 
primarily outside of the state in which the conflict is being fought, and zero 
otherwise.  The coding of this variable is based upon original research. 
 
Term limits: This dummy variable, included in the punishment equation (H4), is 
coded 1 if a leader faces term limits, and zero otherwise.  It is coded based upon 
original research.   
 
Transitional leaders: This variable, also included in the punishment equation (H4), 
is a dummy variable coded 1 if a leader is a transitional leader, and zero otherwise.  A 
leader is coded as transitional if he or she comes to power with the explicit 
mandate/intention to preside over a period of regime change before stepping down for 








Table A.1 Descriptive Statistics for Control Variables 
War Termination Model     
Variable Min Max Mean Mode 
Relative Power 2 4 3.33 3 
ICC Signatory 0 1 0.21 0 
Balanced Interventions 0 1 0.32 0 
Casualties (ln) 0 9.397 4.24 -- 
Democracy 0 1 0.28 0 
Population (ln) 5.95 12.34 10.02 -- 
GDP Per Capita (ln) 5.08 10.24 7.76 -- 
War Duration 1 48 9.699 -- 
War Duration Squared 1 2304 167.94 -- 
War Duration Cubed 1 110592 4000.06 -- 
Extreme Outcomes and Political Concessions Models 
Variable Min Max Mean Mode 
Strength Imbalance 0 1 0.34 0 
Casualties (ln) 0 10.99 5.45 -- 
Mediation 0 1 0.43 0 
External Troop Support 0 1 0.05 0 
Incompatibility 0 1 0.39 0 
Leader Conf Duration (ln) 0 5.69 2.85 -- 
Rebel Political Wing 0 1 0.39 0 
Democracy 0 1 0.17 0 
Leader Punishment Model     
Variable Min Max Mean Mode 
Casualties (ln) 0 10.99 5.81 -- 
Leader Conf Duration (ln) 0 6.27 3.04 -- 
Leader Location 0 1 0.07 0 
Term Limits 0 1 0.11 0 





B Appendix: Regime Type and Culpability 
 
 
I. Culpability and Personalist Regimes  
 This appendix addresses the relationship between regime type and leader 
culpability.  Existing research on interstate conflict finds that culpability’s influence 
on interstate war outcomes is conditional on regime type.  Specifically, culpable 
democratic leaders are more vulnerable to removal from power than culpable 
nondemocratic leaders.  Accordingly, culpable democrats are more responsive to the 
pressures of culpability than culpable non-democrats, being more likely to achieve 
favorable war outcomes than culpable autocrats because of the increased threat of 
removal from power (Croco 2011).  Given the conditional relationship between 
culpability and regime type for leaders in interstate conflicts, it may be the case that 
culpability is similarly conditioned by regime type in the context of civil war.   
 
1.1 Why Culpability’s Impact may be Conditional on Regime Type 
The regime-type designation that is particularly relevant in the current 
context, however, is that between personalist and non-personalist regimes.  Weeks 
(2008) argues that scholars generally underestimate the extent to which 
nondemocratic leaders can be held accountable by domestic audiences.  It is 
personalist regimes, she argues, that exhibit the classic characteristics generally 
attributed to autocracies more broadly.  Specifically, the crucial distinction between 




non-personalist regimes, even single-party or military governments, can coordinate to 
sanction or remove a leader, whereas those in personalist regimes cannot.
65
   
Personalist leaders can avoid punishment by domestic audiences for two 
reasons.  First, they have monitoring and coercive capacities to punish individuals 
who oppose them, and second, elites’ fates in personalist regimes are closely linked to 
that of the leader (Weeks 2008).  Leaders of personalist regimes control (1) the 
security organs of the state and (2) political appointments (Geddes 1999, 2003).  
Control over the security apparatus and appointments allows personalist leaders to fill 
influential positions in the government and the security apparatus with only trusted 
associates, and to undercut any potential coordination among elites against his rule.  
Control of the security apparatus ensures that the personalist leader can arrest, 
demote, imprison, or execute critics of his rule.  Control of political appointments, 
furthermore, ensures that the leader can use promotions and demotions, as well as 
rotation of political elites, to prevent potential political challengers from building 
independent power bases (Geddes 2003; Weeks 2008).   Furthermore, elites in 
personalist regimes will be disincentivized against removing the leader because their 
own positions of political power are dependent upon the maintenance of the 
personalist leader.  Elites lack independent political bases, are compromised by the 
regime’s corruption, and are often dependent upon state or party offices for their 
livelihood, lacking independent, private capital holdings (Weeks 2008). 
Elites in personalist regimes, therefore, cannot sanction the leader without 
jeopardizing their own political (or physical) survival.  This suggests that personalist 
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 While Weeks is focused on how leaders generate audience costs to signal resolve, 




leaders should be insulated against internal punishment, as insider elites face a 
coordination problem that prevents them from collaborating to remove a personalist 
leader from office.  This trend is generally observable in the data, furthermore.  As 
Figure B.1 demonstrates, 43 percent of non-personalist leaders are punished, while 
only 36 percent of personalist leaders face punishment.  While this seven percentage 
point difference is relatively small, it does provide initial evidence in support of the 
idea that personalist leaders are less vulnerable to punishment than non-personalist 
leaders.   
 
 







Given that punishing the leader is the key causal mechanism in the culpability 
argument developed in this dissertation, Weeks’s (2008) argument and the trend in 
Table B.1 suggest that the important regime-type distinction, that which may 
condition the impact of culpability, is not between democracies and autocracies, but 
instead between personalist and non-personalist regimes.  Further, Weeks’s findings 
have important implications for the relationship between culpability and civil war 
termination and outcomes.  If personalist leaders are insulated against punishment by 
insider elites, even when they preside over policy failures such as wartime losses, 
then culpability should have little impact on the likelihood of leader punishment 
among personalist leaders.  Culpable personalist leaders, who will be viewed as 
responsible for wartime losses by winning coalition members, can avoid punishment 
because regime elites lack the ability and incentive to punish these leaders for their 
poor wartime performance.     
Because personalist, culpable leaders can avoid internal punishment, they 
should be less responsive to the pressures of culpability when it comes to their 
wartime decision-making.  Because they face no greater threat of punishment than 
non-culpable leaders, culpable personalist leaders will face no incentive to fight 
longer or harder in a gamble for resurrection or to avoid concessions-making at war 
termination.  This suggests that, among personalist leaders, culpability should not 







1.2 Why Culpability’s Impact may Not be Conditional on Regime Type 
 There are other reasons, however, to expect that culpability will affect leader 
behavior regardless of regime type.  That is, even personalist leaders may face 
incentives to gamble for resurrection and avoid making concessions to an opponent.   
 This expectation follows from the unique nature of punishment in the context 
of civil war.  Unlike in the interstate war context, leaders during civil war face a 
threat of punishment not only from within their own winning coalitions, but also by 
their civil war opponents.  The regime characteristics that insulate personalist leaders 
against internal punishment – control over the security apparatus and political 
appointments – have no bearing on the ability of opponent elites to punish the 
adversary’s leader.  Unlike internal regime elites, opponent elites do not face a 
coordination problem in attempting to sanction their adversary’s personalist leader 
because their fates are unconnected to that of the personalist adversary leader.  
Opponent-based punishment, therefore, should still be possible when a personalist 
leader is in power. 
 Further, in addition to the incentives opponent elites have to punish a culpable 
adversary leader, they may have additional incentives to seek punishment when the 
opposing forces are led by a culpable personalist leader.  The highly centralized 
organizational structure of personalist regimes means that the personalist leader exerts 
a high level of control over decision-making on military and political personnel and 
promotions, strategy, and tactics.  Because decision-making authority is concentrated 
in the individual in these hierarchically organized regimes, adversary elites may 




its war effort and increasing their own chances of victory.
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  A personalist 
organizational structure, therefore, may incentivize opponent elites to seek removal of 
the culpable personalist leader. 
 And in fact, when data on leader punishment is broken down by the source of 
that punishment (i.e. internal or opponent-based), personalist leaders are slightly more 
likely than non-personalist leaders to face punishment by the opponent.  Figure B.2 
shows that punishment, regardless of source, is slightly more likely for non-
personalists than personalists.  This trend continues when looking only at internal 
punishment: non-personalist leaders are punished internally 29 percent of the time 
while personalists are punished internally in only 22 percent of cases.  As expected, 
however, this trend reverses when examining only opponent-based punishment.  Non-
personalist leaders are punished by the opponent in 18 percent of cases while 
personalist leaders face opponent-based punishment slightly more often, 21 percent of 
the time.  These trends, therefore, provide preliminary support for the idea that the 
impact of punishment is not dependent upon regime type because of the different 
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 This justification is commonly used by counterinsurgency strategists; that 
decapitation of the organization by removing the leader will lead to the military 
defeat of the group (Johnston 2012; Price 2012).  What scholars studying the effects 
of decapitation strategies fail to account for, however, is the political organization of 
the group.  That is, they fail to recognize that decapitation of the organization is likely 








II. Theoretical Expectations 
The above theoretical discussion suggests that culpable personalist leaders 
should be insulated against internal punishment, but should face at least as high an 
expectation of opponent-based punishment as culpable non-personalist leaders.  This 
implies that the overall threat of punishment is diminished only slightly for 
personalist culpable leaders, relative to non-personalist culpable leaders, and that 
culpability should still significantly decrease the likelihood of conflict termination 
and political concessions, while increasing the likelihood of extreme outcomes and 
leader punishment, even among personalist leaders.  The following hypotheses result 




Hypothesis B1: Culpability will significantly decrease the likelihood of conflict 
termination when a personalist leader is in power. 
 
Hypothesis B2: Among personalist leaders, culpability will significantly increase the 
likelihood of extreme war outcomes. 
 
Hypothesis B3: Among personalist leaders, culpability will significantly decrease the 
probability of political concessions at termination. 
 
Hypothesis B4: Culpable, personalist leaders will be significantly more likely to 
experience punishment than non-culpable, personalist leaders.  
 
 
III. Research Design and Data 
 To test these theoretical expectations, I use the same datasets used for the 
analyses in chapters 3 and 4, with one notable addition:  I code an additional variable 
which measures each leader’s regime type.  Specifically, I code each leader in the 
dataset as either personalist (1) or non-personalist (0) based upon the following 
coding rules.  The key criteria used for coding a leader as personalist include: (1) the 
leader personally controls the security apparatus and (2) access to political office is 
dependent upon the leader (Geddes 2003).   
 Data on state leaders’ regime types comes from Geddes, Wright and Frantz’s 




types between 1946 and 2010.  There is no existing cross-national data on rebel 
groups’ regime types.  I therefore did original research on each rebel leader in order 
to classify him or her as personalist or non-personalist leader.  I followed the two key 
coding rules listed above when coding rebel leaders’ types, coding the rebel leader as 
personalist if he met both criteria.   
Vellupillai Prabhakaran of the LTTE, for example, is coded as a personalist 
rebel leader.  Sources describe him as enjoying ‘absolute power’ as supreme leader of 
the LTTE, which was reflected in the fact that LTTE cadres were required to not only 
pledge allegiance to the organization, but to Prabhakaran himself.  The LTTE leader 
was both Chairman of the group’s Central Committee and Commander in Chief of its 
military wing, and evidence indicates that he exerted tight control over appointments 
to both branches of the organization.  Further, he punished any challenges to his rule 
quickly, harshly and violently, thereby maintaining tight control over the organization 
throughout his decades-long rule.  
 Coding regime type for rebel leaders is quite difficult in some cases, as there 
are many rebel groups for which very little is known about their internal political or 
organizational structures.  Due to lack of available information, I was unable to code 
leader type for 26 rebel leaders.  These leaders are consequently excluded from the 
analyses below.  The results, therefore, should be treated as preliminary and 
suggestive rather than authoritative.  Table B.1 provides information on the 







Table B. 1 Leader's Regime Type during Civil War 






Non-Personalist 354 (78%) 211 (74%) 143 (86%) 
Personalist 99 (22%) 75 (26%) 24 (14%) 




 To test hypotheses B1 to B4, I reran each of the main analyses using a split-
sample.  That is, I ran each model separately on the sub-sample of non-personalist 
leaders and then again on the sub-sample of personalist leaders.  This allows me to 
test whether culpability has an impact on war outcomes and punishment for both 
personalist and non-personalist leaders.  
 
3.1 War Termination 
 The results of each analysis are presented below.  I begin with the test of 
hypothesis B1 regarding civil war termination.  Model 1 in Table B.2 presents the 
results of the war termination analysis for the non-personalist leader subsample, and 
model 2 in Table B.2 presents the results for the analysis run on the subsample of 
civil conflict dyad years in which at least one personalist leader is in power.
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 There are not enough dyad years in which both leaders are personalist to run the 




Table B. 2 Logit Results for Termination, Personalist/Non-Personalist Samples 
 Neither Leader 
Personalist 
At Least One Personalist 
Leader 
   








   








   













   






   
















   











   






   











Observations 479 496 





 As the results in Table B.2 show, one leader culpable and both leaders 
culpable are negative and significant in both models.  This indicates, as expected, that 
even among the sub-set of dyad years in which a personalist leader is in power, 
culpability significantly decreases the likelihood of conflict termination.  That is, 
having a one or two culpable leaders in power makes civil conflict more difficult to 
terminate.    
 
 
3.2 War Outcomes 
 Table B.3 presents the result of the analysis of extreme war outcomes.  Model 
1 in Table B.3 presents the analysis using non-personalist leaders only, while Model 2 
presents the results when including only personalist leaders in the sample.  As these 
results demonstrate, leader culpability is a positive, significant predictor of extreme 
war outcomes in both samples.  That is, as predicted in hypothesis B2, among 
personalist leaders (model 2), culpability significantly increases the likelihood that a 
leader experiences an extreme war outcome.  This result indicates, as expected, that 
culpability’s impact on extreme war outcomes is not conditional on regime type; 








Table B. 3 Logit Results for Extreme Outcome, Personalist/Non-Personalist 
Samples 
 Non-Personalist Leader Personalist Leader 









   






   









   









   




   











Observations 136 53 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on conflict. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
 
3.3 Political Concessions 
 The results for the test of Hypothesis B3 on political concessions are 
presented in Table B.4.  As before, Model 1 presents the results run on the sub-
sample of non-personalist leaders, while Model 2 presents the results of the analysis 
run on the sub-sample of personalist leaders.  Hypothesis B3 predicted that among 




leader makes concessions to end a civil war.   
 
 
Table B. 4 Logit Results for Political Concessions, Personalist/Non-Personalist 
Samples 
 Non-Personalist Leader Personalist Leader 


































   











   








   









Observations 136 53 




 Unlike the results discussed thus far, the results for political concessions are 




the likelihood of political concessions among non-personalist leaders (model 1), but 
while the effect is negative, as expected, for the personalist leader subsample (model 
2), the effect is not significant.  This indicates that culpability’s effect on the 
likelihood that a leader makes political concessions to end a conflict may be 
conditional on regime type.  These results are based upon a very small sample 
(N=53), however, so should be treated with some caution.   
 
3.4 Leader Punishment 
 Finally, the results for the test of Hypothesis B4 on the likelihood of 
punishment are presented in Table B.5.  Model 1 presents the results for the non-
personalist sub-sample, while Model 2 presents the results for the personalist sub-
sample.  These models include an interaction term between culpability and war 
performance, so to better understand the statistical significance and substantive 




















Table B. 5 Logit Results for Leader Punishment, Personalist/Non-Personalist 
Samples 














   

















   




   




   




















Observations 335 92 




 The left-hand side of Figure B.3 presents the change in the predicted 
probability of punishment across different war outcomes when moving from a 
baseline non-culpable leader to a culpable leader, within the sub-sample of non-
personalist leaders.  The right-hand side of Figure B.3, on the other hand, presents the 




personalist leaders instead.  As expected, the results for the non-personalist sub-
sample reflect those from the original analysis.  Culpability significantly increases the 
likelihood of punishment for leaders who perform poorly and for leaders who only 
manage to maintain the status quo.   
 
 





 Among personalist leaders, the results are slightly different.  As predicted in 
Hypothesis B4, among personalist leaders, culpability significantly increases the 




the war.  Culpability also increases the likelihood of punishment for personalist 
leaders who achieve the status quo, but this effect is not significant, unlike in the non-
personalist subsample.  Finally, culpability actually decreases the likelihood of 
punishment for personalist leaders who perform favorably in civil war, although this 
effect is again not significant.   
 These results suggest that culpability’s impact on leader punishment is slightly 
impacted by regime type.  While personalist regime type cannot save a culpable 
leader who suffers wartime losses, it does appear to mitigate the impact of culpability 




 This appendix has examined the potential conditionality of culpability on 
regime type.  While culpability’s impact on war outcomes has been shown to be 
conditional on regime type during interstate war, I argued that the unique dual sources 
of punishment that leaders face during civil war mitigate any regime type 
conditionality in the relationship between culpability and each of the outcome 
examined in this dissertation during civil war.  While leaders of personalist regimes 
are insulated against internal punishment due to the coordination problem faced by 
elites in these regimes, personalist regime leaders are just as likely, if not more so, to 
face punishment at the hands of their wartime opponent.  Based upon these theoretical 
arguments, I hypothesized that culpability would decrease the likelihood of 




while increasing the likelihood of extreme outcomes and punishment among both 
non-personalist and personalist leaders. 
Overall, the results presented above provide relatively strong support for my 
expectation that culpability’s impact on war termination, war outcome, concessions, 
and leader punishment is not conditional on regime type.  Culpability has a significant 
impact on termination and extreme war outcomes, even among personalist leaders.  
Further, it increases the likelihood of punishment among personalist leaders who 
perform poorly in war.  Only culpability’s impact on political concessions appears to 
be conditional upon culpability: personalist, culpable leaders are no less likely to 





C Appendix: Additional Tables and Figures 
 
This appendix includes additional tables and figures excluded from Chapters 3 
and 4 due to space considerations.  Additionally, it includes Receiver Operating 
Characteristic (ROC) curves as a model fit diagnostic for each of the four main 
analysis presented in the main text. 
 
 







 The ROC curves presented in Figure C.1 plot the true positive rate against the 
false positive rate for each of the main analyses.  This provides a measure of accuracy 
for each model, and thus the goodness of fit.  The area under a ROC curve can range 
from 0.5 (very poor fit – the plotted line will follow the 45 degree line) to 1.0 (perfect 
accuracy – the plotted line will follow the left-hand side and then the top of the graph 
region).  As Figure C.1 demonstrates, the area under the ROC curve for the main 
models presented in chapters 3 and 4 ranges from 0.736 to 0.869, with the lowest area 
for the war termination equation and the highest for the political concessions 
equation.  These values indicate that the models range from good to excellent in terms 
of their level of accuracy.   
 
 
Additional Results Tables from Chapter 3 
 The tables below are those not presented in full in Chapter 3 due to space 
limitations.  First, Table C.1 presents the full results table for the main analysis of 
civil war termination.  These are the same results as those in Figure 3.1 from the main 
text, but Table C.1 includes the time controls and constant, which were omitted from 









Table C. 1 Logit Results for Probability of Civil War Termination 
 B S.E. P-Value 
    
One Culpable Leader -0.746 (0.372) 0.045 
    
Both Leaders Culpable -1.199 (0.379) 0.002 
    
Strength Disparity -0.138 (0.208) 0.509 
    
ICC Signatory 0.860 (0.223) 0.000 
    
Balanced Interventions -0.366 (0.248) 0.139 
    
Casualties (ln) -0.110 (0.050) 0.027 
    
Democracy -0.474 (0.371) 0.202 
    
Population(ln) -0.342 (0.108) 0.002 
    
GDP Per Capita (ln) 0.088 (0.123) 0.472 
    
War Duration -0.378 (0.101) 0.000 
    
War Duration Squared 0.026 (0.008) 0.001 
    
War Duration Cubed -0.000 (0.000) 0.004 
    
Constant 3.472 (1.424) 0.015 
Observations 1038   
Estimated using logistic regression. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on conflict dyad.  





 Table C.2 presents the predicted probabilities, first differences, and percentage 
changes for the control variables included in the war termination and extreme 
outcomes models from Chapter 3.  The discussion of control variables presented in 
the main text focused on the political concessions model only, and these tables were 





Table C. 2 First Differences and Percentage Changes for Control Variables 
I. War Termination Model 













































I. Extreme Outcomes Model 


















































 percentile for continuous variables) while holding all other covariates at 
mean or modal values. First differences are computed by subtracting the baseline predicted 
probability (covariate at low value) from the predicted probability following the change in the 
covariate of interest. I then divide the discrete change by the baseline probability and multiply 





 Table C.3 corresponds to Figure 3.8 in Chapter 3; it provides full results for 
the war termination model using a four-category DV. 
 
Table C. 3 Multinomial Logit Results for Type of Civil War Termination 





vs. Other  
Both Leaders Culpable 1.097 2.018 0.513 
 (0.400) (0.807) (0.614) 
 0.006 0.012 0.403 
    
Strength Disparity 0.730 1.475 0.680 
 (0.341) (0.539) (0.458) 
 0.033 0.006 0.138 
    
ICC Signatory -1.272 -0.737 -0.450 
 (0.344) (0.559) (0.558) 
 0.000 0.187 0.420 
    
Balanced Interventions -0.089 -0.641 -0.871 
 (0.341) (0.586) (0.607) 
 0.795 0.274 0.151 
    
Casualties (ln) 0.270 0.505 0.148 
 (0.066) (0.143) (0.109) 
 0.000 0.000 0.174 
    
Democracy 0.614 0.270 0.127 
 (0.625) (0.911) (0.885) 
 0.326 0.767 0.886 
    
Population(ln) 0.559 0.318 0.367 
 (0.139) (0.272) (0.219) 
 0.000 0.242 0.094 
    
GDP Per Capita (ln) -0.035 -0.319 0.389 
 (0.183) (0.317) (0.316) 
 0.849 0.315 0.219 
    
Constant -5.893 -7.246 -8.443 
 (1.764) (2.883) (2.848) 
 0.001 0.012 0.003 
Observations 1038   
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on conflict dyad. P-values in third row. Time controls 




 Table C.4 presents the full results table that corresponds with Table 3.8 in 
chapter 3.  This presents the results of the multinomial logit model for war outcome 
using a four-category DV: military loss, negotiated loss, negotiated win, and military 
victory.  
 
Table C. 4 Multinomial Logit Results for Civil War Outcome, Negotiated Loss 
Base Category 
 Military Loss vs. 
Negotiated Loss 
Negotiated Win vs. 
Negotiated Loss 
Military Win vs. 
Negotiated Loss  
Culpability 1.053 1.237 1.845 
 (0.633) (0.520) (0.683) 
 0.096 0.017 0.007 
Strength Imbalance 1.958 0.090 2.154 
 (0.782) (0.321) (0.777) 
 0.012 0.779 0.006 
Casualties (ln) 0.460 -0.062 0.574 
 (0.161) (0.067) (0.165) 
 0.004 0.358 0.000 
Mediation -3.523 0.474 -3.396 
 (0.786) (0.264) (0.797) 
 0.000 0.072 0.000 
External Troop Support 0.666 -1.178 1.368 
 (1.312) (1.631) (0.935) 
 0.612 0.470 0.143 
Incompatibility 1.685 0.015 1.375 
 (0.656) (0.202) (0.659) 
 0.010 0.940 0.037 
Leader Conflict 
Duration (ln) 
-0.960 0.188 -0.942 
(0.261) (0.181) (0.240) 
 0.000 0.298 0.000 
Rebel Political Wing -1.182 0.235 -1.382 
 (0.683) (0.234) (0.688) 
 0.084 0.316 0.045 
Democracy -0.220 -0.099 0.006 
 (0.925) (0.211) (1.033) 
 0.812 0.638 0.996 
Constant 0.938 -1.346 -0.584 
 (0.961) (0.725) (0.923) 
 0.330 0.064 0.527 
Observations 207   





 Finally, Table C.5 presents the table of coefficient estimates corresponding to 
the post-estimation results presented in Figure 3.10 in chapter 3.  This table provides 
the results of the analysis of favorable war outcomes, using an interaction term 
between leader culpability and the combatant group’s relative strength. 
 
 
Table C. 5 Logit Results for Favorable War Outcomes 
 B S.E. P-Value 
Culpability 0.285 (0.527) 0.588 
    
Relative Strength -0.251 (0.419) 0.549 
    
Culpability X Relative Strength 0.737 (0.416) 0.076 
    
Casualties (ln) 0.013 (0.038) 0.721 
    
Mediation 0.427 (0.182) 0.019 
    
External Support 0.517 (0.324) 0.111 
    
Loss of Troop Support -2.290 (0.573) 0.000 
    
Leader Conflict Duration (ln) 0.182 (0.085) 0.033 
    
Constant -1.489 (0.593) 0.012 
Observations 207   
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